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Has the authority of the sovereign state system undergone a fundamental 
transformation in recent decades? This dissertation seeks to: 1) offer a critical 
examination of claims regarding the perceived fracture and erosion of sovereign state 
authority; 2) contribute to the task of building a theoretical framework to study the power 
and authority of the sovereign state system and its changes over time; 3) find evidence of 
patterns in how the nature of that power and authority changes over time and across 
different political organizations in the context of war. Theoretically, the characterization 
of the threat non-state combatants pose to the authority of the state system neglects 
relations of power between those who hold privilege within that system and those who 
are excluded from its benefits. Empirically, there has been an absence of systematic study 
of potential authoritative transformations that is both historically and geographically 
broad. This dissertation analyzes the language of justification for war – as expressions of 
political authority - used by political and military leaders from 1618-2008, employing a 
combination of fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) with interpretive 
case analysis to determine the constellations of conditions which drive the use of 
 	  
justification for war. Findings indicate that non-state actors are not challenging the 
authoritative logic underlying the sovereign state system; rather, the use of sovereign 
rights logics of justification in asymmetrical conflicts indicates a desire to access the 
benefits and privileges of that system. When interpreted through a post-colonial and 
critical race lens, these claims appear as a challenge to exclusion that is largely rooted in 
a legacy of racialized colonial subjugation. Relations of power, embedded in a state 
system that developed through imperial conquest and colonial domination, drive the use 
of justification frames. Thus, low power actors may in fact threaten the stability of the 
sovereign state system, but not in the manner characterized by the fracture narrative. The 
threat is not to the authoritative logic of the system, but rather to the uneven distribution 
of the powers and privileges of that system that stems from a legacy of colonization, 
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Chapter 1 The Ever Transforming State 
 
Introduction 
The sovereign state system, its origins, power, and influence have been dominant 
themes in comparative and historical scholarship for decades. Since the 1990s, much of 
this scholarship has turned its attention to the perceived decline of the sovereign state 
system, the erosion of its power, and the undermining of its authority by myriad forces. 
Transformations in the dynamics of warfare have been central to this scholarship, in 
particular the perceived rising influence of transnational combatant forces operating 
across and beyond national boundaries. Much attention has been given to the globalizing 
factors that allow war to take on a character distinct from the state-centered boundaries 
that have defined it for much of the modern era, and the danger that such a transformation 
may hold for global security. However, systematic analysis of the extent to which such a 
fundamental transformation has actually occurred has remained underdeveloped.  
Has the authority of the sovereign state system in fact undergone a fundamental 
transformation since the end of the Cold War? This dissertation is situated within this 
overarching question, and seeks to achieve three major objectives: first, to offer a critical 
examination of claims regarding the perceived fracture and erosion of sovereign state 
authority; second, to contribute to the task of building a theoretical framework to study 
the power and authority of the sovereign state system and its changes over time; third, to 
find evidence of patterns in how the nature of that power and authority changes over time 
and across different political organizations in the context of war.  
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To achieve these objectives, I focus my analysis on justifications for war-making 
among political and military leaders throughout the history of the modern sovereign state 
system, from 1618-2008. The study of war-making has been central to many analyses of 
the state system within comparative, historical, and political scholarship, exemplified by 
Tilly’s famous adage that “war makes states, and vice versa” (1992). Beyond the 
centrality of war, broadly speaking, within this field of scholarship, justifications for war 
in particular are an extremely useful object of analysis to examine the political authority 
and its transformations over time. War requires widespread coordination of wills and 
resources; that is, in order to obtain the material and moral support necessary to wage 
war, leaders need to publicly articulate to their constituent population why war is 
appropriate and actionable in a manner that they expect to resonate with the public’s 
perceptions of legitimate authority. Justifications for war, therefore, provide the historical 
documentation necessary to track how political authority is conceived of in particular 
historical and social contexts.    
 
Context 
Scholarship on the sovereign state in the post-Cold war era has focused 
extensively on the perceived fracturing and erosion of boundaries: territorial boundaries 
between nations, ideological boundaries between politics and religion, and temporal 
boundaries between war and peace. This fracture narrative has typically depicted the 
consequences of this boundary erosion as chaotic and destructive: without the protective 
blanket of sovereign state authority that has dominated the political organization of war 
for the past 500 years, millions of lives and the future security of the world hangs on a 
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precarious thread. While such claims abound, two major implications of this assertion 
have remained largely unexamined. 
The first of these relates to an issue of historical perspective. Many of the 
inquiries into the erosion of state sovereign authority have focused solely on the 
challenges posed by non-state actors in the post-Cold War era; there has not been 
sufficient attention to the development and transformation in the conceptual strength of 
sovereign state authority over the historical course of the sovereign state system. As a 
result, scholarship embedded within the fracture narrative carries an implicit presentist 
fallacy whereby the sovereign authority of past centuries appears stable and secure, while 
its current status appears much more precarious. What is needed, therefore, is a broader 
historical analysis that more critically engages with the ways in which the authority of the 
sovereign state system has been contested and incomplete throughout its history. 
The second implication relates to an implicit Eurocentrism. While much attention 
is paid to non-state combatant actors and they threat they pose to the stability of the 
modern state system, there has been very little critical examination of the geographic, 
historic, and racial meanings packed within the term “non-state actor,” who are likely to 
include groups who have been colonized by Western powers, racially marginalized, and 
distanced or excluded from the state system. It is therefore important to situate the violent 
actions, military struggles, and political organization of such non-state actors in the 
context of a history of European-driven colonial domination and marginalization from 
systems of power. Scholarship embedded within the fracture narrative, I argue, are 
missing a key part of the story: for most of the world, the sovereign state system and its 
authority was imposed through colonization and a power hierarchy of exclusion, it did 
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not necessarily “win out” over competing forms of political authority as Spruyt (1994) 
has described in the context of European history. I argue that this makes a fundamental 
difference in how we assess the history, current status, and future prospects of the 
sovereign state, particularly in terms of how scholars conceive of the threat posed by non-
state actors to the authority of the state system. 
Guided by a postcolonial, critical race perspective, I argue that a more historically 
rigorous analysis of conceptions of legitimate authority among combatant actors at 
various levels of integration within the state system will result in a very different vision 
of the current status and future prospects of the international system of sovereign states. 
Rather than the authority of states fracturing under the weight of challenges from non-
state actors who have been empowered by globalizing forces in recent decades, we can 
understand the sovereign state system as a site of constant political struggle throughout 
its history, its authority constructed in continuous interaction with challenges to that 
authority in a historical context of imperial expansion, racial formation, colonial 
domination, and post-colonial resistance. The challenges to state authority witnessed in 
recent decades are therefore not a new threat, but one small part of a much larger story of 
change, struggle, and continuity. In other words, the more things have changed in the 
state system, the more they have stayed the same. 
 
Plan of Research 
It is necessary, therefore, to examine the story of the sovereign state system and 
its authority from two lenses simultaneously: as a story of temporal transformation as 
well as a story of structural integration. Starting from the premise that justifications for 
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war-making reflect conceptions of legitimate political authority in particular historical 
and social contexts, this dissertation will address two central research questions: 
1. To what extent do justifications for war-making in the post-
Cold War era reflect a fundamental transformation in the 
way the authority of the sovereign state system is 
conceived? 
2. What constellations of conditions, particularly those related 
to the political organization and state system integration of 
combatant groups, lead to the use of particular logical and 
discursive frames to justify war-making? 
Justifications for war-making provide a unique window through which we can 
examine patterns in conceptions of legitimate political authority across different types of 
political organizations and over time. By uncovering these patterns, I intend to contribute 
theoretically to the conversation on state sovereignty in current sociological and political 
scholarship by offering an analysis of this system which accounts for the historical 
intersections between imperial expansion, colonial domination, racial formation, and 
post-colonial resistance. War initiation provides a historical rupture in which political 
authority needs to be publicly articulated in order to gain the material and moral support 
necessary to wage it. I therefore analyze only justifications for the initiation of war, and 
not arguments related to brokering peace. Although an analysis of settlement negotiations 
and peace treaties could likewise provide valuable information on conceptions of political 
authority, including an analysis on the ends of wars would introduce a set of 
considerations that are beyond the scope of the current study. Likewise, while I focus on 
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justifications for war-making as evidence of widely held conceptions of legitimate 
political authority, this analysis can not speak to the resonance of particular arguments for 
or against going to war. Rather, I group these particular arguments into frameworks of 
justification, and employ these frames as evidence of broadly held conceptions of 
legitimate political authority that political and military leaders invoke with the 
understanding that they will be (or should be) considered in alignment with prevailing 
conceptions of legitimate authority.  
In the following section, I detail the theoretical foundations on which the current 
analysis rests. I begin by describing what I refer to as the fracture narrative: a dominant 
theme in post-Cold War scholarship on the state system which is focused on the declining 
power of the international system of sovereign states and the dangers entailed in the 
erosion of the authority of that system in the face of non-state challengers. My critique of 
this narrative, which highlights the need for a historically and geographically broad 
analysis that accounts for experiences of colonial domination and subjugation as well as 
state system integration and exclusion, leads to the theoretical framework that guides my 
research approach, namely, an integration of historical and cultural institutionalist 
theories of the state with critical race and post-colonial perspectives. This theoretical 
framework guides my methodological approach; a fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA) that is used to reveal the causal configurations associated with 
particular justification frames. A small-n interpretive analysis is also used to highlight 
interesting patterns and explore questions raised by the fuzzy-sets analysis.  
Taken together, these analyses reveal a very different story of the state system and 
transformations in its authority than the one told by the fracture narrative. Rather than a 
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dangerous erosion of boundaries and fracturing of the state’s authority, we are able to 
conceive of transformations in political authority as ongoing processes that grow out of 
the interactions between the weak and the powerful. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Foundations 
 
Sovereignty: the idea and structure of political authority 
Sovereignty, in its broadest definition, is the principle of supreme and overarching 
authority within a geographic space (Phillpott 2001). As such it is both abstract and 
concrete: it is an idea about the legitimacy of authority as well as a concrete 
manifestation of political organization. As a concept, sovereignty as understood within 
international relations scholarship and political philosophy first emerged during the 
European Middle Ages, and has since taken on a variety of ideational and institutional 
forms. In both idea and structure, sovereignty is a social construct rooted in time and 
place (Biersteker & Weber 1996). As a social construct, it is pervasive, stubborn, and 
fluid. It is constructed in specific social contexts, and its normative power in turn shapes 
social reality, creating a sense of what legitimate authority means and who has it, as well 
as contributing to the institutional structures through which its power is manifest.  
Since the 17th century, political sovereignty has ideationally and organizationally 
manifested as state sovereignty. The sovereign state is typically identified as the form of 
political organization that emerged within the Westphalian transformation in the latter 
half of the 17th century (Axtmann 1996). It is at this point that the concept of the “state” 
as a political and governing body became intimately connected with territorial continuity 
and clear geographic boundaries. Territorial consolidation, mutual recognition, internal 
centralization and external autonomy provided the foundations of sovereign authority 
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(Axtmann 2004, Parekh 2002). Prior to the Westphalian transformation, political 
authority in Europe was conceived in an overlapping web of allegiances to local nobility, 
guilds, and the Church, to name but a few, as well as the ever-changing web of alliances 
between any and all of these loci of authority. Although sovereignty is broadly 
understood as authority within a geographic space, it is the mutual exclusivity of that 
authoritative space that made the modern sovereign state distinct from the political 
organizations of medieval Europe that came before. The sovereign state emerged as a 
system of political organization rooted in mutual exclusivity and physical differentiation 
(Brubaker 1992). These qualities, as well as the ideational and institutional definitions of 
sovereignty, are crucial to understanding how the modern system of sovereign political 
authority has transformed over time. Although state sovereignty has been the dominant 
form of political authority in the modern era, how this authority has been conceptualized 
and institutionally manifest has not been consistent or universal. Because state 
sovereignty is a social construct, it is important to disentangle the historical and social 
contexts in which it emerged, proliferated, and came to dominate global political 
organization.  
The current chapter lays out the theoretical foundations on which I construct my 
analysis of transformations in the political authority of the sovereign state system. I begin 
by briefly outlining the major parameters of what I refer to as the fracture narrative: a 
body of scholarship within international relations security studies in conjunction with the 
new war perspective that portrays a fundamental transformation in the nature of warfare 
since the end of the Cold War, signaling the erosion of the authority and stability of the 
international system of sovereign states. Critiques of this perspective problematize the 
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Eurocentric and ahistorical viewpoint embedded within the fracture narrative and call for 
a study of the state system and organized violence from a post-colonial perspective in 
which state authority is constructed within interactions between the weak and the 
powerful in the context of imperial domination and resistance. I argue that the theoretical 
tools necessary to accomplish such an analysis are available within sociological 
comparative historical analysis. By integrating historical and cultural institutionalist 
theories of the role of warfare in state formation and proliferation with post-colonial and 
critical race perspectives, an approach I call historical intersectionality, it is possible to 
construct an analysis of the transformations in the political authority that envisions the 
state system as constructed through continuous interactions between weak and strong and 
which attends to the role of colonization and racial formation, exclusion and resistance, in 
the construction of sovereign state authority and its transformations. 
 
The Fracture Narrative and the Erosion of Sovereign State Authority 
Arguments regarding the eroding authority of state sovereignty take somewhat 
different forms across disciplinary boundaries, but scholars from sociology, political 
science, and international relations have shared a growing concern over the apparent 
fracturing of national sovereign authority in the post-Cold War era. Taken together, this 
body of literature suggests that a variety of local and global trends have coalesced to 
undermine the foundational power of the international system of states which had 
prevailed over the previous five centuries. Stephen Krasner (1999) has suggested that the 
conventional notion of state sovereignty has been frequently violated in practice 
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throughout the history of this system, but only in recent decades have the governing rules 
of this system been challenged in principle. It is the nature and source of this challenge to 
the underlying principles of the system of state sovereignty that has been the focus of 
much post-Cold War political scholarship.  
The relationship between globalization and shifting cultural boundaries has been a 
central focus in explaining the erosion of sovereign authority; globalizing trends have 
diminished the territorial boundaries that have defined state sovereignty in the 
Westphalian era (Sassen 1996, Brown 2010) while the post-Cold War political climate 
has witnessed claims to ethnic identity trumping allegiances to the state (Gurr 1994). 
Roland Axtmann (1996) argues that the notions of the ideal nation state – one that is 
territorially consolidated, homogenous, and sovereign – have been problematized by 
growing multiculturalism within national boundaries, growing societal heterogeneity and 
disillusionment with Enlightenment philosophy in combination with the restructuring of 
the global economy in increasingly interconnected ways. Axtmann suggests that the state 
will continue to retain several important institutional functions but that the locus of 
authority will shift from state sovereignty to more dispersed and differentiated sources of 
authority emanating from multiple sources. Wendy Brown likewise suggests that the state 
and sovereignty are becoming detached from each other with key characteristics of 
sovereignty “migrating from the nation-state to the unrelieved domination of capital and 
God-sanctioned political violence” (2010: 23). While it is typically the end of the Cold 
War that is pointed to as the fracture point signaling the end of the old order of state-
controlled violence, recent work has also focused on the events of September 11, 2001 
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and the subsequent Global War on Terror as further evidence of the threat that non-state 
combatants pose to the sovereign state system (Bauman 2007, Snow 2007).  
The fracturing authority of the state and the military challenges posed by non-
state actors are directly connected in many accounts, particularly within the new war 
perspective. Mary Kaldor (1999) coined the term ‘new war’ to describe a fundamental 
shift in the dynamics of war from state-centered conflicts controlled by governments with 
clear political objectives towards war that is pervasive in time and space, fought by 
criminals and bandits, controlled by warlords who benefit from its continuation, fought 
for abstract ideological goals, and waged with no clear distinction between belligerents 
and victims, beginning and end. Martin van Creveld (1991) had earlier argued that a 
‘transformation of war’ was underway in late 1980s and early 1990s, characterized by a 
growing climate of low-intensity conflicts in which state governments were increasingly 
incapable of effectively wage war against much smaller and weaker non-state 
combatants. Van Creveld anticipated that this pattern would ultimately lead to the loss of 
the state’s ability to fulfill one of its central roles: to protect its dependent population.  
The reasons for and implications of the challenges of these non-state combatants 
to the system of sovereign state authority has exhibited substantial divergence. For some, 
these trends are indicative of one aspect of larger patterns of globalization in which state 
sovereignty has become de-centered and conflicts have become transnational (Kaldor 
1999, Bauman 2007). In a globalized context, dynamics of urbanization and global 
networks of overlapping and territorially diverse economic and political interconnections 
has led to an international environment of “fragmented sovereignty” with the potential to 
undermine national state-based sovereignties, particularly in the developing world (Davis 
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2010, Kalmo & Skinner 2010). For others, changing patterns of warfare indicate a shift in 
motivations for war from the political to the ideological, resulting in non-state actors 
gaining greater influence in war-making and decreasing the ability of state organized 
militaries to quell violence (Van Creveld 1991, Keegan 1993). Still others view these 
trends as more old than new, that is, that war is exhibiting a regression to pre-modern 
modes of fighting including the dispersion of the control of violence among a variety of 
groups not organized within a state (Mueller 2004, Münkler 2005). While many argue 
that such patterns pose a serious danger to global political stability and human life, not all 
are convinced that trends of dispersing sovereign authority warrant such pessimism. 
Cosmopolitans, for example, have emphasized the ways in which the erosion of state 
sovereign authority offers hope of a new kind of global political system that values 
universal human rights over the power of states (Held 2005, Pogge 2002, Parekh 2002). 
What these perspectives share is a vision of the post-Cold War political climate in which 
the authority of the state is undergoing a fundamental transformation.  
Although there are a multitude of elements that can be examined as evidence of 
the nature of this perceived transformation, one set of scholarship has focused on the 
manner in which political and military leaders justify going to war. The “justness” of war 
has been a common consideration for war scholars, from the writings of Augustine of 
Hippo and Thomas Aquinas in the late Roman era, to Hugo Grotius and the Catholic 
legal scholars of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, to Michael Walzer in the post-
Vietnam era. In the just war tradition, debates on both the just cause (jus ad bellum) and 
just conduct (jus en bello) within war have dominated legal and ethical scholarship on 
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war.1 Some recent scholarship has pointed to an apparent transformation in claims of just 
cause, in which justifications for war are increasingly invoking notions of humanitarian 
justice and protection of the innocent that were once characteristic of early modern 
warfare, rather than invoking the claims of the sovereign rights of states and protection of 
national economic and security interests that had been characteristic of war since the 
Westphalian transformation.  
Richard Falk has argued that the reemergence of a just war discourse after the 
Cold War is explained by the inability of international law to address the changes in 
technology, organization of conflict, and the emergence of powerful ‘non-territorial’ 
actors that occurred during, and particularly after, the Cold War. Because international 
laws of war were based on the regulation of violence between territorial states, the just 
war discourse provided a “more flexible notion of permissible use of force” for states that 
found themselves confronted by violence waged by non-state actors (2004: 43). Peter 
Lawler suggests a similar argument that the unconventional nature of many conflicts in 
the post-Cold War era has spurred a reformulation of justifications for engaging in war. 
Because conventional justifications were situated within the framework of wars between 
sovereign states, the increasing prevalence of attacks waged by non-state actors has 
forced state leaders to develop new justifications to fit these new conflicts. As a 
consequence, the moral frameworks surrounding post-Cold War conflicts (particularly in 
Western foreign policy) have come to be characterized by a discourse of the ‘good war’ 
which can take the form of the ‘war-waging’ narrative or a ‘criminality’ narrative. Lawler 
suggests that the ‘war waging’ narrative reinforces the established state-centric system of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rengger (2002) provides an excellent and concise summary of the just war tradition. 
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war while the ‘criminality’ narrative poses a challenge to these conventions and 
“anticipates the ultimate transcendence of the war system as a corollary of a larger logic 
of global transformation” (2002: 154). In other words, the discourses and logics of 
justification for war-making invoked by political and military leaders provide a concrete 
manifestation of broader processes of stability and transformation within global political 
organization. 
The fracture narrative presents an image of global political organization that has 
been fundamentally altered in recent decades as globalizing trends diminish the salience 
of national boundaries and provide new avenues, such as technologically facilitated trans-
national networks, through which non-state combatants can challenge the authority of the 
state system. However there are reasons to be critical of the assumption that the 
challenges to sovereign authority presented by non-state combatant groups is indicative 
of a fundamental shift in the nature of global political organization.  
Although the new war approach has received substantial attention and carried 
credibility in many scholarly circles, it has also been met with considerable critique. 
These critiques have largely centered on issues of measurement and definition. One set of 
critiques argues that empirical analyses of recent wars reveal that the surge in non-state 
and non-territorially bound combatants may have been overstated and that the sovereign 
state has been and continues to be the dominant player in contemporary conflicts (Fearon 
& Laitin 2003, Chojnacki 2003).  A second critique suggests that new wars are largely a 
matter of perception, and that greater attention to the historical variety in both current and 
past conflicts (Newman 2004) as well as critical engagement with how conceptual 
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categories are employed (Kalyvas 2001), reveals that the "newness" of wars is often 
exaggerated and does not stand up to scrutiny.   
Embedded within the problem of conceptual clarity is an issue of Eurocentrism 
which pervades most political scholarship. In the new war approach, this Eurocentrism 
manifests as a fallacy of asymmetric comparisons: all conflicts today are compared to 
only a tiny minority of wars that took place on the European continent in a span of two 
and a half centuries, from the end of the Thirty Year's War until the World Wars of the 
mid-20th century. When such a comparison is made, it is easy to support the claim of 
substantial change in patterns of war making; all wars today look almost nothing like the 
wars that took place in Europe from 1700-1950.  Neither do the vast majority all of the 
other wars that took place in the world from 1700-1950.  
The conflation between conceptual shifts and empirical shifts result in a vision of 
current wars that appears to fundamentally challenge the authority and security of the 
sovereign state system. Kaldor, for example, uses the term "new war" in order "to 
distinguish such wars from prevailing perceptions of war drawn from an earlier era" 
(2007: 1-2, my emphasis). She goes on to argue that what we "tend to perceive as war, 
what policy-makers and military leaders define as war, is, in fact, a specific phenomenon 
which took shape in Europe somewhere between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries" 
(2007: 15). Despite Kaldor’s acknowledgement that the supposed historical shift from old 
to new wars is exclusively a matter of definition and perception, she goes on to argue that 
wars in the post-Cold War era are in fact new. The major distinction between old and 
new wars that she offers is that old wars were hierarchical and centralized within states, 
whereas new wars are characterized by a more vertical and decentralized organization, 
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waged by a diverse set of actors which include not only states and regular armies, but 
also warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, and mercenary groups (2009: 9). But she 
also argues that the notion of hierarchical and centralized state based war is largely a 
myth based on a perception of war that emerged from the experience of intra-European 
conflict in the modern era that excluded the experiences of warfare in this same period of 
time outside of the continental boundaries of Europe.  
This is not to say that new war proponents are uniquely guilty of a Eurocentric 
vision; rather this vision is embedded within the foundations of the study of the state, 
political authority, and international relations itself. Arguably, it is embedded within all 
fields of scholarship because the academe itself emerged from Western society in a 
historical moment of Western imperial expansion and therefore envisions the world from 
the West out. This is the perspective put forth by post-colonialists such as Franz Fanon 
and Edward Said, third world intellectuals who sought to problematize the origins of 
modern scholarship as constructed within a system of Western privilege and intimately 
connected with projects of colonial expansion and racial subjugation. With its emphasis 
on culture, knowledge, and representation, the postcolonial perspective has been well 
integrated into the humanities, but has met an uneven reception within the social 
sciences. In sociology, much of the response to the postcolonial challenge has been to 
shift focus from studying Western nations to those in the global East and South, rather 
than focusing on the interactions between them (Go 2013). A postcolonial sociology must 
not simply give greater attention to the colonized and post-colonized peoples of the 
world, but rather must fundamentally alter the ontology with which scholarship is 
approached away from one that sees units of analysis as beings in and of themselves and 
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move towards a relational ontology that studies the “intertwined histories” of these units 
(Said 2003, quoted in Go 2013: 41). A similar argument is made for a postcolonial 
approach to international relations which approaches the study of global security through 
a lens of “the mutually constitutive nature of world politics, the numerous and diverse 
ways in which the weak and the strong are bound up together” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006). 
Wimmer (2013) has also emphasized the need to add relations of power and exclusion 
from systems of power to the analysis of war and the state; he argues that political 
violence is more likely to occur the larger the population that is excluded from state 
networks. While Wimmer’s study focuses largely on internal conflicts, I argue that a 
similar focus on power and exclusion can be useful to understand international political 
violence. 
A relational ontology is necessary to effectively evaluate the extent to which 
political authoritative structures have transformed in the post-Cold War era because 
challenges to political authority are constructed within dynamic global systems of power 
and exclusion that dictate the relationships between the strong, the weak, and everyone in 
between. A study of the transformations in political authority must therefore be 
historically broad, conceptually critical, and globally intersectional. It must move beyond 
Eurocentric conceptions of state formation and proliferation and seek to understand how 
the authority of the sovereign state system is constructed in continuous interaction with 
challenges to that authority in a historical context of imperial expansion, racial formation, 
colonial domination, and postcolonial resistance. 
The tools to conduct such an analysis are already available within comparative 
historical sociology when integrated with postcolonial and critical race perspectives. In 
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the following section, I argue for the integration of historical and cultural institutionalist 
approaches to the state, which I refer to as historical intersectionality, as the most fruitful 
way to understand historical transformations in state sovereignty. Applying this lens to 
the emergence and proliferation of state sovereignty reveals several interrelated themes 
that are essential to understanding historical transformations in state sovereignty. First, 
sovereignty is a culturally embedded system of political authority and as such it is 
fundamentally a relation of power. Second, as a system of physical demarcation, 
processes of state formation and proliferation are intimately bound to racial formation. 
Third, the proliferation of the state and the standardization of state sovereignty as the 
dominant form of global political organization occurred within a process of colonial 
exploitation. Finally, the modern state is defined in terms of its ability to monopolize the 
legitimate use of violence within mutually exclusive territorial boundaries; the use of 
force is therefore central to understanding what state sovereignty and challenges to it 
mean.  
 
Institutionalist Theories of the State 
Theories of the state – its formation and proliferation – in comparative historical 
analysis typically fall into one of three broad institutionalist theoretical approaches: 
historical (HI), cultural (CI), and rational choice institutionalism (RCI). Because RCI 
accounts of state formation tend to be functionalist, voluntarist, intentionalist, and often 
to treat culture as exogenous to action, I find this approach ill-suited to understand 
historical transformations of state sovereignty where sovereignty is conceived of as both 
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an ideational and structural social construct.2 Such explanations often discount the 
asymmetries of power involved in processes such as state formation and growth in which 
domination, resistance, and struggle are integral to the story. Rather, I argue that an 
integration of historical and cultural approaches is well-equipped to deal with the 
question of how state sovereignty as a culturally embedded system of political authority 
has transformed over time, and what these transformations mean for current 
understandings of political authority and the supremacy of state sovereignty. 
HI emphasizes the role of structure in bringing about social change, particularly 
the way in which institutional structures mold and disseminate worldviews and shape 
power relations (Hall & Taylor 1996). The focus on historical context results in HI 
theories of the state that can link process to outcome, effectively explain particular cases, 
and explain variations in outcome among similar cases. Thus, Ertman (1997) is able to 
distinguish four types of states that emerged during European state formation based upon 
the characteristics of state infrastructure and political regime. Building on Tilly’s “war 
makes states” formulation, Ertman suggests that what war makes is the specific type of 
political and administrative infrastructure and this infrastructure is dependent on the 
timing of the onset of conflict. Spruyt (1994) likewise offers an account of state 
formation that is able to move beyond rational choice assumptions of efficiency and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Attempts to deal with some of these problematic assumptions, such as Lachmann’s (2002) account of 
state formation, emphasize the role of both individual agency and unintentional consequences. Although 
Lachmann’s account avoids the fallacy of intentional action, this account of state formation still treats 
macro level outcomes as the aggregation of individual action and fails to account for the ways in which 
individual action exists within and is mutually constitutive of historically embedded cultural systems that 
both inform individual action as well as exist autonomously from it. Lachmann’s treatment of culture as a 
“toolkit” that simply informs rational (albeit not necessarily intentionalist) action is exemplary of many 
rational choice accounts of culture in general, an understanding of culture as distinct from instrumentality 
that are ultimately incapable of providing a fully robust account of macro level processes that are 
embedded within cultural systems. 
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instrumental action. Rather, he argues that the sovereign state did not simply emerge 
through unilinear stages of increasing efficiency, it won out over competing forms of 
organization due to both top down and bottom up selection processes.  
HI approaches often employ bellicist models of state formation, exemplified by 
Tilly’s “war makes states” argument (1992), in which sustained geopolitical competition 
created the need for standing armies which in turn required large-scale bureaucratic 
administrations capable of extracting and managing the resources necessary to maintain a 
large force over a relatively long period of time. Centralized state bureaucracies 
developed to implement and enforce the taxation of the population necessary to maintain 
these armed forces, which in turn required a social system capable of defining and 
accounting for the taxable population. The social system spurred by this process was 
citizenship, which redefined the relationship of people to the state in terms of mutual 
obligations: the people owed resources - in the form of taxes and later in the form of 
military service as well - and in turn, the state was obligated to protect the lives and well-
being of the people who lived within the territorial boundaries claimed by the state (Tilly 
1992). The creation of citizenship ultimately led to the development of nationalism; as 
people became incorporated into the state through both taxation and military 
conscription, they became capable of conceiving of the state as “theirs.” In the context of 
Enlightenment philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, popular sovereignty 
emerged as a dominant ideological frame in which national identity legitimated political 
organization. This entry of ordinary people into war-making through citizen-based 
conscription is central to understanding the organization of state and society, as 
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Kestnbaum (2004) suggests, because through the processes of war-making state and 
society engage in an "invisible dialogue" in which the state is reproduced.  
Historical institutionalist accounts of state formation highlight a largely top-down 
and structural account of the emergence of the state and its effect the people. Exogenous 
shock transformed structural organization altering the relationship between the people 
and political organization such that the structure became a state and the people became 
citizens who identified with “their” state through nationalism. As Benedict Anderson 
(1983) argues, citizens were able to imagine themselves as part of a national community 
in the historical context of Enlightenment and Revolutionary philosophy that destroyed 
the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm and replaced it with 
the popular sovereignty of the modern state. 
While historical institutionalist accounts often emphasize the role of structure, 
these accounts do not preclude the incorporation of individual agency and issues of 
power and resistance. What historical institutionalists can offer is a vision of history that 
“is malleable and partly the creature of power. Traditions are invented, but never 
completely. Nationalism, much like culture, is situationally grounded” (Centeno 1997: 
169). Nevertheless, conceiving of state formation as a series of events in which structural 
transformations shape social relations leads to a somewhat linear understanding of state 
proliferation which neglects the continuous level of interaction between strong and weak 
polities in which the state is continuously produced and reproduced in contexts of power, 
exclusion and resistance. The advantage of such an approach, however, is that the HI 
account identifies a starting point in the event of state formation in which these 
relationships can be understood. 
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In contrast to the eventful characterization of state formation and proliferation, CI 
approaches conceive of state formation as an ongoing subjective and objective process in 
which multiple forms of power are crystallized within a territorially bound, coercive 
apparatus that is conceived of and simultaneously exerts itself materially and mentally. 
Culturalists are critical of a top down structural approach to state formation, suggesting 
that such an approach treats the power relationships spurred by state formation as natural 
or inevitable, thus failing to critically engage issues of power and resistance that should 
be made central. 
Drawing from Foucault, culturalist approaches conceive of state power as widely 
dispersed, rather than localized in the state apparatus and argue that traditional state 
theory underestimates the decentralized and molecular nature of state power. Drawing 
from systems theory and networks theory, the state is understood as one of many systems 
of power, and CI often focuses on the state as a web of shifting ties among changing sets 
of actors, rather than a monolithic unified entity. The goal in such a cultural turn, as 
Steinmetz argues, is not to put the state on a theoretical pedestal, but rather to highlight 
how the state is not autonomous from cultural forces, but "shot through with circuits of 
meaning that cut across the state-society frontier" (1999: 12). CI approaches therefore 
tend to explicitly engage in the deconstruction of knowledge, advocating a deconstruction 
of theories about the state that are rooted in a modern naturalistic ontology, leading us to 
“discover” particular questions and problems at the expense of others (Somers 1996). It 
becomes useless, then, to theorize the state unless engaging in a rigorous historical 
epistemology that questions and deconstructs the knowledge culture in which our 
questions and answers are embedded.  
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Bourdieu (1999) likewise argues in favor of a deconstruction of the state, namely, 
to question our own understandings of the state as culturally embedded in our thoughts 
regarding it. Matters of culture, and the social divisions and hierarchies associated with 
them, often appear and are treated by the analyst as natural precisely because they have 
been constituted and institutionalized by the state "both in things and in minds" in order 
to be experienced as natural. The state "thinks itself through those who attempt to think 
it" (1999: 55), and so to successfully analyze the state, the analyst must submit to "radical 
questioning" of his own thoughts and assumptions about reality. The state as we know it 
is constantly formed through processes of culture; that is, the state unifies linguistic and 
juridical codes and homogenizes communication, classification systems (e.g. age and 
sex), bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals. Thus, "the state 
molds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division...And it 
thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national 
identity" (1999: 61, emphasis in original). The radical questioning necessary to study the 
state can be accomplished by reconstructing a model of its emergence, thus 
deconstructing the seeming naturalness of the state and raising the question of discarded 
possibilities: something else could have been and could still be possible.  
The role of warfare in state formation is characterized by cultural institutionalists 
as interdependent with processes of social and cultural systems of symbolic power. This 
process is best characterized by Bourdieu who defines the state as “the culmination of a 
process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or 
instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) 
informational capital, and symbolic capital” (1999: 57, emphasis in original), stressing 
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that these different dimensions are interdependent and co-constitutive. In Bourdieu’s 
formulation, war makes states, but not simply as a result of a consolidation of 
administrative power through taxation and subsequent bureaucratization. Rather, this 
centralization of power is interdependent with the development of systems of social and 
cultural signification. 
Given this greater focus on multiple systems of power and exclusion, CI 
approaches have focused more extensively than others on the role of race within these 
relationships, emphasizing how state policies not only reflect power relations among 
unequally situated citizens, but also constructs them within an international context. 
Anthony Marx (1999) and Aiwha Ong (2004) have outlined the processes by which both 
race and nation are “made” through exclusionary citizenship policies. The broader 
implication of this for the processes of nation-state building through inclusion and 
exclusion indicates that institutional rules not only consolidate existing social cleavages 
but these cleavages can also be manipulated by the state to shape how dominant 
institutions and loyalty to them are built. Thus, selective exclusion - and the conditions 
under which it is selected and occurs - is central to understanding how political power is 
established and maintained. Omi and Winant's racial formation perspective is especially 
useful in understanding how racial projects, as processes which link structure and 
representation, are constantly transformed in the context of political struggle (1994: 55-
56).  A racial formation perspective thus focuses our attention on how racial meanings 
become rearticulated within this ever transforming project and the necessity of 
deconstructing "code words" that bear racial signification but are not always recognized 
as such.  Thus it becomes possible to see that the classification of "non-state actor" in 
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post-Cold War analyses typically refers to people whose experiences and identities have 
been shaped by resistance to a particular form of state domination, namely, Western 
colonialism.   
Situating state sovereignty within the modernizing project likewise raises 
questions regarding the presumed homogenizing force of the state. Parekh (2002) 
suggests that in the face of globalizing challenges that bring with it the forces of 
heterogeneity, the modern state and its inherent drive towards homogeneity must be 
reconstituted. The traditional functions of the state, Parekh argues, have become either 
irrelevant or ineffectual due to the recent advent of globally articulated politics that have 
come to either overshadow or replace the familiar territorially based or state centric 
politics, thus weakening the emotional hold of the territorial boundary. Because the 
modern state is defined in terms of individual identity subordinated to territoriality, the 
changes wrought by globalization mean that the state must be reconstituted in a way that 
can cope with coordinated sovereignty and porous territorial boundaries. Goldberg 
(2000), however, challenges prevailing conceptions of racial heterogeneity in the post 
WWII era as a product of increasing global integration and the end of colonialism. 
Rather, he suggests that racial heterogeneity is produced within and constructive of the 
racist modern state. Like Goldeberg, Parekh defines the modern state in terms of its 
homogenizing tendencies, but unlike Goldberg, Parekh sees the modern state as an ideal 
form of political organization that is beneficial in granting liberties and equality to its 
citizens. It only runs into trouble when it encounters the heterogeneous forces spurred by 
globalization. Where Parekh sees this heterogeneity as a new challenge to the otherwise 
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homogenizing modern state, Goldberg sees heterogeneity as productive of the modern 
state and its oppressive features. 
Just as it is impossible to understand sovereignty distinct from modernity, so it is 
also impossible to separate both of these processes from race. Fanon makes clear that 
colonization is fundamentally a racial project that creates a "compartmentalized 
world...Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides 
this world is first and foremost what species, what race one belongs to" (2004[1963]: 
5).  Colonization was not simply a division of the West and the rest, but a process of 
racialization which divides whites from people of color. Goldberg (1993) likewise asserts 
that race is not simply an outcome of historical and cultural circumstances and social 
process, but rather is an ever transforming process that structures social processes 
themselves. James C. Scott similarly draws attention to the ways in which the state is 
constructed in the context of resistance to it, with one important result of this process 
being the imposition of ethnic and racial categories defined in terms of degrees of 
inclusion and exclusion in relationship to the state. Scott describes racialization and 
ethnicization as “state effects” produced in a context whereby  
“those who had reason to flee state power- to escape taxes, conscription, 
disease, poverty, or prison, or to trade or raid – were, in a sense, tribalizing 
themselves. Ethnicity, once again, began where sovereignty and taxes 
ended.  The ethnic zone was feared and stigmatized precisely because it 
was beyond sovereignty and therefore a magnet for those who, for 
whatever reason, wanted to elude the state” (2009: 122).   
28 	  
Scott’s analysis, employing the example of the expanding Chinese Han state at various 
historical moments, is especially useful in pointing to the necessity of understanding how 
state formation and expansion is productive of racial and ethnic identity. Racial and 
ethnic identities are formed in the context of resistance to the state which then in turn 
reproduces state boundaries and structures. 
The CI perspective thus leads to a characterization of state formation and 
proliferation as one in which the state constructs and is constructed by systems of identity 
imbued with power and exclusion. CI approaches draw our attention to the manner in 
which the state operates as a mechanism of both inclusion and exclusion, constructing 
multiple systems of power and resistance. In contrast, HI approaches conceive of the state 
of as an autonomous structure, determining the relationship between states within a 
system governed by a (relatively) clear set of rules. There are several benefits to such an 
approach. First, it emphasizes the ways in which structural transformations from above 
extensively impact social relations on the ground, thus forcing us to attend to the ways in 
which macro level processes impact lived experiences. It likewise forces us to confront 
issues of macro level change, suggesting that unexpected exogenous shocks and large 
scale social transformations will inevitably transform the ways in which people relate to 
each other and to the institutions in which they are embedded. The drawback of such an 
approach, however, is an inherent danger of perceiving of the consequences of macro-
structural transformation as natural or inevitable, undermining the role of individual 
agency, inequalities of power, and possibilities for resistance. CI approaches specifically 
addresses this drawback, focusing our attention on the relationship between citizenship 
and nationalism and the role of processes of state formation in this relationship in such a 
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way that requires the analyst to conceive of the state, the citizen, and the nation in 
mutually constructive terms with a focus on unequal relations of power. What CI 
approaches lack, however, is a place to start. While HI approaches tend to conceive of 
power far too narrowly and underemphasize the central role that power, coercion, and 
resistance play in the relationships between polities, CI approaches focus more 
exclusively on the mutually constructed nature of these relationships, not accounting for 
the ways in which unexpected exogenous shock affect structural transformations in the 
first place. While culturalists are correct in bringing relations of power, coercion, and 
resistance to the center of the analysis, they often do so at the expense of a clear 
understanding of how the specific ways in which structural transformation occurs in the 
first place affects how these relations of power play out.   
Integration between cultural and historical approaches focuses our attention on the 
mutual construction of the state as an institution, the nation as a cultural and ideological 
structure, and the individual as agent. The traditional institutional approaches tend to 
focus on one of these fields and then explicate its effects on the other two. A more useful 
approach, and the one I advocate here, instead envisions these fields in a trinitarian 
relationship in which conceptions of legitimate political authority lie at the intersection of 
these three interdependent relationships, transforming in the context of the changing 
contours of the mutually constituting relationships between the state, nation, and citizen. 
This historical intersectional approach allows us to see how individuals’ lives and actions 
are shaped in terms of the degree to which they are included or excluded from the state as 
an institution and the nation as an ideological construct. Clearly specifying the 
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intersections between these fields and the resulting contours that they form is therefore 
vital to understanding historical transformations in political authority. 
 
The Historical Transformations of State Sovereignty 
The above discussion of theoretical approaches to understanding state formation 
and proliferation highlight several interrelated themes which are essential to 
understanding historical transformations of state sovereignty: sovereignty as a cultural 
system, state formation as a process of physical demarcation and racial formation, state 
proliferation as a project of colonial exploitation, and an understanding of the state as a 
monopolist of the legitimate use of violence. Philpott (2001) argues that two revolutions 
in the idea of sovereignty have fundamentally shaped the current system of international 
states: first, the Westphalian transformation in 1648 and second the colonial 
independence movements after the Second World War. I argue that we should consider 
two additional events that occurred between these revolutions: the advent of popular 
sovereignty surrounding the American and French revolutions at the end of the 18th 
century and role of nationalist identity formation in the 1848 “springtime of the nations.” 
Understanding how each of these transformations built upon, expanded, and rebuilt ideas 
about the political authority of state sovereignty leads us to a fuller understanding of the 
state of sovereignty in the current global context.     
The emergence of the foundational principles of state sovereignty (territorial 
consolidation, mutual recognition, internal centralization, and external autonomy) after 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the bedrock on which the modern 
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international system of states was built. This process set the standard of mutually 
exclusive physical boundary making that set into a motion a cultural system of political 
authority rooted in processes of othering. In doing so, the Westphalian state introduced 
into the conception of political authority a boundary between those who were subject to 
the authority of the state and those who were not.  
This transformation of political authority from overlapping and uneven within a 
territorial space to mutually exclusive, uniform, and bounded spaces of authority drew an 
explicit connection between the physical boundaries of an authoritative space and the 
people around whom the boundary is drawn. Thus, the embodiment of legitimate political 
authority transferred from the monarch to the people under the government’s rule. In 
order to be legitimate, authority had to operate by the consent of the governed. This 
transformation was notably articulated in the French and American revolutions in the late 
18th century, most explicitly in the “We the People” frame in which the 1776 United State 
Declaration of Independence was conceived. 
In conjunction with the principles of rule by consent of the governed that came to 
fruition at the end of the 18th century, the advent of the bounded state also led to the 
solidification of identity in the context of state boundaries. By the mid-19th century, the 
idea of popular sovereignty had incorporated an understanding of the people that was 
defined in terms of national identity. This transformation was marked by broad popular 
revolutions in Europe and Latin America in the 1840s, specifically the 1848 “springtime 
of the nations.” 
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While popular and national sovereignty gained an authoritative foothold in 
Europe, North America, and increasingly in Latin America, the colonial and imperial 
holdings of the Western powers experienced political authority as subjects to the 
civilizing mission of the colonizing powers. Throughout this era of colonial expansion, 
resistance to such colonial authority both drew upon and challenged European ideals of 
popular national sovereignty, emphasizing universal human rights and the right to self-
determination as a vital component of national sovereign authority. This transforming 
conception of sovereign authority was notably articulated by the official end of British 
colonial rule in India and the establishment of the independent states of India and 
Pakistan in 1947, events which became a source of inspiration for a number of 
independence movements in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. In this context of 
political authority becoming increasingly rooted in universal human rights, global 
political dynamics in the post-war era became centered around the bi-polar superpower 
system in which the states within the international system were defined in terms of their 
alignment to the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, or their 
exclusion from that system as part of the non-aligned third world. Political authority in 
this era thus came to be largely understood in terms of supranational sovereignty, in 
which some aspects of national sovereignty were subordinated to the collective authority 
of a broader group of similarly aligned countries and under the auspices of the aligning 
superpower. The idea formed here was that there was an authority that existed beyond the 
state and that to protect values of human rights and self-determination, states should 
subordinate some aspects of national sovereignty to supranational authoritative structures. 
The Berlin wall served as a highly visible symbol of this global polarization between the 
33 	  
eastern and western supranational alignments and its destruction in 1989, precipitating 
the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, signaled an important 
reorganization of that system. 
Each phase of transformation in the authority state system has successively 
become more strongly oriented towards the obligations of governing polities to value 
human rights and well-being over material and territorial interests. These transformative 
processes occurred in direct conjunction with war-making; as Kestnbaum (2004) argues, 
states and society engage in an “invisible dialogue” during armed conflict in which state 
power is reproduced through citizen participation in war-making. The formation of the 
state system within the Westphalian transformation created mutually obligatory 
relationships between state and citizen, as increasingly larger standing armies were 
required to defend territorial states, the integration of ordinary people into war-making 
allowed citizens to increasingly view the state as “theirs”; mass mobilization 
subsequently led to the nationalization of war between states further reifying the 
definition of the state in terms of its obligations toward its citizens (Kestnbaum 2002, 
2004). Since the end of the Cold War, and increasingly since the start of the Global War 
on Terror in 2001, political scholarship has engaged with another transformation in 
political authority: that of a fragmentation in state sovereignty. The challenge posed by 
non-state actors to the authority of the state system is, as characterized by the fracture 
narrative, a challenge to the relationship between territorial states and their citizens, and 
the sovereign rights of states to act on behalf of their populations at the expense of other 
populations.  
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It is these questions of how the political authority of the sovereign state has 
transformed over time and the extent to which sovereignty has undergone another 
transformation in the post-Cold War era that this dissertation seeks to answer. Although 
there appears to be a temporal pattern since the advent of the Westphalian system to the 
post-Cold War era of political authority moving away from notions of the collective 
interests of territorial entities and towards a stronger notion of universal human rights, it 
is important to recognize that this transformation is not experienced by all political 
entities in a uniform way. Conceptions of legitimate political authority transform over 
time, but they do so in social contexts of power, exclusion, and resistance. Placing this 
transformation into these varying contexts can help us understand how justifications for 
war come to be framed in different ways, and what these framings tell us about political 
authority in particular social and historical contexts.  
To answer these questions, I examine justifications for war-making across the 
history of the sovereign state’s growth and proliferation. Throughout this history, war-
making has been central to the transformation of ideas on political authority. I have 
highlighted the ways in which theories of state formation have identified war-making as 
central to this process, and revolutions in ideas about state sovereignty have often been 
accompanied by revolutions of a violent nature. Beyond this, war generally, and the ways 
in which the initiation of wars are constructed in particular, offer a unique window to 
understand how political authority is constructed and how these constructions transform 
over time and in different social contexts. 
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Framing War: Logics and Discourses of Justification 
Justifications for war provide a useful site to examine political authority and its 
transformations because political authority is discursively constituted. In analyzing how 
authority was constructed in the French Revolution, Baker argued that political authority 
is a matter of linguistic authority, “first, in the sense that political functions are defined 
and allocated within the framework of a given political discourse; and second, in the 
sense that their exercise takes the form of upholding authoritative definitions of the terms 
within that discourse” (1990: 4). In addition, approaching political authority from a 
linguistic interpretation of justification frames is also a means to illuminate the 
connections between human agency and historical context. Human agents “find their 
being within language; they are, to that extent, constrained by it. Yet they are constantly 
working with it and on it, playing at its margins, exploiting its possibilities, and extending 
the play of its potential meanings, as they pursue their purposes and projects” (Baker 
1990: 4-6). Thus, the language invoked to express political authority can tell us 
something about the historical and structural context in which it was employed. To be 
authoritative, expressions of political authority must work within the boundaries of what 
is already accepted as legitimate, but can simultaneously reify boundaries while pushing 
them in a new direction. 
A similar understanding of linguistic frameworks is present in the works of 
Erving Goffman (1986) whose theory of frame analysis conceives of primary frameworks 
as discursive expressions which render meaningful aspects that would otherwise be 
meaningless. Frame analysis has typically been employed in the study of social 
movements and the identification of processes by which frames align to produce 
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resonance among participating individuals (Benford & Snow 1988 provide a useful 
review of this literature). The goal of the current project is not to determine the resonance 
or effectiveness of these justifications per say, but rather to ground them in their broader 
social contexts. That is, the degree to which the populace accepts or rejects these 
justifications is not an object of analysis; that leaders employ those logics that they 
perceive to hold power within their own particular contexts is a significant indicator of 
how authority is conceived. In this regard, Goffman’s concept of social frameworks 
provides a useful set of tools to conceive of justifications for war-making as frames that 
are situated in specific historical contexts. As mentioned above, the just war tradition has 
long focused on just cause for war, or jus ad bellum, as a matter of philosophical and 
moral significance. While there is certainly overlap between the just cause of a war and 
the justification frames employed by political and military leaders, I propose to move past 
the just war focus on the moral relevance of these frames, and instead deal with 
justification frames as they are. That is, the larger philosophical and moral question of 
whether and under what conditions a war can be considered just is not at issue here. 
Rather, the specific frames that leaders use to justify war, whether political and legal 
philosophers consider them truly just or not, are incredibly useful sites of knowledge ripe 
for study. These justification frames reveal important information about what leaders in a 
specific moment in time and political context consider appropriate and legitimate 
authority; they are windows into the widespread and normative conceptions regarding 
legitimate political authority in specific historical and political contexts. As such, when 
collected globally and over large swaths of time, these justifications are data which can 
be used to better understand long term trends in political transformation. 
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Operating within this understanding of social frameworks, I define a justification 
frame as one type of social framework that is invoked by political and military leaders to 
substantiate to the public the reasons why engaging in armed conflict is both necessary 
and authoritatively sound. As such, justification frames are comprised of two 
components: a logic of justification which specifies the authority by which the right to 
wage war is drawn, and a discourse of justification which defines the object for which 
war is needed to benefit and/or protect. The two central logics of justification that have 
been employed historically are a sovereign rights logic and a humanitarian justice logic. 
A sovereign rights logic refers to the right to wage war because the authoritative structure 
in question is widely acknowledged as the highest level at which authority operates. In 
other words it is an authority that is readily identifiable at a concrete temporal and 
physical level: authority is located in a specific person or governing apparatus. A 
humanitarian justice logic refers to the right to wage war because of a sense of moral 
righteousness drawn from the nature of humanity itself; it is an authority that exists 
beyond any concrete, physically identifiable form. Although a humanitarian justice logic 
often does correspond with a particular religious institution, it is not the institution itself 
that is identified as the source of authority but rather a higher, divine power. Such a logic 
could take the form of “God-sanctioned violence” but need not be associated with belief 
in the divine; this logic also encompasses a humanist perspective which envisions 
authority located in an innate human morality. In contrast to logics of justification, 
discourses of justification encompass the need for waging war. A discourse of 
justification can be human-centric – referring to the obligation to protect people from 
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undue harm – or interest-centric – referring to the need to protect material and status 
interests.  
This distinction between logics and discourses of justification here may help to 
explain why some scholars have perceived of a shift in the nature of justifications for war 
since the end of the Cold War. Just war revival claims assert that justifications rooted in 
moral authority, rather than the authority of governments, have resurfaced in recent 
decades after a centuries-long dormancy in which the authority of states dominated the 
language of war. This shift, it is argued, is indicative of a broader global transformation 
in which the power and authority of the international system of states is waning. These 
just war revival claims in particular draw attention to the use of human-centric language 
employed by leaders to justify waging war (see for example, Lawler 2002 and Falk 
2004). What these accounts fail to specify is whether this perceived transformation is 
authoritative in nature, from sovereign to humanitarian justice logics, or rather is 
discursive in nature, from interest-centric to human-centric within the same logical 
framework. A sovereign logic of justification can, and often does, link with human-
centric discourses. States, for example, may claim the need to wage war to protect their 
citizens; however, this discourse is linked with a sovereign rights justification: they need 
to protect their citizens because that is a central role of the state and their authority to do 
so is based on their status as a sovereign state. Claiming to protect people is not 
necessarily indicative of a transformation in legitimate political authority, unless it is 
accompanied by a logical framework which locates the authority to do so as existing 
beyond the power of states.      
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When invoked in various combinations, these discourses and logics comprise the 
set of frameworks that leaders use to justify war (see table 2.1). A justification frame that 
employs a logic of sovereign rights and a human-centric discourse is referred to as a 
protection obligation frame. Here, justifications for war-making center on the 
responsibility of the state apparatus to protect and defend the people under its rule. This 
justification is based on one of the traditional defining features of the state system—that 
of the state holding a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Because the state 
(largely) denies its citizens the right to use force for their own protection, the state has a 
responsibility to provide protection for those citizens against any perceived threat to their 
safety. The protection obligation frame is often used in the context of a state protecting its 
own citizens, but this is not always the case. The protection obligation frame may also be 
used by a state to justify fighting for the protection of the citizens of another state, 
arguing that if a state is not fulfilling its obligation to protect its citizenry then it becomes 
the responsibility of another state to step in and fill that role. Similarly, an absence-of-
state argument may be used by a group within a state by claiming that because the state is 
not fulfilling its obligation to protect its citizenry, another polity must take on this 
responsibility until the state proves capable of doing so. The key component that 
distinguishes the protection obligation frame from humanitarian justifications that call for 
the protection of innocents, which will be discussed in more detail below, is that the 
identity of those who are due protection is defined in terms of a geographic location; that 
is, they largely occupy a distinct location that can be territorially identified and is (or is 
supposed to be) under the rule of a territorially delineated government. It is their physical 
location within specific geographic boundaries that warrants their protection. 
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A justification frame which employs a sovereign rights logic and an interest-
centric discourse is referred to as a state power-interests frame. This frame justifies war-
making in terms of the power and authority possessed by the state to protect and defend 
its interests, namely, material and status interests. Material interests refer primarily to 
territory and natural resources, while status interests refers to the need to establish or 
maintain beneficial relations to other (typically similarly organized) polities and the need 
to defend against threats to the status quo. In other words, the state power-interests frame 
is primarily concerned with the prevention of a disruption to the established system of 
polity organization, in this case, the international system of states. Similar to the 
protection obligation frame, the state power-interests frame can invoke an absence-of-
state claim, but here the absence-of-state claim is used to argue that war-making is 
necessary to protect the material and/or status interests of a citizen body because the state 
that is imbued with the authority to do so is unwilling or unable to act.   
A justification frame which employs a humanitarian justice logic and a human-
centric discourse is referred to as a suffering of innocents frame.  This frame justifies war-
making in the broad context of human rights and typically invokes the idea of the 
prevention of suffering of innocent people as a basis for action.  Recall the distinction 
made above between the protection obligation frame and humanitarian justifications in 
terms of how the identity characteristics of the group that warrants protection; namely, 
their association with territorially defined political organization. Human rights claims 
within the suffering of innocents frames are likewise distinct in the manner in which the 
claim invokes a fundamental right to basic security, independent from association with 
any territorial political organization.   
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A justification frame which employs a humanitarian justice logic and an interest-
centric discourse is referred to as a group preservation frame. This frame justifies war-
making for the protection of the interests of a group (again, based on an identity that is 
independent from territorial political organizations). These interest claims can be in terms 
of the protection of a belief system that is fundamental to the group’s identity (in 
particular, religion), a broader claim of threat to the group’s basic security and survival, 
the prevention of the spread of violence or security threat to other group members, or as a 
claim of unprovoked aggression. It is important to note that a claim of unprovoked 
aggression in the context of a humanitarian justice logic refers to the concept of a 
fundamental right to security that is independent from territorial political 
organization. Claims of unprovoked aggression may be present within a sovereign rights 
logic, but these claims are in terms of national security interests within a power-interests 
frame.  The essence of the unprovoked aggression claim within the group preservation 
frame is that the group has done nothing to deserve violence against it, but because of the 
aggressive actions of others, the group’s fundamental right to existence is threatened, 
necessitating the use of force. 
The major advantage to these employing frameworks in this manner is the 
plasticity they offer in interpreting transformations in political authority. The broadness 
of these frames allows them to encompass the wide variety of specific claims that may be 
historically or geographically contextual. The boundaries of these frames are malleable, 
leaving room for interpretation on the part of the researcher to situate claims in very 
different contexts into the same framework. At the same time, however, these frames 
offer clear boundaries around which broad classes of frames can be distinguished from 
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each other, allowing for analysis and generalization across a wide variety of cases, and 
avoiding the tendency for contextual specificity that is inherent in historical research. 
These categorical boundaries are important because in order to understand how political 
authority transforms over time and in different contexts, it is essential to clearly 
demarcate and identify both the logic and discourse of justifications that are being 
employed within a particular frame. I have previously approached the question of a just 
war revival in the post-Cold War era by analyzing the logics and discourses of 
justification employed by political and military leaders in nine conflicts initiated from 
1990-2008 (Clever 2012). The findings of this study do not support the claim that states 
are eschewing conventional state-interest arguments in favor of the greater flexibility of 
humanitarian arguments, or that non-state actors are more likely to use humanitarian 
justice logics because the established state sovereignty frames are not open to them. 
Rather, the data indicates that power-interest frames are the predominant frame employed 
by both state and non-state actors, and that state actors are more likely than non-state 
actors to intertwine sovereign rights and humanitarian rights logics. 
Table 2.1 Justification Frameworks 




 Obligation to protect/ defend people 
Obligation to protect/ 
defend interests 
Logic of Justification 
Sovereign rights Protection obligation Power-interests 
Humanitarian justice Suffering of innocents Group preservation 
 
These preliminary findings also indicate several fronts where further research 
should be targeted. First, the small number of cases examined limits the extent to which 
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these findings can be generalized to all conflicts. It is one thing to claim that non-state 
actors pose a challenge to the conceptual authority of state sovereignty; it is quite another 
to claim that this challenge is somehow different or more serious after 1990 than during 
preceding centuries. It is necessary then to expand the historical scope and number of 
cases in order to establish more generalizable conclusions. Second, the results of the 
analysis indicate important differences between the types of justification frames 
employed in different types of war. State combatants, for example, were more likely to 
use sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical wars against non-state actors 
than in symmetrical inter-state wars. This highlights the need for a relational ontology; 
how strong and weak actors interact with each other, and the social and historical context 
that informs this interaction, is essential to understanding what particular claims to 
authority mean and how these claims vary in different contexts.  
Finally, these findings indicate that although state actors were more likely than 
non-state actors to employ sovereign rights logics of justification, non-state actors still 
employed a sovereign rights logic more than 40 percent of the time, with the vast 
majority of these frames employing an interest-centric discourse. Understanding why 
non-state actors employ sovereign rights justification is necessary to understand what 
these authoritative claims indicate about transformations in the power of the state system. 
If they employ these logics because they perceive it as the only way to reasonably 
compete and be recognized by other polities, then this is indicative of the continuing 
strength and dominance of the sovereign state system. However, it is also possible that 
the use of seemingly old frames is indicative of a shift towards new ways of thinking.  
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Cecilia Ridgeway has used the concept of cultural frames to understand the 
persistence of structural gender inequality, arguing that because cultural frames serve as 
the basis for social coordination, forms of inequality are able to persist for two reasons: 
lag time, and the reapplication of old cultural frames on new organizational forms (2011, 
2012). When social change creates “sites of innovation,” she suggests, increased 
uncertainty leads to an increased likelihood that individuals will unconsciously fall back 
on familiar cultural frames. When those familiar frames contain expressions of 
inequality, that inequality becomes reapplied to the new organizational form that emerges 
from the site of innovation. This process occurs simultaneously with a cultural “lag time” 
in which new ideas exist in advance of the application of those ideas to new 
organizational forms. That is, an idea has to be widely held in society before it can be 
applied to new organizational forms. Even when an idea is widely held, there will be a 
lag before it can be effectively applied to a new organizational form because sites of 
innovation create uncertainty, causing people to fall back on older and more familiar 
cultural frames as the basis for coordination. This means that new ideas will be applied to 
new organizational forms in a piecemeal pattern, with one step back for every two steps 
forward. 
Ridgeway applied these concepts of lag time and familiar frame reapplication to 
the study of gender inequality, however, the focus on cultural frames as the basis for 
coordination readily applies itself to the study of war. Because war requires massive 
coordination both of ideas and action, cultural frames, in the form of justification frames, 
are necessary. If a new organizational form of political power is in fact emerging, 
Ridgeway’s theory would predict that the uncertainty created by such a site of innovation 
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would cause leaders to fall back on the familiar cultural frame of state sovereignty, in 
order to enhance their basis for coordination with other leaders and existing 
organizations. In addition, we should expect to observe a lag between when an idea first 
emerges (global governance over state sovereignty, for example) and its application to a 
new organizational form, and we should expect that the application to occur in a 
piecemeal fashion. Thus, while the end of the Cold War and rising relevance of non-state 
combatants in war spurred the notion that sovereign state authority mattered less than in 
the past, the uncertainty created by such a situation and the lag between the emergence of 
a new idea and its full application to a new organizational form can be expected to lead to 
the persistence of sovereign rights frames in justifications for war long after such a frame 
is deemed irrelevant by scholars. If these processes of lag time and reapplication of 
familiar cultural frames on new organizations are actually at work, we should be able to 
observe evidence of these patterns over the longer term. That is, during periods of 
ideational and organizational change – such as that surrounding the transition to national 
governments in the late 18th and early 19th century revolutions – it should be possible to 
observe a pattern whereby the emergence of new ideas is accompanied by a fall back to 
older justification frames, followed by a lag in which new ideas are slowly adapted to 
new organizational forms while carrying older frames along with it.  
While Ridgeway’s concepts of familiar frame reapplication and lag time can help 
us to understand how old frames may persist in the face of new ideas, it is also important 
to keep in mind the interactional context that informs the use of these frames among 
actors at varying levels of integration within organizational structures such as the 
international system of states. Those categorized as non-state combatants are comprised 
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of groups who have been historically and systematically excluded from the international 
system of states, as well as the privilege and benefits that accompany inclusion within 
this system. The term ‘terrorism’ is often used by Western powers to legitimate state 
power and delegitimize the violent actions of these actors with little thought given to the 
historical experiences of exclusion that inform the motives behind such forms of violent 
resistance (Barkawi & Laffey 2006). For those identified by Western powers as terrorists, 
the link between this history and current violent acts are often made explicit. Osama bin 
Laden, for example, has stated that “the West’s occupation of our countries is old, but 
takes new forms. The struggle between us and them began centuries ago, and will 
continue” (quoted in Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 330). Within such a historical context, 
claims to the authoritative power of the state system by those who have been historically 
excluded from this system may be indicative of a desire to access the benefits and 
privileges of that system, as well as the continuing authoritative relevance of that system. 
An analysis of justification frames in the context of war can uncover patterns of 
continuity and change in systems of authority when approached from a relational 
ontology that includes historically and global broad cases.  
 
Argument and Hypotheses 
My argument is driven by two assumptions drawn from theories of the 
interiorization of state power (Goldberg 2002, Bourdieu 1999, Scott 1990). First, that 
modern state sovereignty is a system of political power. Second, that within systems of 
power which are globally, culturally and socially pervasive (as is the modern state 
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system), those who are most excluded will tend to more strongly assert the ways in which 
they are or desire to be integrated into that system, while those who are well integrated 
and advantaged by such a system of power have greater flexibility in the ways in which 
they claim belonging and have the privilege to assert, deny, or remain ambivalent about 
their relationship to that system. In the words of Scott “the greater the disparity in power 
between the dominant and the subordinate and the more arbitrarily it is exercised, the 
more the public transcripts of the subordinates will take on a stereotyped ritualistic cast” 
(1990: 3). This relationship, operating within particular historical contexts, shapes the 
justification frames that are employed by combatant actors in war. I argue that which 
justification frame is employed in a given conflict is shaped by the tension between the 
prevailing conceptions of the specific nature of the political authority of the state and the 
extent to which a combatant actor in a given conflict is excluded from the state system. 
Central to the story of the transformations in the political authority of the 
sovereign state are the processes of modernity, colonization, and race. Modernity is a 
social condition of differentiation, characterized by the establishment and exclusivity of 
boundaries. State sovereignty as a system of political authority is rooted in the territorial 
delimitation and mutual exclusivity of state power defined by its physical boundaries. 
Racialization is a product of the same modern social condition that produced the state, a 
condition of differentiation and physical delimitation between people. Colonization, by 
the same token, is a product and an extension of state power which creates a 
“compartmentalized world” divided first and foremost by racial distinction (Fanon 2004); 
it is a state project that is marked and ordered by race (Goldberg 2002). Colonization and 
race are two sides of the same coin and intimately linked with the proliferation of the 
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state. That these processes emerged simultaneously and in the context of early modern 
Western Europe is no coincidence. Colonization, race, and the sovereign state are 
interrelated products of the same modern social condition. 
How each of these components is employed in my dissertation is modeled in 
figure 2.1. Justifications for war-making (as expressions of conceptions of legitimate 
political authority) are shaped by three factors: the colonial experiences of the combatants 
(as a colonial power, a colonial subject, and a colonial relationship between the 
combatant dyad), the prevailing understanding of the nature of the state’s authority within 
the historical era in which the war is taking place, and the symmetry of the combatant 
dyad in terms of their relationship to the international system of states. It is also important 
to note the link between colonial history and combatant symmetry; those actors with 
histories as colonial powers will be more likely to be strongly integrated into the state 
system, while those with histories as colonial subjects will be less integrated. Therefore, 
conflicts between colonial power actors and colonial subject actors as well as conflicts 
between a combatant dyad with a colonial history with each other will be more likely to 
be asymmetrical than conflicts between two colonial powers, two colonial subjects, or 
non-colonial relationship dyads. 
Racial formation is an important component to include in this model, but in and of 
itself is not a variable I will measure in terms of its impact on the use of justification 
frames. Rather, what matters about race here is that it is an inextricable part of the 
colonial experience and the divisions produced by the colonial project. It is essential to 
keep race in the picture for the sake of understanding and explaining the perceived threat 
of non-state combatants to the political authority of the state system. Including three 
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different aspects of the colonial experience allows me to capture the range of ways in 
which a history of colonialism can impact how combatant actors experience integration 
or exclusion from the state system. Those who have had recent or ongoing experiences as 
a colonial subject have experienced exclusion and disadvantage within the state system, 
while those who have had recent or ongoing experiences as a colonial power have 
experienced inclusion and advantage within the state system. Greater inclusion means 
greater privilege of flexibility in how legitimate authority is expressed, while greater 
exclusion leads to greater assertion of claims in line with the authority of that system 
from which one is excluded. Connected to this colonial experience is the level of 
symmetry of the combatants, highly symmetrical conflicts will tend to be those between 
combatants that are both highly integrated into the state system, and therefore the 
language used will be less likely to rigidly adhere to sovereignist logics of justification 
because such highly integrated combatants have the privilege of greater flexibility in 
drawing on prevailing conceptions of political authority.3 Highly asymmetrical conflicts 
will be those among dyads in which one combatant is relatively more integrated into the 
state system than the other. Such conflicts will be more likely to draw on sovereignist 
logics of justification because the position of one of the combatants as relatively excluded 
from the state system. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Conflicts between combatants of which neither are highly integrated into the state system (non-state 
conflicts) would also be considered highly symmetric, but such conflicts are rare in modern history and are 
unlikely to enter into the historical record, and are therefore not included in the analysis. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model: factors influencing justifications for war 
 
     
The conditions under consideration are state system integration, colonial 
experience, and historical era of political authority. The definitions of these variables will 
be discussed in more detail in the methods chapter, but for current purposes, I define state 
system integration conditions as including the status of the combatant as a state or non-
state actor, and the symmetry or asymmetry of the combatant dyad. Colonial experience 
conditions include the recent history or ongoing status of the combatant actor as a 
colonial power or colonial subject, and whether the combatant is engaged in conflict with 
another combatant with whom it has shared a colonial relationship. The historical eras in 
political authority described above – the Westphalian transformation, the era of popular 
sovereignty, the springtime of the nations, the era of supra-national authority, and the era 
of fragmented sovereignty after 1989– each exhibit successively greater weight given to 
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the authority of universal human rights over the collective interests of territorial polities. I 
expect that the constellations of state system integration and colonial experience 
conditions as combined within particular historical eras of political authority produce 
particular outcomes in how justifications for war are framed. While it is possible, and 
even likely, that more than one frame will be present in a given case, I focus on which 
frame emerges as most prominent, or is given the most authoritative weight in each case. 
The technique used to establish which frame is most prominent is detailed in the methods 
chapter.  
The following chapter also details the techniques used to determine which 
constellations of conditions combine to produce particular justification frame outcomes. 
Based upon the theoretical perspective outlined in the above chapter, there are a few 
patterns in particular that I expect to observe.  
The fracture narrative and just war revival arguments would predict that the 
greater the divergence in power status between the two combatants, the more invocations 
of authority and cause for war will be rooted in a humanitarian justice logic and a human-
centric discourse for war. In other words, both low and high power actors in power 
divergent and/or asymmetric conflicts will employ the suffering of innocents frame 
because such conflicts require an authoritative context that exists outside of the 
conventional boundaries of the sovereign state system. Further, this pattern would 
become more apparent over time as states encounter ever more opponents who are 
outside the system.  
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My theoretical approach, employing a relational ontology, however, challenges 
this prediction. I predict that high power and low power actors employ different 
justifications frames depending on the combatant structural and historical context that 
surrounds the conflicts. I expect that in conflicts in which the relations of power between 
the main combatant actors are highly divergent and/or highly asymmetrical, high power 
actors will employ a humanitarian logic of justification while low power actors will 
employ a sovereign rights logic of justification. I expect this pattern to occur because the 
sovereign state system is a system of political power which confers privilege on those 
who are highly integrated into its structure, and disadvantages to those who are excluded 
from it. Those who are excluded seek to invoke the rules of that system in order to stake 
claim to its privileges, while those who benefit from the system shift focus toward 
justifications that lay outside the rules of the system, as if to refuse to allow those who 
threaten that privileged status to play by the set of rules that grants them that privilege. 
However, if both combatants hold privileged status within the system of states, 
sovereignist logics will be most prevalent among both actors, since both seek to assert 
their privilege most strongly. While this balance fluctuates between humanitarian and 
sovereignist logics dependent upon the divergence in power-integration, discourses of 
justification will show an increasing trend in prevalence towards human-centric 
justifications over the course of time, because each era in the transformation of political 
authority has become successively more oriented toward the obligation of government to 
the people under its rule.  
The theoretical framework outlined here therefore leads to the following sets of 
hypotheses: 
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H1: A sovereign rights logic of justification will be employed as a primary 
justification by high power actors in symmetrical and/or non-power divergent 
conflicts and by low power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts. 
Among all actors, interest-centric discourses will be associated with earlier eras of 
the state system, while human-centric discourses will be associated with later eras of 
the state system, with middle eras exhibiting both discursive types. Thus,  
 H1a: The power interests frame will be associated with high power actors in 
symmetrical and/or non-power divergent conflicts in the early and middle eras of the 
state system. 
 H1b: The power interests frame will be associated with low power actors in 
asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the early and middle eras of the state 
system. 
H1c: The protection obligation frame will be associated with high power actors in 
symmetrical and/or non-power divergent conflicts in the middle eras and later eras of the 
state system.  
 H1d: The protection obligation frame will be associated with low power actors in 
asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the middle and later eras of the state 
system.  
H2: A humanitarian rights logic of justification will be used as a primary 
justification by high power actors in power asymmetrical and/or power divergent 
conflicts. Low power actors, however, will not employ a humanitarian right logic as 
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a primary justification when in conflict with high power actors.4 Among all actors, 
interest-centric discourses will be associated with earlier eras of the state system, 
while human-centric discourses will be associated with later eras of the state system, 
with middle eras exhibiting both discursive types. Thus, 
 H2a: The group preservation frame will be associated with high power actors in 
power asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the early and middle eras of the 
state system. 
 H2b: The suffering of innocents frame will be associated with high power actors 
in power asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the middle and later eras of 
the state system.  
If these hypotheses are supported, my analysis will offer evidence against the 
fracture narrative and just war revival arguments that see state authority declining as low 
power, non-state actors increasingly come into conflict with high power state actors. 
Rather than the authority of the sovereign state system waning in the face of such 
challenges, the invocation of a sovereign rights logic of justification by low power actors 
against high power actors indicates that the authority of the state system remains strong; 
that is, the challenge to the state system is not a challenge to the nature of its authority, 
but rather, a challenge to include previously excluded actors into the benefits of that 
system. By remaining attentive to the discourses used within each of these logics of 
justification, the current analysis offers a level of nuance that has not been provided by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Because symmetrical low power conflicts (that is, non-state wars) are relatively rare in the historical 
record and are not included in the present data set, the current analysis cannot speculate on the frames 
associated with symmetrical and non-power divergent conflicts between low power actors.  
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the fracture narrative and just war revival arguments. That is, while it is possible that 
recent conflicts are exhibiting different justification frames from those that were common 
in past centuries, I predict that this shift reflects the ever transforming orientation of the 
obligations of the state system, not a transformation in the authoritative foundations of 
the state system itself.  
In the following chapter, I detail the variable definitions and methodological 
techniques used to test the above hypotheses.  
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Chapter 3 Methods 
 
Interpretive Document Analysis: close acquaintance and QCA approaches 
This dissertation has two primary objectives. First, to determine the extent to 
which conceptions of the authority of the sovereign state system in the post-Cold War era 
has transformed from earlier eras. Second, to uncover the constellation of conditions, 
particularly those related to the political organization and state system integration of 
combatant groups, which lead to the use of particular frames to justify war-making. To 
achieve these objectives, I employ an interpretive analysis through two complementary 
approaches: a small-n interpretive case study and a medium-n fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA).  
Justifications for war provide the documentary window through which we are 
able to observe how conceptions of political authority are conceived of in particular 
social and historical contexts. It is therefore fitting to employ an interpretive approach 
that treats these justifications as “repositories of meaning,” to borrow Sewell’s 
terminology, in order to “reconstruct the codes…that the text or text analogues instantiate 
and upon which their authors can be presumed to have drawn on in carrying out their 
actions” (2005: 332). As discussed in the previous chapter, my focus on constructions 
and transformations of political authority make an interpretive approach especially 
appropriate. Baker (1990) describes political authority as a matter of linguistic authority 
that must work within the boundaries of prevailing notions of legitimate authority while 
simultaneously pushing those boundaries in new directions. Goffman’s (1986) theory of 
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primary frameworks likewise provides a set of tools through which linguistic expressions 
of authority can be interpreted to uncover their underlying social meanings.  
An interpretive approach, in addition to being an appropriate fit for questions of 
political authority, also has several advantages for historically oriented research. Skocpol 
(1984) has advocated the narrative style of interpretive works as offering a compelling 
means to reach audiences beyond academia. The single or limited comparative case 
studies used in interpretive approaches attend to the rich complexity of historical events 
while avoiding the high levels of abstraction inherent in causal modeling that may seem 
arbitrary or alienated from context. Arguments proceed through the telling of stories that 
draw on contemporary sensibilities and deliberately stress the relevance of past events to 
current worldviews. I use a case-study interpretive approach to tell a story about how 
political authority has transformed, and how it has stayed the same, over the course of the 
history of the sovereign state system. Skocpol also emphasizes, however, that compelling 
storytelling does not equate with validity, and single or small-n interpretive studies are 
painfully limited in their ability to speak to broader patterns beyond the individual case. 
In an effort to balance rich historical context with generalizable empirical 
assessment, I employ a second complementary approach that bridges qualitative and 
quantitative assessment. The techniques of interpretive case studies necessarily limit the 
number of cases with which a single researcher can feasibly engage in a reasonable 
amount of time, but that does not mean that it is impossible to examine a broader set of 
historically and geographically representative cases for the purposes of revealing more 
general patters. Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) has developed a set of strategies for engaging 
in medium-n analysis that is especially appropriate for the project at hand. Qualitative 
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comparative analysis (QCA) is particularly suited to historical case-based research in 
which a given outcome can be the result of multiple trajectories, or pathways, expressed 
as different configurations of conditions. 
In addition to providing strategies for analyzing outcomes that have multiple 
sources of causation, Ragin challenges both traditional quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to social science as violating basic assumptions about how the social world 
operates. Namely, both approaches neglect the importance of set-relations in social 
research, instead preferring to convert theoretic statements into statements of correlation. 
In conventional qualitative approaches, this means transforming sets into typologies to be 
deconstructed, whereas quantitative approaches transform these sets into dummy 
variables that can be plugged into linear models. The problem with both approaches, 
according to Ragin, is that set-relations should be analyzed on their own terms as they 
“reflect integral social or causal connections and are not merely definitional in nature, 
they require explication – that is, they are theory and knowledge dependent” (2008: 14). 
For example, consider the following claim: “one indication of the declining authority of 
the state is the resurgence of humanitarian rather than sovereignist claims as the basis of 
justifying war in the post-Cold War era, particularly as evidenced in conflicts between 
state and non-state actors.” This statement identifies humanitarian and sovereignist 
justifications as subsets of all justifications for war-making and state and non-state actors 
as subsets of all types of combatant actors. A traditional correlational approach would 
seek to link the instances of each type of justification with the type of actor employing 
them. The analyst could then make statements about the proportion of instances, in terms 
of a defined set of wars and/or actors, in which each kind of justification was used. The 
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analyst could then make claims about the prevalence of particular types of justifications 
under particular conditions and offer theoretically informed speculations on what these 
correlations indicate about how political authority has changed over time. 
Although such an approach may offer some useful insights, these correlations 
neglect important aspects of the meaning and degree of belonging of these variables 
within their respective analyst-imposed categories. For example, a combatant actor can 
be understood as being state or non-state, but variations in the extent to which an actor 
belongs to these categories is meaningful. A non-state actor can include groups that 
operate entirely independently of any support from a state, but also those who operate 
within a state that offers material and moral support, operate within a state that tolerates 
their presence but does not offer any support, or operate within a state that is hostile to 
them while receiving support from other external actors. Similarly the justifications 
employed by actors can have meaningful differences in belonging to categories of 
humanitarian or sovereignist. To claim, for example, that humanitarian logics are more 
likely to be employed when states fight non-state actors glosses over the meaningful 
distinction between statements that exclusively use one type of logic, those that 
intertwine different logics of justification, and the degree of weight given to one type of 
justification over another when they are intertwined.  
To address these complexities, I use a particular form of QCA: fuzzy sets 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). In fsQCA, each variable is calibrated in terms 
of the degree to which it belongs to a set, informed by theory and knowledge of each 
case. Where a ‘crisp’ set would define a variable in terms of either satisfying the 
conditions for membership or non-membership, a fuzzy-set approach allows for more 
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precise quantitative membership, ranging from full membership (1.0) to full non-
membership (0.0), with a range of values in between to satisfy conditions of partial 
membership. Collective social science knowledge as well as the researcher’s own 
accumulated knowledge informs the criteria for calibration, setting ‘qualitative anchors’ 
where the researcher can distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation. A fsQCA 
approach thus forms a bridge between quantitative and qualitative approaches: a fuzzy-
set is both case oriented and variable oriented, full membership or non-membership is a 
qualitative state defined by the analyst’s knowledge, while the allowance for varying 
degrees of membership leads to greater quantitative precision (Ragin 2008: 81-83). 
These two interpretive approaches, a close-acquaintance study and fsQCA, 
complement each other and their use together enhances the overall quality of the study. 
Using these approaches together allows me to examine the question of transformation in 
political authority with rich historical context in a small subset of cases as well as draw 
out broader patterns and trends from a larger set of globally and historically 
representative cases. Although fsQCA addresses some of the generalizability 
shortcomings of a close-acquaintance study, this approach cannot provide a fully 
representative and broadly generalizable analysis. It can, however provide an analysis of 
limited generalizability which more appropriately accounts for the set-theoretic nature of 
the variables of interest. These two approaches can also be used to inform one another, 
with the trends revealed in the fuzzy-set analysis highlighting important illustrative cases, 
and the in-depth narratives of individual cases allowing for theoretical insights that can 




Following the case selection guidelines for QCA outlined in Rihoux and Ragin 
(2009) and Ragin (1987), I selected cases of war-making with attention to issues of the 
relationship between the outcome of interest and case definition, as well as the balance 
between case diversity and practicalities of sample size. 
The universe of cases for this analysis was wars since the beginning of the 17th 
century. This historical scope was selected in order to include cases of war immediately 
prior to, during, and after the Westphalian transformation out of which the modern state 
system was born. I define war as a specific form of violence that is explicitly organized 
for the purpose of obtaining a political objective. Accordingly, I do not believe it is 
appropriate to define war in terms of threshold of combat related fatalities, as has been 
the standard practice of most currently available data sets.5 What makes war distinct from 
other forms of violence is not the number of people killed, but rather the fact that people 
organize with the express purpose of enacting violence in order to achieve a political 
objective. This emphasis on the organization of political violence is particularly relevant 
given the outcome of interest: justifications for war-making. Because war is violence 
organized for political objectives, engaging in it requires the extraction of substantial 
manpower and material resources. This extraction, in turn, requires the war-waging 
leadership to publicly and explicitly justify why such an action is appropriate and 
necessary. For the purposes of case selection, the scale of conflict matters only to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See for examples the Correlates of War project (www.correlatesofwar.org) and the Uppsala Conflict 




extent that a conflict requires widespread public articulation of the reasons for conflict; 
that is, its organization must have been sufficiently large enough in scale to have entered 
into the historical record. 
Because QCA requires a sufficient level of intimacy with each case in the sample 
in order to make theoretically informed decisions about variable specification, the 
number of cases that can be included is necessarily restricted. In addition, sample size 
must be balanced with condition selection. The range of conditions included should be 
guided by careful examination of all relevant competing theories, but too great a focus on 
including the full range of possible conditions can lead to a problem of ‘limited diversity’ 
where the logical combinations of conditions is greater than the number of cases (Rihoux 
& Ragin, 2009). Limited diversity can result in an analysis where each individual case 
has an individual explanation, rather than revealing general explanations for groups of 
similar cases. It is necessary then to remain cognizant of the balance between sample size 
and the number of conditions, an issue which I will explicate in more depth in the 
variable descriptions below. 
Case selection must also ensure that the variation across cases sufficiently 
captures the diversity of cases within the universe. Particularly in QCA, where analyst 
knowledge of cases is paramount, it is important for case selection to obtain “a maximum 
of heterogeneity over a minimum number of cases (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009: 21). Because 
this dissertation addresses conceptions of legitimate political authority in the context of 
the historical development of the international system of states, it is necessary to select 
cases of war that capture geographic and temporal diversity, as well as reflect the 
different ways in which authority is employed or challenged within war. With this 
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variation in mind, I select cases of war purposively to include external wars, wars of 
rebellion, and civil, or internal wars (see table 3.1). These categorization of war types 
exhibits some divergences between conventional categorizations such as inter-state and 
civil wars and reflects the focus of this dissertation on authoritative meanings. 
Particularly for internal conflicts, categorizing wars as either rebellions or conflicts can 
obscure the authoritative meanings embedded in them more than they help to distinguish 
between them. For example, at what point does an insurgency become a civil war? What 
is the difference between a civil war and a rebellion? Often these categorizations reflect 
the legitimacy ascribed to the conflict by external parties rather than reflecting real 
differences in the dynamics of conflict. Because this dissertation is concerned with 
expressions of political authority, I draw the lines of distinction between different types 
of internal conflicts around whether the conflicting groups are fighting for total 
dominance of one territorial locus of authority, or whether one group is seeking to 
separate its political authority from another and create a distinct locus of authority in 
addition to and on par with its rival. The distinction here is between seeking to overtake 
an existing authority or create a parallel authority. In addition to including variation 
across different types of authoritative conflicts, I also make an effort to include as much 
geographic diversity as possible, including wars from Europe, Asia (including the Middle 
East), Africa, and the Americas (including the Caribbean). Ideally, a case selection that 
exhibited the fullest possible variation would include one war of each type for each 




Table 3.1 War Type Definitions 
War Type Definition 
External Conflict between parties with territorially distinct and independent centers of 
power at the start of conflict. 
Internal for central 
control 
Internal for control of political authority. Conflict between parties with wholly 
or partially overlapping centers of power at the start of conflict contesting the 
legitimate rule in a singular territorial space. 
Internal separatist  Internal for separation of political authority. Conflict between parties with 
wholly or partially overlapping centers of power at the start of conflict where 
one of the parties seeks political concessions from the reigning political 
authority, or a partial or total separation of political authority. 
With attention to these issues, I purposively selected 63 cases of conflict 
involving a total of 126 combatants. After an initial round of data collection, 16 cases 
involving 37 combatant actors were excluded from analysis because of insufficient 
documentation available. For each of the dropped cases, the lack of primary 
documentation was a result of original materials having been destroyed or only reported 
in a second-hand manner that was unreliable. For some cases, such as the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850) and the Egyptian-Ethiopian War (1870), sufficient documentation was 
available for one combatant but not another. In these cases, only the information on the 
combatant for which documentation could be collected was included in the final analysis. 
The final case selection included data from 89 combatants across 47 conflicts initiated 
from 1618-2008 (see Appendix Table 1). While I made a concerted effort to achieve 
maximum variation in geographic location, war type, and period of time, the facts of 
history do not always cooperate. For example, there are very few external wars with 
adequate documentation in Africa and the Americas before the early 19th century 
resulting in a sample of wars that exhibits greater variation after the mid-19th century that 
in the period between the early 17th and mid-19th centuries.  Table 3.2 provides basic 
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summary information on the war type, time period, and geographic location for the 
combatant cases.  
The choice to select cases purposively on these measures was done with the aim 
of ensuring variation on the variables, rather than variation on the population as would be 
accomplished with a random sampling from an existing data source. This approach to 
case selection follows from the objectives of this dissertation; that is, to seek to 
understand how different temporal and geopolitical contexts impact conceptions of 
legitimate authority within the state system. As reflected in table 3.2, the limitations of 
documentation availability mean that the current sample of conflicts analyzed are more 
heavily skewed towards external conflicts and conflicts occurring in Europe and the 
Americas than is represented in other widely used data sets such as COW and 
UCDP/PRIO. Some of this skewing is a result of documentation availability, however, 
much of it can also be attributed to a combination of differences in the time frame 
encompassing the data and the death threshold use to define war. Differences in these 
parameters ensure that every data set of war will have different representations on these 
major variables. Because of the manner in which the current analysis is conducted, 
particularly in its use of fsQCA as will be described in more detail below, the scale of 
representation on each of these variables is not influential on the outcome of the analysis. 
It is the existence of variation in the geopolitical contexts surrounding conflicts rather 





Table 3.2 Combatant case summary statistics 
 Current Sample 
1618-2008 
COW (v. 4) 
1816-2007 
UCDP/PRIO (ACD v. 
4) 
1946-2008 
 N %  N %  N %  
War Type       
External6 48 54% 212 32% 67 27% 
Internal for central 
control7 
21 24% 249 38% 
177 73% 
Internal separatist 20 22% 191 29% 
War Initiation       
17th century 14 16% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
18th century 10 11% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
19th century 21 24% 228 35% N/A N/A 
20th century 38 43% 397 61% 226 93% 
21st century 6 7% 27 4% 18 7% 
Geographic Location       
Africa 15 17% 151 23% 79 32% 
Americas 20 22% 102 16% 26 11% 
Asia/Middle East 19 21% 273 42% 102 42% 
Europe 35 39% 125 19% 34 14% 
Total 89 100% 651 100% 241 100% 
Document Collection and Coding 
All documents were transcribed and imported into Atlas.ti coding software. An 
initial round of open coding was conducted using a grounded theory approach (Glaser & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For COW and UCDP/PRIO data, external wars include all wars fought across borders, including inter-
state conflicts, extra-state conflicts, and wars of colonial and imperial conquest. 
7 UCDP/PRIO data does not distinguish between internal separatist wars and internal wars for central 
control. 
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Strauss 2009). This initial coding scheme was consolidated and revised through three 
further rounds of coding, until a saturation point was reached and coding was not 
revealing any new information. This coding procedure ultimately produced 13 distinct 
discourses and 12 distinct logics of justification (see Appendix table 2). These logics and 
discourses were then organized into typologies where discourses were identified as being 
either human-centric or interest-centric, and logics were identified as being rooted in 
either sovereign rights or humanitarian justice (see tables 3.3 and 3.4). Three codes did 
not fit into this typology. First was a discourse of fighting for the common good or 
general peace and order with no accompanying specification of for whom or what this 
common good would benefit. Second was a logic of unspecified self-defense, usually 
framed in terms of an enemy’s aggressive acts or amassing of force when unconnected to 
any other authority. Many claims of self-defense were connected to a specific authority, 
for example claiming a “God-given right to self-defense” or citing a specific UN charter 
or treaty stipulation that grants the right to self-defense, and such claims would be coded 
as a divine/natural authority or treaty/legal authority, respectively. Unspecified claims of 
self-defense, however, were highly prevalent across all cases. Another highly prevalent 
logic of justification was a claim that recourse to war was legitimate because all peaceful 
means of resolution had been exhausted. These unspecified claims: a common good 
discourse, a general self-defense logic, and an exhaustion of peaceful means logic, I 
classified as universal codes because of their high prevalence across cases. These 
universal codes were therefore not integrated into the justification frame typologies 
detailed below.  
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Table 3.3 Typologies of Discourses of Justification with Examples 
Discourse 
For whose or what protection is war necessary? 
Human-Centric 
Protect people (extra-
territorial identity)  
“…this	  we	  owe	  to	  [our	  Indian	  allies],	  as	  free	  Men	  and	  true	  Christians,	  to	  
promote	  their	  Happiness,	  and	  make	  them	  Partakers	  of	  our	  happy	  
Constitution,	  and	  extending	  it	  thro’	  the	  Continent,	  by	  endeavouring	  to	  
civilize	  and	  incorporate	  with	  them…”	  
-­‐Governor	  Dobbs	  of	  North	  Carolina,	  1756,	  French	  &	  Indian	  War	   
Protect people (government 
obligation to subjects/ 
citizens/ ruler/ homeland) 
“First,	  the	  Falkland	  Islanders	  are	  British	  citizens.	  British	  citizens	  have	  
been	  invaded.	  If	  they	  can't	  look	  to	  their	  own	  country	  to	  protect	  them,	  to	  
go	  and	  try	  to	  get	  the	  invader	  off,	  what	  future	  is	  there	  for	  anyone	  in	  this	  
world?	  So	  they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  look	  to	  us	  for	  their	  defence.	  We	  have	  a	  
right	  to	  defend	  our	  own	  territory.”	  
-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Margaret	  Thatcher,	  May	  17th	  1982,	  Falklands/Malvinas	  
War 
Dignity/ humiliation of 
populace 
“More	  and	  more	  Africans	  everywhere	  in	  Zimbabwe	  will	  embrace	  armed	  
struggle.	  So	  it	  must	  proceed	  inexorably	  to	  its	  end	  of	  inevitable	  victory	  of	  
justice	  against	  injustice	  and	  fascism,	  human	  dignity	  against	  humiliation	  
and	  degradation,	  freedom	  against	  oppression,	  and	  progress	  against	  
exploitation	  and	  racial	  greed.”	  
-­‐ZANU	  Proclamation,	  April	  1973,	  Chimurenga	  War 
Promote racial equality “…	  racialism	  in	  any	  form	  or	  guise	  has	  no	  room	  whatsoever	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  
Our	  objective,	  among	  other	  things,	  is	  to	  rid	  the	  country	  of	  this	  
detrimental	  system	  of	  prejudice...”	  
-­‐James	  Chikerema,	  May	  1966,	  Chimurenga	  War 
Protect or promote 
representative government 
“…such	  conduct	  was	  indispensable	  to	  show	  to	  the	  whole	  world	  that	  the	  
Mexican	  people	  are	  fit	  for	  democracy,	  that	  they	  are	  thirsty	  for	  liberty,	  and	  
that	  their	  present	  rulers	  do	  not	  measure	  up	  to	  their	  aspirations.”	  
-­‐The	  Plan	  of	  San	  Louis	  San	  Potosi,	  November	  20th	  1910,	  Mexican	  
Revolution 
Interest-Centric 
Allies “If	  Germany	  is	  not	  to	  be	  false	  to	  her	  word	  and	  permit	  her	  ally	  to	  suffer	  
annihilation	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Russian	  superiority,	  she,	  too,	  must	  mobilize.”	  
-­‐Memorandum	  of	  Helmuth	  Von	  Moltke,	  July	  29th	  1914,	  World	  War	  I 
Protect 
law/treaty/constitution 
“The	  barbarian	  merchants	  of	  your	  country,	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  do	  business	  for	  
a	  prolonged	  period,	  are	  required	  to	  obey	  our	  statues	  respectfully….They	  
must	  by	  no	  means	  try	  to	  test	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  law	  with	  their	  lives.	  
May	  you,	  O	  King,	  check	  your	  wicked	  and	  sift	  your	  wicked	  people	  before	  
69 	  
they	  come	  to	  China,	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  the	  peace	  of	  your	  nation.”	  




“We	  will	  withdraw	  from	  Iranian	  territory	  -­‐	  where	  defence	  lines	  and	  army	  
security	  necessitate	  our	  presence	  -­‐	  as	  soon	  as	  Iran	  recognizes	  our	  
sovereignty	  over	  our	  land	  and	  respects	  our	  vital	  interest.”	  
-­‐Iraqi	  Commentary	  on	  Military	  Action,	  September	  23rd	  1980,	  First	  Persian	  
Gulf	  War 
Territorial/economic interests “By	  the	  occupation	  of	  the	  coast,	  the	  Egyptians	  have	  completely	  isolated	  
Abyssinia	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  preventing	  trade	  with	  Europe	  by	  the	  
heavy	  taxes	  they	  impose	  on	  both	  exports	  and	  imports.”	  
-­‐King	  Yohannis	  of	  Ethiopia,	  May	  13th	  1873,	  Egyptian-­‐Abyssinian	  War 
Religious institution “Alas,	  since	  the	  Tartar	  slaves	  invaded	  China,	  they	  have	  taught	  people	  to	  
worship	  their	  false	  idols,	  to	  renounce	  the	  true	  faith	  and	  to	  betray	  God	  by	  
shaking	  the	  people’s	  beliefs.	  The	  Manchu	  demons	  are	  different	  from	  men.	  
They	  affront	  High	  Heaven,	  tyrannize	  our	  black-­‐haired	  multitudes,	  and	  
destroy	  our	  people’s	  lives.”	  
-­‐Proclamation	  of	  the	  Taiping	  Rebels,	  1854,	  Taiping	  Rebellion 
 
Table 3.4 Typologies of Logics of Justification with Examples 
Logic 
By what authority is the right to wage war drawn? 
Humanitarian Justice 
Divine/natural authority “We	  will	  be	  left	  no	  choice,	  but	  to	  take	  the	  necessary	  measure	  to	  maintain	  
our	  authority	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  Almighty	  by	  whose	  grace	  we	  are	  your	  
rightful	  king	  and	  master.”	  
-­‐Emperor	  Matthias’	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  Bohemians,	  1619,	  Thirty	  Years’	  
War 
Personal vengeance “The	  Ming	  killed	  the	  father	  and	  grandfather	  of	  Nurhaci	  for	  no	  reason.”	  	  
-­‐Nurhaci’s	  Seven	  Grievances,	  1618,	  Manchu	  Conquest	  of	  China 
Virtue/might makes right “By	  means	  of	  an	  army	  of	  veteran	  soldiers	  well	  trained	  in	  warfare,	  they	  
seized	  on	  our	  treasures,	  our	  lands,	  and	  the	  government	  of	  our	  country,	  
thereby	  proving	  that	  the	  only	  thing	  requisite	  for	  the	  usurping	  empire	  is	  
the	  fact	  of	  being	  the	  strongest.	  There	  is,	  therefore,	  no	  difference	  between	  
ourselves,	  who	  lay	  contributions	  on	  the	  villages	  we	  take,	  and	  the	  agents	  
sent	  from	  Peking	  to	  collect	  taxes.	  	  
-­‐Manifesto	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  the	  Throne,	  Taiping	  Rebellion,	  1854 
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Historical precedent “As	  a	  matter	  of	  history,	  successive	  British	  Governments	  have	  felt	  obliged	  
to	  resist	  attempts	  by	  a	  single	  Power	  to	  dominate	  Europe	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
others,	  and	  the	  imposition	  of	  one	  country's	  will	  by	  force	  of	  arms.”	  
-­‐British	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  August	  24th	  1939,	  Second	  
World	  War 
Sovereign Rights 
Monarchical sovereignty “The	  whole	  world	  knows	  that	  it	  was	  essential	  to	  the	  French	  monarchy…	  
that	  the	  king	  of	  France	  should	  be	  legislator;	  that	  he	  should	  have	  the	  full	  
and	  entire	  disposal	  of	  the	  army;	  that	  he	  should	  cause	  justice	  to	  be	  
administered	  to	  his	  subjects;	  that	  he	  should	  have	  the	  right	  of	  making	  
peace	  and	  war;	  and,	  in	  a	  word,	  that	  plenitude	  of	  power	  which	  belongs	  to	  
sovereignty.”	  
-­‐Manifesto	  issued	  by	  the	  allied	  monarchs	  of	  Europe,	  August	  4th	  1792,	  
European	  Wars	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution 
Popular/ national 
sovereignty (consent of 
governed) 
“…this	  scandalous	  proceeding	  attacks	  the	  principle	  of	  popular	  
sovereignty,	  which	  all	  the	  Republics	  of	  South	  America	  recognise	  as	  the	  
basis	  of	  their	  institutions.”	  
-­‐Argentine	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  Bolivia,	  May	  9th	  1837,	  War	  of	  the	  
Confederation 
State sovereignty “Thus	  were	  established	  the	  two	  great	  principles	  asserted	  by	  the	  Colonies,	  
namely:	  the	  right	  of	  a	  State	  to	  govern	  itself;	  and	  the	  right	  of	  a	  people	  to	  
abolish	  a	  Government	  when	  it	  becomes	  destructive	  of	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  
it	  was	  instituted.	  And	  concurrent	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  these	  
principles,	  was	  the	  fact,	  that	  each	  Colony	  became	  and	  was	  recognized	  by	  
the	  mother	  Country	  a	  FREE,	  SOVEREIGN	  AND	  INDEPENDENT	  STATE.”	  
-­‐South	  Carolina	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Causes	  of	  Secession,	  December	  24th	  
1860,	  U.S.	  Civil	  War 
Territorial or economic 
violation 
“The	  Palestinians	  have	  achieved	  something	  but	  not	  what	  they	  wanted	  and	  
need.	  They	  have	  been	  granted	  autonomy.	  But	  what	  does	  autonomy	  mean?	  
We	  are	  living	  here	  but	  we	  do	  not	  own	  the	  country.	  The	  owner	  controls	  
everything…	  continues	  to	  be	  under	  Israeli	  control.	  We	  have	  no	  
sovereignty	  over	  our	  land	  and	  our	  water.”	  
-­‐Ahmed	  Yasin,	  October	  4th	  2000,	  Second	  Intifada 
Treaty, legal, or 
constitutional authority 
“We	  are	  in	  the	  right	  and	  the	  treaties	  support	  this	  claim;	  diplomacy	  ratifies	  
this;	  and	  the	  international	  community	  recognizes	  it.”	  
-­‐Peruvian	  Foreign	  Minister,	  February	  6th	  1995,	  Alto	  Cenepa	  War 
Illegitimate foreign 
interference 
“These	  bands	  occasionally	  adorn	  themselves	  with	  the	  title	  of	  National	  
Liberation	  Army.	  In	  terms	  of	  liberation,	  the	  bring	  only	  oppression	  and	  
terror.	  They	  call	  themselves	  national,	  and	  drawing	  their	  directives	  from	  
abroad,	  they	  slay	  their	  brothers	  in	  religion.	  They	  make	  their	  way	  through	  
fires,	  looting,	  and	  crime.”	  




Dependent variables: justification frames 
The above discourses and logics of justification are organized into the 
justification frameworks outlined in chapter 2 in order to form the dependent variables 
for fuzzy sets analysis. For each combatant case, I established the proportion of 
discourses employed that were interest-centric or human-centric, and the proportion of 
logics that were sovereignist or humanitarian. As a first step, I evaluated the proportions 
of discourses and logics for each case and set qualitative markers of being “fully in,” 
“more in than out,” “more out than in,” and “fully out” for each justification frame. For 
example, if 100% of the discourse codes employed in a particular case were interest-
centric, while the 70% of the logics sovereign rights codes and 30% were humanitarian 
justice code, I would code this case as being more in than out of the power interests 
frame, more out than in the group preservation frame, and fully out of the suffering of 
innocents and protection obligation frames. After qualitatively assessing each case, I then 
averaged the proportions of each logic and discourse for each case using the following 
formulas: 
Protection obligation frame = %human-centric discourse + %sovereign rights 
logic/2 
Power-interests frame = %interest-centric discourse + %sovereign rights logic/2 
Suffering of innocents frame = %human-centric discourse + %humanitarian 
justice logic/2 
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Group preservation frame = %interest-centric discourse + humanitarian justice 
logc/2 
Applying these formulas produces a value ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 that is 
indicative of the extent to which a case belongs within the set of each particular frame. 
Values closer to 0.0 indicate that the case is more out of the set, while values closer to 1.0 
indicate that the case is more in the set, thus forming a continuous-value fuzzy set (Ragin 




These justification frameworks comprise the outcome variables of interest.  What 
constellations of conditions are associated with the use of each of these frames? As 
detailed in chapter 2, a historical intersectional perspective leads me to reject the just war 
revival claims, which assert a resurgence of humanitarian justice authoritative claims in a 
post-Cold War era of diminishing sovereign state system authority. Rather, informed by 
critical race and post-colonial perspectives, I expect that the type of justification frame 
employed in a particular war is related to patterns of inclusion or exclusion from systems 
of global power within broader a broader historical transformation in conceptions of 
political authority.  
As emphasized above, it is important to achieve a balance between the number of 
cases and the number of conditions to avoid the problem of limited diversity. While it 
may be possible to identify innumerable conditions that impact how political leaders 
73 	  
justify war, my review of the existing theoretical approaches to understanding the 
evolution of legitimate political authority in the modern era leads me to identify three 
central conditions that warrant focused attention in the context of my study: (1) when the 
conflict occurred in terms of its temporal proximity to key moments in the development 
of the concept of state sovereignty, (2) whether and the extent to which the combatant has 
been a colonial subject or a colonial power, and (3) whether and the extent to which the 
combatant is integrated into the state system and the state system integration of its 
opponent.  Applying a fuzzy-sets logic to the construction of state system integration, 
colonial history, and historical era variables provides a useful way to integrate 
meaningful variation within these categories into the analysis. I discuss the 
operationalization of each of these conditions in turn. 
 
Historical Era 
The historical era in which a conflict took place is determined by its proximity to 
certain key events and trends in the historical development of the sovereign state system. 
As has been discussed in chapter 2, five key events stand out in the course of the 
ideational development of political authority in the international system of sovereign 
states: (1) the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which set foundational principles of state 
sovereignty; (2) the revolutions France and the United States in the late 18th century 
which marked a transformation in conceptions of the embodiment of sovereign authority 
from the monarch to the people under the government’s rule; (3) the national demarcation 
of popular sovereignty marked by the popular revolutions in Europe and Latin America 
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in the 1848 “springtime of the nations”; (4) the incorporation of and challenges to 
European ideals of national popular sovereignty in colonial resistance movements marked 
by the 1947 Indian and Pakistani independence and subsequent 1960s African colonial 
independence movements, resulting in the emergence of a human rights based 
supranational authority, and (5) the fragmentation of this supranational authority after the 
demise of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw pact allies after 1989. 
Throughout its history, how political authority was conceived of within the 
international system of states underwent substantial transformation and can be usefully 
conceived of in five eras, marked by important events in the years 1648, 1776, 1848, 
1947, and 1989. Although these dates provide important markers for key developments in 
transforming conceptions of political authority in the development of the state system, it 
is important to emphasize that these events do not mark the emergence of a new idea 
about political authority, but rather are key events that can be pointed to as moments 
when an idea became eventfully articulated. For example, the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence was perhaps the earliest prominent example of popular national 
sovereignty (i.e. “We the People...”) becoming articulated as the institutional foundation 
of a government, but it is important to remember that the concept of popular sovereignty 
had to already exist in the imagination of its authors in order for it to be articulated in the 
document and carry the conceptual authority and legitimacy necessary to become the 
basis of a system of government that individuals would be willing to risk their lives to 
defend.  
One option for measuring the effect of historical era on the justification frame 
employed in conflict is to dichotomously code each conflict in terms of its belonging as 
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either “in” or “out” of a defined period of time. For example, we could define the era of 
Westphalian sovereignty as occurring during the period of time between the start of the 
Thirty Years war and the start of the Seven Years war, i.e. from 1618 to 1756, and then 
coding conflicts as having been initiated either within or outside of this period of time. 
However, artificially imposing such temporal boundaries, even if theoretically well-
informed, obscures how ideas about political authority actually emerge, gain acceptance, 
transform, and inform subsequent ideas. For example, if we define the era of Westphalian 
sovereignty as occurring from 1618-1756, and the era of popular sovereignty as occurring 
from 1757-1830, how could we account for the impact of historical era on the 
justification frame employed for a conflict occurring in 1750? Is it “fully” in the era of 
Westphalian sovereignty, and therefore shaped by the notions of political authority that 
dominated at this time? Or, because of its proximity to the events of 1776 and the 
likelihood that ideas about political authority at this time helped to inform the 
development and proliferation of ideas about popular sovereignty would it be more 
appropriate to include this conflict in the era of popular sovereignty? The answer, of 
course, is that ideas about political authority in such a conflict would be shaped by 
notions of Westphalian sovereignty that came before, as well as exhibiting aspects of and 
contributing to the formation of ideas about popular sovereignty that were developing but 
had not yet been eventfully articulated. These eras are not mutually exclusive then, and in 
fact overlap. In addition, the strength of different conceptions about political authority 
within each era are not even, that is, a particular conception of political authority will 
have greater strength in the period of time immediately surrounding the moment when 
that idea has first been eventfully articulated. Therefore it does not make sense to 
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conceive of conflicts as events that took place either inside or outside of these eras, but 
rather to conceive of eventful articulations as central moments within the overlapping and 
uneven development of ideas. Defining historical eras in this way allows me to account 
for how justifications for war-making can be shaped by multiple ideas in the overlapping 
eras. Figure 3.1 provides a visual model of these overlapping and uneven historical eras 
of ideas about political authority. 
I treat each of these eras as five-value fuzzy sets in which the justifications within 
each conflict case will be coded in terms of its temporal distance from each eventful 
articulation. Those occurring within a set period of time close to the eventful articulation 
are coded as being fully-in the historical era it marks (1.0), while those occurring further 
away are respectively coded as being more in than out (0.75), neither in nor out (0.5), 
more out than in (0.25) or fully out (0.0). The overall length, extent of overlap, and 
specific calibration of each set is determined by my own knowledge of the emergence 
and development of ideas about political authority throughout this period of time (see 
section on the history of political ideas in chapter 2).  
Figure 3.1 Historical Eras of Prevailing Conceptions of Political Authority 
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Table 3.5 outlines the fuzzy-set calibration of this timeline. To some extent, these 
calibrations may seem arbitrary. While there may be reasonable disagreement about 
precisely where the lines should be drawn, the calibration was informed both 
theoretically and by my own understanding of the historical processes in which ideas on 
political authority develop. For example, rather than treating each era as a uniform block 
of time (say, 100 years surrounding each eventful articulation) I allow each era to be a 
different length, informed by the historical context surrounding the emergence and 
transformation of each prevailing idea of political authority. In addition, the bubbles 
representing each historical era are oval, rather than circular, with the divisions between 
each calibration closer together at the front end of each era and more spread out towards 
the end of each era. This is to reflect the differing paces at which ideas emerge, gain 
acceptance, and fade. Although this is certainly not a perfect representation of historical 
eras of ideas about political authority, I believe it is a substantial improvement on a more 
rigid understanding of historical eras that treats eras as mutually exclusive and the impact 
of ideas within these eras as having equivalent influence on events no matter where it 
















Table 3.4 Historical Era Fuzzy-set Calibration 
Historical Era Range Calibration 
Westphalian (1618-1756) Prior to 1618, after 1756 0.0 
1618-1624, 1721-1757 0.25 
1625-1630, 1701-1720 0.50 
1631-1638, 1671-1700 0.75 
1639-1670 1.0 
Popular (1740-1835) Prior to 1740, after 1835 0.0 
1740-1749, 1820-1835 0.25 
1750-1756, 1801-1819 0.50 
1757-1766, 1783-1800 0.75 
1767-1782 1.0 
National (1816-1939) Prior to 1816, after 1939 0.0 
1816-1824, 1918-1939 0.25 
1825-1834, 1895-1917 0.50 
1835-1841, 1871-1894 0.25 
1842-1870 1.0 
Supranational (1915-2008) Prior to 1915, after 2008 0.0 
1915-1924, 1995-2008 0.25 
1925-1934, 1980-1994 0.5 
1935-1942, 1957-1979 0.75 
1943-1956 1.0 
Fragmented (1968-present) Prior to 1968 0.0 
1968-1972 0.25 
1973-1981 0.50 
1982-1988, 2001-2010 0.75 
1989-2000 1.00 
 
State System Integration 
Two variables are employed to indicate state system integration: degree of 
membership into the state system and the symmetry of the conflict dyad in terms of 
whether the central combatants have differing degrees of membership within the state 
system. 
Full membership into the international system of states is determined by employing 
the Correlates of War Project State System Membership List (v.2008.1, hereafter SSML). 
This list covers the period from 1816 to 2008 and includes dates of tenure, that is, it 
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allows polities to drop in and out of state membership throughout this period as political 
and historical context warrants. State membership of each combatant actor is defined as 
being a member of the international system of states according to SSML guidelines in the 
year the conflict began. The guidelines for inclusion in the SSML are:8 
1. Prior to 1920, the entity must have had a population greater than 500,000 and 
have had diplomatic missions at or above the rank of charge d’affaires with 
Britain and France. 
2. After 1920, the entity must be a member of the League of Nations or the United 
Nations, or have a population greater than 500,000 and receive diplomatic 
missions from two major powers. 
For conflicts occurring before 1816, I will classify entities as a state system member if 
they have a population greater than 500,000 and are a signatory to the treaty of 
Westphalia or have diplomatic relations with a signatory to the treaty of Westphalia.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The criteria for inclusion in the international system of states are derived from several publications 
(Russett, Singer & Small 1968, Singer & Small 1972, Small & Singer 1982, full details available in the 
SSML codebook). Setting population size as a primary criterion was meant to indicate that in order to be a 
member of the state system, an entity had to possess enough national power to be moderately active in 
world politics, “to be a player more than a pawn” (Singer & Small 1972). The population threshold of 
500,000 was determined by its high correlation with other measures of national power, such as territory, 
unity, self-sufficiency, and armed might. The second primary criterion, its widespread recognition of the 
entity by other members of the system, was meant to determine whether the entity was “sufficiently 
unencumbered by legal, military, economic, or political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty 
and independence” (Small & Singer 1982). This criterion can be operationalized in terms of the granting or 
withholding of diplomatic recognition. This decision, particularly before WWI, was based not on whether a 
state approved or disapproved of a particular government, but rather was determined by whether they 
believed a given entity could effectively fulfill its international obligations. Prior to the Versailles 
Conference after WWI, the diplomatic recognition of Britain and France serve as an effective proxy, as the 
system up until this time was dominated by European powers and “as went Britain and France, so went the 
majority” (Singer & Small 1982). In the post-Versailles era, however, the supremacy of Britain and France 
was less secure and there were no two powers within the system who could effectively replace Britain and 
France as proxy legitimizers. Therefore, after 1920, state membership criteria were changed to classify as a 
state any entity that was a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations at any time during its 
existence or met the 500,000 population and was recognized by as a state by at least two major powers 
within the system. 
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While the SSML is extremely useful for determining those who were clear and 
full members of the state system, membership into the category of states is not best 
understood as a crisp-set between “state” or “non-state.” Rather, variation in the 
belongingness to these categories is meaningful. The degree to which a non-state 
combatant group is tolerated or not tolerated by the host country in which they operate 
and the extent to which they receive support from their host country or external actors 
reveals important information about the extent to which a non-state group has been 
incorporated into the state system, how they perceive themselves and how other groups 
perceive them as having a stake in that system. Therefore, while the COW SSML can be 
used to determine those who are full state system members, further work is needed to 
determine the level of belongingness of other combatant actors whose degree of 
membership is more fuzzy. I treat state system membership as a four-value fuzzy set; 
table 3.6 outlines the criteria for each value.9 
Determining whether an entity is tolerated or supported by a host country and the 
extent to which they receive meaningful support was determined by close investigation of 
individual cases.10 After determining the extent to which each actor is incorporated into 
the state system, I then take the difference of these scores to obtain a dyad symmetry 
score, where a score of 1.0 indicates that the dyad is fully symmetrical, meaning they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Ragin (2008) chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on fuzzy set calibration. I initially coded state 
integration variables as a six-value fuzzy set, however found that there was not enough case diversity to 
make a six-value set analytically useful. A four-value fuzzy set was the maximum amount of variation 
possible in which there were enough cases within each value set to make the results of the analysis 
meaningful.  
10 In most instances, the association between country and combatant actor is fairly clear, as the combatant 
actors explicitly represent the ruling government of a country or operate exclusively within a country and 
claim to represent that country. In some cases the association is less clear. For groups such as Al Qaeda 
which operate across country boundaries, I will use the country in which the group originated and/or the 
origins of its founding members to establish colonial history. 
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share a similar level of incorporation into the state system. The closer the dyad symmetry 
score is to 0.0, the less symmetrical the dyad (see table 3.7). 
Colonial Experience  
Three aspects of colonial experience are relevant for this project: 1) did either of 
the primary combatants have a history as a colonizer empire or a colonized subject 
country? 2) does the combatant dyad in question have a colonial history with each other? 
and 3) of those combatants with a colonial history of any sort, was the relevant colonial 
experience in the recent  or distant past, or is it ongoing at the start of the war? 
Table 3.5 State Integration Variables 
Value  State Membership Dyad Symmetry 
1.00 Fully in Fully state; actor fits the criteria of state 
membership according to COW SSML 
Fully symmetrical, difference in state 
membership scores between combatant 
dyad equals 0.0 
0.67 More in 
than out 
Mostly state (sub-state); actor is not member of 
state system, but operates within a tolerant host 
state and receives meaningful support from host 
state or another state system member; OR actor 
is government of another type of territorially 
autonomous geopolitical unit that does not meet 
COW’s SSML criteria (e.g. pre-state system 
kingdoms, empires, etc.)  
Mostly symmetrical, difference in 
state system membership scores equals 
0.33 
0.33 More out 
than in 
Mostly non-state; actor is not member of state 
system and operates within a hostile host state 
while receiving meaningful support from 
another state. 
Mostly asymmetrical, difference in 
state system membership scores 
between combatant dyad equals 0.67 
0.00 Fully out Fully non-state; actor operates without any 
meaningful support from any state system 
member; OR operates within a non-state 
political unit. 
Fully asymmetrical, difference in state 
membership scores between combatant 
dyad equals 1.0 
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A fuzzy-sets approach is useful for addressing these questions. A crisp set coding 
of whether a combatant actor had a colonial experience or not, or was part of a colonizer 
or colonized country, obscures important degrees of variation in these categories. For 
example, a combatant dyad whose colonial relationship ended over a century before the 
conflict should not be treated as analytically identical to a dyad whose colonial 
relationship ended in the previous decade, as the rhetoric surrounding conflict 
justifications in these two cases would draw upon the colonial experience in very 
different ways. Differences between the colonial experiences - for example, if the 
colonial experience was part of a national historical narrative or part of the recent lived 
experiences of these populations - could also impact the kind of language that a leader 
would choose to use as appealing to the populace. 
Because there is no available data source which clearly demarcates the colonial 
power and colonial subject status of each polity, I used careful historical investigation of 
each case to determine the colonial history experiences of each case. In its broadest 
definition colonization can be voluntary, however, for the purposes of the current 
research, I define colonization as the forceful exercise of political sovereignty of one 
polity, defined as the metropole, over a previously independent polity, defined as the 
colony, in which the metropole seeks to extract resources from the colony in order to 
benefit the political and economic power of the metropole.  
Three variables are used to capture the complexities of colonial history and 
analyze its impact on the use of justification frames: colonial power, colonial subject, and 
colonial dyad are used to indicate if each combatant case has a history as a colonial 
power, has a history as a colonial subject, and if the combatant is engaged in conflict with 
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an opponent with whom it has had a colonial relationship. A three-value fuzzy set is used 
for each of these variables to classify these colonial history factors as having never 
occurred, having occurred in the past century, or being present at the onset of conflict.11 
The calibrations for these variables are summarized in table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6 Colonial Experience Variables 
Value  Colonial Power Colonial Subject Colonial Dyad 
1.00 Fully in Combatant is a colonial 
power at onset of 
conflict 
Combatant is a colonial 
subject at onset of 
conflict 
Current, ongoing colonial 
relationship between combatants 
at start of conflict 
0.50 Neither fully 
in nor fully 
out 
Combatant has been a 
colonial power in past 
century  
Combatant has been a 
colonial subject in past 
century 
Colonial relationship existed 
between combatants in past 
century 
0.00 Fully out Combatant has never 
been a colonial power 
(within past century) 
Combatant has never 
been a colonial subject 
(within past century) 
Colonial relationship never 
existed between combatants 
(within past century) 
 
Analysis Procedures 
In the previous chapter, I specified the set of relationships I expect to observe 
based upon a historical intersectional perspective. To reiterate, I expect that in cases 
where the power-integration characteristics of the primary combatants are highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The 100-year cut off, while somewhat arbitrary, is based on the notion of a colonial living memory 
among the population, that is, if the colonial experience ended more than a century prior to the onset of 
conflict, there no living memory of that colonial experience among the population. A more nuanced five-
value fuzzy set calibration was initially used to distinguish between ongoing, recent, intermediate, and 
distant colonial experiences, however the limited numbers of cases that fit into each of these 
categorizations severely diminished the utility of the analysis. A three-value fuzzy set proved the most 
nuanced possible to allow for meaningful interpretation of results.  
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divergent, a humanitarian justice logic will be most prevalent among those with high 
power-integration within the system, but that further excluded from the system a 
combatant is, the more they will invoke sovereignist claims. Those who are excluded 
seek to invoke the rules of that system in order to stake claim to its privileges, while those 
who benefit from the system shift focus toward justifications that lay outside the rules of 
the system, as if to refuse to allow those who threaten that privileged status to play by the 
set of rules that grants them that privilege. However, if both combatants hold privileged 
status within the system of states, sovereignist logics will be most prevalent among both 
actors, since both seek to assert their privilege most strongly. While this balance 
fluctuates between humanitarian and sovereignist logics dependent upon the divergence 
in power-integration, discourses of justification will show an increasing trend in 
prevalence towards human-centric justifications over the course of time, because each era 
in the transformation of political authority has become successively more oriented toward 
the obligation of government to the people under its rule. This progression will not be 
steady however, but will show increased intensity surrounding moments in which these 
ideational transformations are eventfully articulated. To test these expectations, I 
administered the following procedures. 
After each variable was calibrated according to the definitions provided in tables 
3.4-3.6, the full dataset was imported into the fsQCA software package designed by 
Ragin (2006) for analysis. The fsQCA software uses a truth table algorithm to assess the 
likelihood that a given outcome is a consistent subset of the set of conditions specified in 
the causal recipe, as well as the extent of coverage offered by a particular causal recipe. 
Consistency gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of 
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conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question, where coverage gauges the 
degree to which a causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome (Ragin 
2008:44). These measures are useful in establishing the causes or causal combinations 
that can be considered necessary or sufficient.    
Because of the problem of limited diversity, or “too many variables and not enough 
cases,” Ragin’s guidelines (2008: 142-144) recommend restricting the number of 
variables introduced into the model to between three and eight. One suggestion for 
mitigating the problem of too many variables is to create macrovariables by merging 
related variables with a logical OR operator. Thus, I consolidate all of the variables 
discussed above into seven macrovariables, where (~) signifies the negation of the 
variable:  
• High power-integration = state system member OR colonial power 
• Low power-integration = ~state system member OR colonial subject 
• Power divergence = ~dyad symmetry OR colonial dyad 
• Power symmetry = dyad symmetry OR ~colonial dyad 
• Early state system = Westphalian  
• Mid-state system = Popular Sovereignty OR National Sovereignty 
• Later state system = Supra-national Sovereignty OR Fragmented Sovereignty 
Four causal combination truth table algorithms were produced, one for each of the four 
justification frame outcomes. The truth table algorithm outputs 2k rows where k is the 
number of causal conditions, representing all possible corners of the vector space. In this 
case, each truth table produces 27, or 128 rows in each of the four tables. Each row 
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reports the number of cases with greater than 0.5 membership in the vector space corner. 
Each row also reports a consistency measure which assesses the degree to which 
membership in each corner is a subset of membership in the outcome for all cases. These 
rows are reduced to only those solutions which meet pre-determined threshold criteria.  
Following fsQCA procedural guidelines (Ragin 2008: 142-144), I conducted two 
parallel analyses to include low threshold and high threshold criteria. The low threshold 
criteria used a consistency threshold of 0.80 and a frequency threshold of n=1. The high 
threshold criteria analysis used a consistency threshold of 0.90 and a frequency threshold 
of n=2. The consistency threshold indicates the proportion of cases in which the causal 
combination in question consistently produced the observed outcome, while the 
frequency threshold indicates the number of cases in the dataset in which the causal 
combination and outcome in question can be observed. Solutions that do not meet these 
threshold criteria are referred to as “remainders.” Remainder solutions are those without 
strong instances or with very few strong instances, that is, they represent potential 
counterfactual combinations. The truth table analysis produces three solutions that can be 
thought of as points on a continuum: a complex, a parsimonious, and an intermediate 
solution. The parsimonious solution incorporates into the causal combinations that meet 
the threshold criteria all remainder solutions that yield a simpler solution. In other words, 
when all counterfactual solutions are considered, the parsimonious solution points to the 
causal condition that is the most decisive factor in determining the outcome. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the complex solution excludes all remainder combinations and 
therefore provides no simplifying assumptions regarding combinations of conditions that 
do not exist in the dataset. Between these two extremes are the intermediate solutions, 
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which are made up of a subset of the most parsimonious solution and a superset of the 
most complex solution and are informed by the investigator’s theoretical and empirical 
knowledge (each row in the truth table is individually coded by the researcher as 
belonging to the set of possible solutions). In other words, in the intermediate solution 
any causal combination that uses at least some of the causal conditions specified in the 
complex solution is a valid solution of the truth table as long as it contains the causal 
conditions specified in the parsimonious solution.12 The results of this analysis are 
discussed in the following chapter.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Ragin (2008) chapters 7-9 for a detailed description of this truth table procedure and the resulting 
solutions. 
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Chapter 4 fsQCA Results 
Interpreting fsQCA Results 
The current chapter details the results of the fsQCA analysis. As outlined in 
chapter 3, fsQCA holds important advantages over conventional quantitative analyses 
and is especially suited to historical case-based research in which the central variables 
exhibit varying degrees of belongingness, and a given outcome can be the result of 
multiple conditional configurations. Certainly, however, there are limitations to this 
approach. Fuzzy-sets analysis is dependent on the careful construction and calibration of 
each variable in a theoretically informed and well-reasoned manner. Reasonable 
disagreements between researchers over the definitions of categories or the setting of 
calibration markers may result in very different analytical output and interpretation. It is 
essential, then, that the variable construction and calibration process be carefully detailed 
and that the interpretation of fsQCA results be carefully wedded to the construction of the 
variables themselves.  
The three solutions produced by the truth table algorithm – complex, 
parsimonious, and intermediate – represent the continuum of possible causal 
combinations producing the observed outcome. The complex solution comprises only 
those combinations that are observed in the data, while the parsimonious solution 
incorporates the observed causal combinations with all possible counterfactuals to 
produce the most simplified solution. The intermediate solution provides a midpoint on 
this continuum in which the complex solution is integrated with a limited array of 
counterfactual remainders that are determined by the researcher’s theoretical and 
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empirical knowledge. This intermediate solution is therefore preferred as the most 
interpretable solution, however, any representation of truth table results must include the 
parsimonious solution because this solution consists of those causal ingredients which are 
the most decisively associated with the outcome.  
The current chapter therefore details the intermediate and parsimonious solutions 
associated with each of the four justification frames detailed in chapter 2: the protection 
obligation frame, the power-interests frame, the suffering of innocents frame, and the 
group preservation frame. 
 
Sovereign Rights Logic of Justification Frames 
In chapter 2, I argued that sovereign rights logics of justification will be employed 
in different contexts by combatant actors depending on the extent to which they are 
integrated into the power structure of the state system. High power actors will be more 
likely to invoke sovereign rights frames when engaged in conflict with other high power 
actors because in this context, both actors are beneficiaries of the state system and so will 
seek to invoke the rules of the system for their benefit. Conversely, low power actors will 
invoke the sovereign rights logic of justification when in conflict with high power actors. 
Because of their relative exclusion from the state system, low power actors will seek to 
stake claim to the benefits of the system within which their opponents are privileged. In 
addition to the different combatant-structural contexts that I predict will be associated 
with the logic of justification, I also predicted that historical context will shape the 
discourses of justification employed. The authority of the state system has over time 
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become increasingly oriented toward the obligation of government toward the people 
under its rule. While the authority of the state system has been conventionally oriented 
toward the protection of and obligation to the material and status interests of the state, 
this orientation has gone through successive phases of transformation in which the 
protection of and obligation to the people which compose the state has become ever more 
central to the defining features of the state’s role and authority. I therefore expect that in 
the early eras of the state system that sovereign rights logics of justification will be linked 
with an interest-centric discourse, producing a power-interests frame. In later eras of the 
state system, this logic will be more strongly linked with a human-centric logic of 
justification producing a protection obligation frame. The middle eras of the state system 
will exhibit a mix between these two frames, highlighting this transformation. 
I therefore hypothesize that the power-interests frame will be produced by these four 
contexts: 
1. High power actors in early era conflicts characterized by power symmetry 
and/or power convergence (non-power divergence). 
2. High power actors in middle era conflicts characterized by power symmetry 
and/or power convergence (non-power divergence). 
3. Low power actors in early era conflicts characterized by power asymmetry 
and/or power divergence. 
4. Low power actors in middle era conflicts characterized by power asymmetry 
and/or power divergence. 
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Because I expect that the structural combatant conditions drive the use of the logic of 
justification, while the historical era drives the use of discourses of justification, I 
hypothesize that the protection obligation frame will be associated with the following 
four contexts: 
1. High power actors in middle era conflicts characterized by power symmetry 
and/or non-power divergence. 
2. High power actors in late era conflicts characterized by power symmetry and/or 
non-power divergence. 
3. Low power actors in middle era conflicts characterized by power asymmetry 
and/or power divergence. 
4. Low power actors in later era conflicts characterized by power asymmetry 
and/or power divergence. 
 
Power-Interests Frame 
The power-interests frame employs a sovereign rights logic of justification 
combined with an interest-centric discourse of justification. This frame justifies war-
making in terms of the power and authority possessed by the state to protect and defend 
its interests, namely, material and status interests. Material interests refer primarily to 
territory and natural resources, while status interests refers to the need to establish or 
maintain beneficial relations to other (typically similarly organized) polities and the need 
to defend against threats to the status quo. In other words, the state power-interests frame 
is primarily concerned with the prevention of a disruption to the established system of 
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polity organization, in this case, the international system of states. Similar to the 
protection obligation frame, the state power-interests frame can invoke an absence-of-
state claim, but here the absence-of-state claim is used to argue that war-making is 
necessary to protect the material and/or status interests of a political unit because the state 
that is imbued with the authority to do so is unwilling or unable to act.  Forty-seven 
percent of cases were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of power-
interests cases. 
The intermediate solution of the fuzzy sets truth table procedure using high 
threshold criteria (a consistency score of at least 0.90 and a frequency threshold of n=2) 




These causal combinations support the expectations regarding the different contexts in 
which high power and low power actors will employ a power interests frame, but do not 
support the expectation that later era conflicts will reflect a discursive shift from interest-
centric to human-centric justifications.  
In the first two combinations, high power actors employ the power interests frame 
in non-power divergent or symmetrical conflicts; in other words, in conflicts in which 
they are fighting other high power actors. The third solution further supports my 
expectation that low power actors employ a sovereign rights logic of justification in 
different contexts than high power actors. Much like the protection obligation frame, the 
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power interests frame is used by low power actors in later era conflicts that do not belong 
to the set of power symmetrical conflicts or power divergent conflicts. Given the manner 
in which these macro-variables were constructed, a conflict can be neither symmetrical 
nor power divergent in two circumstances: when a state system member with a recent 
colonial history engages in conflict with another state system member with which it 
shares a past colonial relationship, or when a non-state system member engages in 
conflict with a member of the state system with whom it does not share a past colonial 
relationship. In both instances, the low power actor is invoking a sovereign rights logic of 
justification in contexts in which it holds a lower level of power and integration within 
the state system relative to its opponent. 
Although these solutions support the expectations that the power-interests frame 
is employed by high-power actors in non-power divergent or symmetrical conflicts and 
by low power actors in power divergent or asymmetrical conflicts, they contradict the 
expectation that the power interests frame would be more strongly associated with earlier 
eras of conflict, giving way to human-centric justifications in later eras. Indeed, the 
parsimonious solution indicates that not belonging to the set of early or middle era 
conflicts, or being a power symmetrical conflict not occurring in the early era of the state 





To better understand why the power interests frame does not appear to be 
associated with earlier eras of conflict, we can lower the analysis threshold to open up 
more potential solutions. The intermediate solution of a lower threshold analysis (n=1 
and consistency >0.80) reveals two possible contexts in the early era of the state system 
associated with the use of a power interests frame: 
6. ~late*~mid*early*~powerdiv*~lopower*hipower 
7. ~late*~mid*early*~powersym*powerdiv*lopower*~hipower 
In solution 6, high power actors in the early era of the state system employ the 
power interests frame in non-power divergent conflicts, that is, in conflicts in which the 
combatant dyad share similarly high levels of power in the state system. In solution 7, 
low power actors in the early era of the state system employ the power interests frame in 
asymmetrical, power divergent conflicts. These solutions provide further support for the 
hypotheses that high power actors will use a sovereign rights logic in conflicts with other 
high power actors, while low power actors use a sovereign rights logic in conflicts that 
are asymmetrical and power divergent. These conditions occurring in the context of early 
era conflicts are not wholly different from the conditions that were associated with both 
low and high power actors employing the power interests frame in middle and later era 
conflicts. However, the lower threshold of analysis indicates that these causal 
combinations are not strongly consistent, and so must be interpreted with caution. 
Although the lower threshold analysis indicated that the conditions surrounding the use of 
this frame in the early era of the state system is not different from later eras, these 
solutions raise doubts about the prediction of a discursive shift from interest-centric to 
human-centric discourses over the course of the state system. To understand the nature of 
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this shift – or lack thereof - it is necessary to explore in greater depth cases that share 
conflict structural characteristics but occur in different eras of the state system. 
 
Protection Obligation Frame 
The protection obligation frame is composed of a sovereign rights logic of 
justification and a human-centric discourse. Here, justifications for war-making center on 
the responsibility of the governing apparatus to protect and defend the people under its 
rule. This justification is most strongly connected with one of the traditional defining 
features of the state system—that of the state holding a monopoly over the legitimate use 
of force. Because the state (largely) denies its citizens the right to use force for their own 
protection, the state has a responsibility to provide protection for those citizens against 
any perceived threat to their safety. The protection obligation frame is often used in the 
context of a state protecting its own citizens, but this is not always the case. The 
protection obligation frame may also be used by a state to justify fighting for the 
protection of the citizens of another state, arguing that if a state is not fulfilling its 
obligation to protect its citizenry then it becomes the responsibility of another state to 
step in and fill that role. Similarly, an absence-of-state argument may be used by a group 
within a state by claiming that because the state is not fulfilling its obligation to protect 
its citizenry, another polity must take on this responsibility until the state proves capable 
of doing so. The key component that distinguishes the protection obligation frame from 
humanitarian justifications that call for the protection of innocents is that the identity of 
those who are due protection is defined in terms of a geographic location; that is, they 
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largely occupy a distinct location that can be territorially identified and is (or is supposed 
to be) under the rule of a territorially delineated government. It is their physical location 
within specific geographic boundaries that warrants their protection. Fifty-three percent 
of cases were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of protection 
obligation cases. 
The intermediate solution of the fuzzy sets truth table procedure using high 
threshold criteria (a consistency score of at least 0.90 and a frequency threshold of n=2) 





The parsimonious solution, indicating the most central conditions contributing to the use 




The intermediate solution largely supports the hypotheses detailed above. The 
first two solutions indicate that the power obligation frame is used in non-power 
divergent conflicts among high power actors in both the middle and later eras of the state 
system. In the third solution, low power actors employ the protection obligation frame in 
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the later era of the state system in conflicts that are neither symmetrical nor power 
divergent. Given how these variables were constructed in chapter 3, there are only two 
logically possible contexts in which a conflict could be asymmetrical but not power 
divergent. One is a conflict in which an actor is classified as low power because they are 
not a member of the state system, and is engaged in conflict with a state system member 
with which there is no shared colonial history. Another possible context is a conflict in 
which an actor is classified as low power because it has been a recent colonial subject, is 
currently integrated into the state system, and is in conflict with a high power actor with 
which there is a shared colonial history.  
The parsimonious solution further supports the prediction that the protection 
obligation has become more prevalent over time as discourses of justification have 
shifted more strongly toward human-centric rather than interest-centric discourses. 
However, power divergence or dyadic symmetry are not implicated in the parsimonious 
solution as being a driving factor in the use of the protection obligation frame. Rather, 
conflicts occurring in the middle and later eras of the state system and belonging to the 
set of high power, and not low power, actors are implicated as the driving factors in the 
use of the protection obligation frame.  
Taken together, these causal combinations support two major findings. First, high 
power and low power actors use the same justification frame in very different contexts. 
Although the high power status of the combatant and middle or later eras of the state 
system were the conditions that were most decisively associated with the protection 
obligation frame in the parsimonious solution, the intermediate solution indicated that the 
state system integration and dyadic power characteristics between the central combatant 
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actors have a differing impact on high power and low power actors. For high power 
actors, the power obligation frame is employed in contexts in which both central 
combatants have a similar level of integration within the state system and/or have been a 
colonial power.13 In other words, since the advent of popular sovereignty in the late 18th 
to early 19th centuries, when members of the state system have fought other members of 
the state system in conflicts occurring they have increasingly come to employ a 
protection obligation justification frame. Low power actors, in contrast, tend to employ 
the protection obligation frame in one of two possible contexts: when a state system 
member with a recent colonial history engages in conflict with another state system 
member with which it shares a past colonial relationship, or when a non-state system 
member engages in conflict with a member of the state system with whom it does not 
share a past colonial relationship. In both instances, the low power actor is invoking a 
sovereign rights logic of justification in contexts in which it holds a lower level of power 
and integration within the state system compared with its opponent. 
Second, the protection obligation frame seems to have become more prevalent 
over time, with conflicts occurring in the later era being one of the strongest determining 
factors in the use of this frame, particularly among high power actors. This finding 
supports the expectation that human-centric discourses have become more prevalent over 
the course of the state system, and provides some support for my critique of the just war 
revival arguments and fracture narrative. These arguments suggested that states have had 
to revert to early modern models of justification because the traditional sovereignist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 High power actors are, without any exception that I have been able to locate, strongly integrated into the 
state system. While some high power actors have been colonial powers and some have not, I cannot find an 
example of an actor which has been a (relatively recent) colonial power but is not well integrated into the 
state system. 
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models of authority have been undermined by the non-conventional nature of recent 
conflicts. The results of this analysis, however, suggest that the uses of human-centric 
discourses in recent justifications for war are not a response to sovereignist models of 
justification. Rather, sovereignist logics of justification, such as within the protection 
obligation frame, remain prevalent even among high power actors. The discursive frames 
attached to these sovereignist logics, however, have become increasingly human-centric 
over time, reflecting how political authority has become successively more oriented with 
each historical era toward the obligation of government toward the people under its rule.  
However, the findings from the power-interests frame analysis, which also 
indicated that this frame was associated with the later era of the state system, sheds some 
doubt on the conclusion that human-centric discourses have become more prevalent over 
the course of the state system. Both frames appear to be strongly associated with the later 
era of the state system. By lowering the analysis threshold (n=1, consistency > 0.80), two 
further combinations associated with the protection obligation frame that indicate its 
usage in early and middle eras are revealed: 
7. lopower*powerdiv*~early*mid*late 
8. hipower*~lopower*~powerdiv*powersym*early*mid*~late 
In solution 7, low power actors employ the protection obligation frame in power 
divergent contexts in the middle or later eras of the state system, but not the early era. 
This solution is consistent with the expectations outlined above. However, solution 8 
indicates that high power actors employ the protection obligation frame in non-power 
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divergent, symmetric conflicts in the early or middle era of the state system, but not the 
later era.  
The fsQCA results for both the power-interests frame and protection obligation 
frame support the hypotheses that high power and low power actors employ a sovereign 
rights justification in different combatant-structural contexts. High power actors invoked 
sovereign rights frames when engaged in conflict with other high power actors, while low 
power actors invoked sovereign rights frames when in conflict with high power actors. 
These findings offer some evidence against the fracture narrative arguments that see state 
authority declining as low power, non-state actors increasingly come into conflict with 
high power state actors. Rather than the authority of the sovereign state system waning in 
the face of such challenges, the invocation of a sovereign rights logic of justification by 
low power actors against high power actors indicates that the authority of the state system 
remains strong; that is, the challenge to the state system is not a challenge to the nature of 
its authority, but rather, a challenge to include previously excluded actors into the 
benefits of that system. 
Although the combatant-structural contexts that I predicted would be associated 
with the sovereign rights logic of justification was supported by the fsQCA results, my 
prediction of a discursive shift from interest-centric to human-centric discourses over the 
course of the state system was not supported by these results. Rather, the conditions 
surrounding the use of both the protection obligation and power-interests frame were 
largely identical, and both frames were strongly associated with the later, and to a smaller 
extent, the middle eras of the state system. To better understand the extent to which the 
discourses of justification have (or have not) shifted from interest-centric to human-
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centric over the course of the state, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of those 
cases which are identical on all power integration and conflict structural characteristics 
but differ on the historical era in which the conflict occurred. 
 
Humanitarian Justice Logic of Justification Frames 
In chapter 2, I argued that humanitarian justice logics of justification will be 
employed by high power actors engaged in power divergent and/or asymmetrical 
conflicts. In these contexts, actors who hold a privileged position within the state system 
will seek to deny the benefits of that system from those have been wholly or partially 
excluded from it. By invoking a humanitarian logic of justification in power divergent 
and/or asymmetrical conflicts while invoking a sovereign rights logic of justification in 
non-power divergent and/or symmetrical conflicts, these high power actors are exerting 
the privilege of their flexibility within a system that is designed to benefit their status. If 
low power actors seek to challenge the authoritative logic of the system itself, they will 
invoke humanitarian justice logics in order to assert that that their right to wage war lays 
outside this system; however, I expect that low power actors are not likely to invoke these 
humanitarian justice claims because they in fact seek to be part of that system. By 
invoking sovereign rights logics of justification instead, low power actors are seeking to 
claim a stake in the benefits of a system from which they have largely been excluded. In 
addition, I expect that as the authority of the state system has become successively more 
oriented towards the obligations of government to the people under its rule over time, 
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there will be an observable shift from the group preservation frame to the suffering of 
innocents frame.   
I therefore hypothesize that the group preservation frame will be used in the following 
two contexts: 
1. High power actors in early era conflicts characterized by power divergence 
and/or power asymmetry. 
2. High power actors in middle era conflicts characterized by power divergence 
and/or power asymmetry. 
The suffering of innocents frame, therefore, will be associated with the following two 
contexts: 
1. High power actors in middle era conflicts characterized by power divergence 
and/or power asymmetry. 
2. High power actors in later era conflicts characterized by power divergence 
and/or power asymmetry. 
 
Group Preservation Frame 
A group preservation justification frame employs a humanitarian justice logic and 
an interest-centric discourse. This frame justifies war-making for the protection of the 
interests of a group (again, based on an identity that is independent from territorial 
political organizations). These interest claims can be in terms of the protection of a belief 
103 	  
system that is fundamental to the group’s identity (in particular, religion), a broader claim 
of threat to the group’s basic security and survival, the prevention of the spread of 
violence or security threat to other group members, or as a claim of unprovoked 
aggression. It is important to note that a claim of unprovoked aggression in the context of 
a humanitarian justice logic refers to the concept of a fundamental right to security that is 
independent from territorial political organization. Claims of unprovoked aggression may 
be present within a sovereign rights logic, but these claims are in terms of national 
security interests within a power-interests frame.  The essence of the unprovoked 
aggression claim within the group preservation frame is that the group has done nothing 
to deserve violence against it, but because of the aggressive actions of others, the group’s 
fundamental right to existence is threatened, necessitating the use of force. This frame 
was the least commonly invoked frame across the data set; only four percent of cases 
were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of group preservation cases. 
The truth table procedure produced no causal configurations, at either a low or 
high criteria threshold, that were associated with the use of a group preservation 
justification frame. Lowering the consistency threshold to 70%, however, reveals one 
intermediate solution that is worthy of further exploration: 
1. ~late*~mid*~early*powersym*~powerdiv*~lopower*hipower 
The parsimonious solution at this lower consistency threshold indicates that the most 





These solutions indicate that the group preservation frame is most likely to be 
associated with high power actors in symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. This 
finding is entirely contradictory to my hypothesis that humanitarian justifications are 
employed by high power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts. In 
addition, this solution indicates that this frame is associated with conflicts that are not 
part of the set of early, middle, or later era conflicts. There are two possibilities that can 
explain this solution: first, that this solution is logically inconsistent and should be 
disregarded (Ragin 2008), or that this solution is associated with not belonging to the set 
of any of these eras, but is prevalent in conflicts that occur in between eras, that is, in the 
historical spaces relatively long after one eventual articulation of political authority but 
relatively long before the next eventful articulation. In addition, because the consistency 
threshold is so low among these solutions (73%), it is difficult to assert with any 
confidence the factors that drive the use of the group preservation frame using this 
analysis. It is necessary, therefore to explore those few cases that employed a group 
preservation frame in greater depth.  
 
Suffering of Innocents Frame 
The suffering of innocents frame employs a humanitarian justice logic and a 
human-centric discourse.  This frame justifies war-making in the broad context of human 
rights and typically invokes the idea of the prevention of suffering of innocent people as a 
basis for action. Human rights claims within the suffering of innocents frames are distinct 
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from human-centric discourse claims within the protection obligation frame in the 
manner in which the claim invokes a fundamental right to basic security, independent 
from association with any territorial political organization.  Much like the group 
preservation frame, the suffering of innocents frame was commonly invoked across 
cases, but comprised a driving justification frame in only a few instances. Only seven 
percent of cases were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of suffering 
of innocents cases.  
The high threshold truth table analysis (n=2, consistency > 0.90) did not reveal 
any causal combinations associated with the suffering of innocents frame. Lowering the 
analysis threshold (n=1, consistency > 0.80) reveals one causal combination in the 
intermediate solution associated with the suffering of innocents frame: 
1. Late*~mid*~early*~powerdiv*~powersym*~lopower*~hipower 
This solution provides partial support for the above hypotheses, indicating that the 
suffering of innocents frame is associated with the later, but not early or middle eras of 
the state system. However, this solution does not support the hypothesis that high power 
actors are more likely to employ the suffering of innocents frame in this later era 
conflicts. Rather, it is actors who do not belong to the set of high power or to the set of 
low power actors who are associated with the use of this frame. In other words, the use of 
the suffering of innocents frame appears to be associated with middle power actors, those 
who have some level of power and status within the state system, but are not fully 
integrated. In addition, this solution indicates that this frame is associated with conflicts 
that are neither symmetrical nor power divergent. If it is the case that this frame is 
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associated with middle power actors, then a conflict that is both asymmetrical and not 
power divergent becomes possible in similar contexts to those described above for low 
power actors in asymmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. That is, a conflict in which 
the middle power actor is not strongly integrated into the state system and is in conflict 
with a state system member with whom there is no shared colonial history, or a conflict 
in which a middle power actor has been a recent colonial subject, is currently integrated 
into the state system, and is in conflict with a high power actors with which it shares a 
colonial history. The former instance would include, for example, non-state actors with 
some external state support in conflict with a high power member of the state system, 
while the latter would include former colonies that have recently become state system 
members in conflict with their recent colonial masters. 
The most decisive factors in driving the use of the suffering of innocents frame, 
however, appears to be not the colonial relationships between the combatants, but the 
status of the combatant as not belonging to the set of either high or low power actors and 
conflicts occurring in the late, but not the early or middle eras of the state system, as 
indicated by the parsimonious solution:   
2. ~hipower*~lopower*late 
3. ~hipower*~lopower*~early*~mid 
Taken together, these solutions indicate several fronts on which the above hypotheses 
should be reevaluated. First, my hypothesis that the interest-centric discourse of the group 
preservation frame should be more prevalent in earlier eras of conflict and the human-
centric discourse of the suffering of innocents frame should be more prevalent in later 
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eras of conflict was not supported. Although the suffering of innocents frame was 
associated with later era, and not early or middle era conflicts, the group preservation 
frame was not associated with any era of conflict. The low consistency threshold of the 
group preservation results, however, makes it impossible to draw any conclusions about a 
temporal shift over time.  
Second, my hypotheses predicted that high power actors in asymmetrical and/or 
power divergent conflicts would employ humanitarian logics of justification. The 
solutions associated with the group preservation frame largely supported this hypothesis, 
however, the solutions associated with the suffering of innocents frame did not. Instead, 
the suffering of innocents frame was associated with those actors who are not part of the 
set of either high or low power actors, indicating that it is most likely to be invoked by 
middle power actors, those who are partially integrated into the state system and/or have 
not experienced colonial subjugation. This surprising and interesting finding raises 
questions about both my own theoretical expectations as well as those of the fracture 
narrative.  
The fracture narrative argues that justification frames have transformed in recent 
decades, as low power actors challenge the authoritative structure of the sovereign state 
system, and high power actors have had to adjust they language they use to justify war in 
a political environment where the old rules of the game no longer apply. According to 
this reasoning, all actors, regardless of their power status characteristics, employ similar 
justification frames. Therefore, middle power actors should exhibit the same justification 
frameworks and the same shift if frameworks in recent decades as all other actors. I 
challenged this fracture narrative however, arguing instead that low and high power 
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actors employ justification frames in different historical and structural contexts. The 
tendency of the fracture narrative to conclude that the authoritative logic of the state 
system is under threat, I argued, results from a failure to disentangle how power, 
exclusion, and historical change interact to produce these frameworks. Rather than the 
authoritative logic of the state system fracturing under the weight of non-state 
challengers, I argued that the authority of the state system remains strong, predicting that 
the further excluded an actor is from this system of power, the more likely they will be to 
invoke sovereign rights logics of justification. The more integrated the actor, in contrast, 
the more likely they will be to invoke humanitarian justice logics of justification; not 
because the old rules of the system no longer apply, but rather because these high power 
actors are attempted to secure and maintain the exclusivity of their privileged position 
within that system. According to this line of reasoning, therefore, middle power actors 
should still invoke sovereign rights justifications when in conflict with high power actors, 
but may exhibit more of a mixture between sovereign rights and humanitarian logics of 
justification. If the authoritative power of the state system remains strong, and actors who 
are excluded from its power seek to access its benefits, then their status as partially, but 
not fully excluded, from the system of power should lead these middle power actors to 
assert their sovereign rights to wage war. However, their status as partially, but not fully 
integrated, from the system of power may also lead them to employ the same 
humanitarian logics of justification as high power actors. 
Despite the fsQCA results indicating that the suffering of innocents frame is 
associated with actors who are not part of the set of high power or low power actors, and 
associated with later era conflicts, an examination of cases that fit these criteria do not 
109 	  
support these configurations. The most recent case which was mostly or fully in the set of 
suffering of innocents was Italy in the 1935 Italian-Ethiopian War. Each of the 29 “later 
era” cases (conflicts occurring after 1945), are either neither in nor out or mostly out of 
the set of suffering of innocents cases.  This indicates that the solution produced by the 
low consistency threshold fsQCA algorithm is logically inconsistent and should be 
disregarded.  
 
Themes for Further Exploration 
The results of the fsQCA analysis supported several of the hypotheses outlined 
above, and raised areas where further analysis is needed. The results for the power-
interest and protection obligation frame supported my hypotheses that sovereign rights 
logics of justification are used by high power and low power actors in very different 
contexts. High power actors employ sovereign rights logics of justification in 
symmetrical and non-power divergent conflicts, while low power actors employ 
sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical and power divergent conflicts. 
Both of these relationships held true for later era conflicts. These findings indicate that 
the authoritative logic underpinning the sovereign state system is not under threat in the 
manner described by the fracture narrative. Those actors who are excluded from the 
power of the state system employ sovereign rights logics when in conflict with high 
power actors, and those who are highly integrated into this power structure employ 
sovereign logics of justification when in conflict with other high power actors. This 
pattern indicates that those who are excluded from the sovereign state system are seeking 
110 	  
to access its benefits, not challenge its authority. Because these associations were present 
at a high analytical threshold (n=2 and consistency > 0.90), I have confidence in 
concluding that this portion of my hypotheses was supported. 
Although fsQCA proved useful for understanding the power and combatant 
symmetry contexts that drive the use of the two types of sovereign rights logic of 
justification, this analysis was less fruitful in revealing evidence for the use of frames 
employing a humanitarian justice logic of justification. The solutions provided by the 
fuzzy sets analysis indicated that the group preservation frame was employed in a very 
different context than my theory predicted: by high power actors in symmetrical 
conflicts, rather than by high power actors in asymmetrical or power divergent conflicts. 
However, the low consistency threshold associated with this solution raises doubts about 
any interpretation that can be drawn from these findings. Another possible explanation 
for this lack of evidence in the fsQCA results is that these frames were simply not used 
with enough prevalence across the cases in the data set to allow decisive causal 
combinations to emerge. This would indicate that these frames, while commonly used, 
have been and continue to be secondary frames among both high power and low power 
actors.  
Although the fsQCA results could not give insight into the conditional 
configurations that contribute to the use of the group preservation or suffering of 
innocents frames, this lack of a finding does provide useful information to contribute to 
this dissertation’s critique of the just war revival and fracture narrative. Very few cases 
exhibited a strongly humanitarian logic of justification; the fracture narrative claims are 
premised on the notion that the reemergence of this just war language, the language that 
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was characteristic of early modern Europe before the Westphalian transformation. The 
evidence provided here indicates that the humanitarian justice logic of justification is 
employed consistently as a secondary frame throughout the history of the state system, 
but only emerges as a dominant frame in a very small number of cases, mostly occurring 
at the very early stages of the state system. There is no evidence that these frames have 
made a resurgence in recent decades. 
For all the frames employed above, it was difficult to pinpoint a concrete 
historical pattern. It does not appear that interest-centric discourses have given way to 
more human-centric discourses over the course of the state system. To better understand 
how transformations in political authority over time have impacted the discourses of 
justification employed, it is necessary to examine how these discourses are employed in 
different historical contexts among actors and conflicts with identical conflict structural 
characteristics. 
The remainder of this dissertation therefore proceeds as follows. In chapter 5, I 
examine three cases of conflict with identical power and conflict structural characteristics 
that occur at three different points in the history of the state system. By keeping all 
variables constant except for historical era, I am better equipped to understand how this 
variable influences the use of justification discourses. 
The low consistency scores associated with the causal combinations produced by 
the truth table algorithm for the group preservation and suffering of innocents frames do 
not allow me to draw any conclusions about the causal factors associated with these 
frames. Only three conflicts within the dataset were calibrated as being mostly or fully in 
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the set of cases characterized by the group preservation frame. In chapter 6, I examine 
these three cases in depth to help uncover the conditions that are associated with the use 
of this frame. 
In chapter 7, I explore one particular justification discourse that exhibited a 
noteworthy pattern. Early in the coding process, I noticed a particularly interesting 
pattern among combatants with relatively low levels of power and status integration 
within the state system. These low power actors appeared far more likely than high power 
actors to invoke the dignity and perceived humiliation as a discourse of justification for 
waging war. The need to protect the dignity of the polity that the combatant group 
represented and avenge or prevent its humiliation emerged as a common driving factor 
for the justification of war. To understand what meaning might lay behind this apparent 




Chapter 5 Interest-Centric to Human-Centric? Examining the 
impact of historical era on discourses of justification 
The findings of the fsQCA truth table algorithm indicated strong support for the 
hypothesis that high and low power actors employ sovereign rights logics of justification 
in different contexts. However, there was less support for the hypothesis that the 
discourses of justification within this sovereign rights logic have shifted over time from 
an interest-centric to a human-centric justification. This chapter uses a small-n 
comparative case analysis to examine the extent to which a discursive shift can, or can 
not, be observed. 
To understand this possible shift, I examine three cases of a high power actor 
involved in highly symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts at three points in time 
over the course of the state system. I choose these types of cases for several reasons. 
First, to understand the impact of historical era on discourses of justification, it is 
necessary to keep all conditions other than historical era constant. Second, choosing three 
cases of high power, symmetrical, and non-power divergent conflict holds a number of 
advantages over, for example, low power, asymmetrical, power divergent conflicts. Fully 
state actors are the most common type of actor appearing in the data set, which allows for 
greater historical range in selecting cases. Because of the variety of levels at which an 
actor can be integrated into the state system, it is much more difficult to find three 
conflicts at different points in time that have equivalently matched characteristics in 
terms of power integration and dyad symmetry. Finally, looking closely at high power 
actors in particular is useful for examining a particular claim of the just war revival: that 
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it is high power actors who have had to adjust their justification language over time as the 
authoritative power of the state system has waned. I argued that the tendency to observe a 
shift in the language used by high power actors over time was not a result of the 
challenged posed by non-state actors to the authority of the state system, but rather a 
discursive shift within a sovereign rights logic of justification from interest-centric to 
human-centric discourses as the authority of the state system became increasingly 
oriented towards the obligations of the state to the people under its rule. The fsQCA 
results in the previous chapter provided support for my hypothesis that sovereign rights 
logics of justification remain a dominant frame among high power actors, but did not 
provide support for a discursive shift over time. 
Great Britain provides a useful case to examine a possible discursive shift in the 
use of a sovereign rights logic of justification. Because Great Britain appears with high 
frequency in the data set, appears in each historical era, and is highly integrated into the 
state system across the historical range of this data set, it is a useful country case to 
examine the extent to which high power actors have exhibited a discursive shift within 
the sovereign rights logic of justification over the past four centuries. Great Britain 
appears in the data set as a combatant 11 times in 10 distinct conflicts (in the 1642 
English Civil War it appears as a combatant twice in the same conflict). Three of these 
conflicts were fully symmetrical: the Seven Years’ War beginning in 1756, the Second 
World War beginning in 1940, and the Falklands/Malvinas War beginning in 1982.  
The results of the fuzzy-sets analysis indicated that causal conditions associated 
with the use of a sovereign rights logic of justification are high power actors engaged in 
highly symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. That is, actors who are well 
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integrated into the state system and have a history of being a colonial power or do not 
have a history of being a colonial subject in conflict with other actors with similar levels 
of state system integration and colonial history. By examining each of these symmetrical 
conflicts that Great Britain engaged in in different historical eras, we are able to hold 
constant those conditions that are associated with logic of justification use and observe 
the effect of historical era on discourses of justification.  
 
The Seven Years’ War, 1756 
The outbreak of hostilities between France and Great Britain on the North 
American continent was a spillover of tensions leftover from the previous decade’s war 
of Austrian Succession. After the treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle that had ended the war 
between Austria and Prussia in 1750, both Maria Theresa of Austria and Frederick II of 
Prussia sought European allies in an effort to counter each other’s growing power: France 
backed Austria’s Hapsburg dynasty while Britain allied itself with Prussia’s 
Hohenzollern dynasty. Britain and France already had competing interests in North 
America, and saw in these alliances to the opposing great dynasties of Europe a growing 
threat to each other’s colonial expansions.  
The Seven Years’ War on the North American continent occurred at a historical 
moment of transition between the Westphalian transformation that began in 1648 and the 
emergence of popular sovereignty that would come to characterize the American and 
French revolutions two decades later. Occurring at this moment when Westphalian 
discourses of material and status interests remained prevalent but at a time when 
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discourses surrounding the obligations of the government to be responsive to the will of 
the people under its rule where beginning to take hold, we should expect to observe the 
need to wage war in this conflict to be articulated primarily in terms of power-interests 
with protection obligation emerging as a secondary justification. Indeed, we find this to 
be the case. Of the 32 discourse codes applied to these documents, 44 percent were 
interest-centric, 38 percent were human-centric, and 19 percent were universal codes.    
Two lengthy primary documents give insight into how the British colonial 
authority in North America conceived of articulated their cause of war against the French 
colonial presence. The first is the Plan of Union, given by Arthur Dobbs, the governor of 
North Carolina, before the North Carolina colonial general assembly in December, 1754 
(Dobbs 1754). The second is the declaration of war issued by the British Crown against 
the King of France in 1756 (King George II 1756). 
In the summer of 1754, delegates from seven colonial assemblies met in Albany, 
New York to draft and vote on a plan of union between the colonies in an effort to 
strengthen British imperial administration over the area, regulate colonial-Indian 
relations, and resolve territorial disputes between the colonies. The plan, originally 
proposed by Benjamin Franklin, was ultimately voted down, as many colonial governors 
were reluctant to subordinate their administrative power to a single colonial authority. 
However, the efforts to strengthen common colonial defense did not end in Albany. In 
December, Governor Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina continued to advocate a plan of 
union to his own colonial assembly, specifically contextualizing the need for a colonial 
union for the defense against the coming, and necessary, hostilities against France.  
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Dobbs’ speech begins by framing the need and authority for fighting France in 
terms of the universal codes. First, by specifying that the “ever active and ambitious 
France, under the insatiable and rapacious House of Bourbon” pose an ever growing 
threat to the “Liberties of Europe,” Dobbs frames the cause for war in broad terms of the 
amassing threat that France’s actions pose to the common good of the peoples of Europe. 
Dobbs then proceeds by citing specific risks to the economic and status interests of 
Britain, claiming that France’s expansion in North America, 
“…by securing the Fisheries, and Naval Stores of America, they would 
increase their Marina, and ruin the Commerce, and with it the Naval 
Power of Britain; and then they wou’d divide America with the Spaniards, 
and the whole wou’d center in the House of Bourbon, for then, by the 
Assistance of France, Portugal must fall an early Prey to the Power of 
Spain, and the French wou’d stipulate to have the Brazil, Africa, and 
India, yielded to them as the elder Branch of the House of Bourbon, and 
then the Wealth and Power of Britain, being reduced, all the Powers of 
Europe, tho’ united, could not withstand the united Power and Wealth of 
the House of Bourbon, it being demonstrable, that those who have the 
Wealth, Power, and Commerce of America, Africa, and the Indies, must 
be Masters of the Liberties of Europe.”  
Here, Dobbs invokes the regional security interests of Europe and the national security 
interests of Britain, as well as both the present and future the economic interests of 
Europe as the primary factors in need of protection through armed conflict. Similar 
interest-centric discourses are used throughout the document. In addition to these security 
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and economic interests, the need to protect the interests of Britain’s allies and dependents 
likewise form a central justification in Dobbs’ account: 
“Are they not gaining all the Indian Nations, intercepting and depriving us 
of our Indian Allies, and daily instigating their Allies to scalp, massacre, 
and destroy our Settlers: These are all Facts too notorious and recent to be 
denied; and must naturally discover to us the whole Plan and Scheme laid 
by the French to confine, conquer, and enslave all our Colonies….then 
they propose proceeding further, and to seize and secure all the Passes on 
the Mountains, and head the Indians against all our colonies, and force us 
to become a tributary, or to submit to the arbitrary Government of France, 
and become their Slaves….” 
These statements of justification contextualize the need to protect and defend Britain’s 
Indian allies on the continent, both as an interest-centric argument regarding the 
protection of territorial and economic interests in the colonies, as well as a human-centric 
argument regarding the obligation of the British government to protect the lives and 
safety of its colonial settler subjects. Human-centric discourses comprise much of the 
middle portion of Dobbs’ speech, along with the need to protect the religious traditions of 
the British against the “Popish Schemes” of the Catholic French: “If we then give the 
French Time to execute the Scheme they have begun, the Liberties, Properties, and 
Protestant Religion in these Colonies will be unavoidably lost.” 
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Dobbs concludes by again citing the obligation of the British colonial government 
to protect the British interests, support their Indian allies, and protect the Protestant 
religion: 
“Let us then cheerfully give what is reasonable and proper for us…as well 
knowing that a moderate Sum now granted, will go farther in securing our 
Rights and Properties, than Ten Times as much if longer delayed: Let us 
then inspire the other Colonies with an equal Fire to maintain their 
Religion and Liberties, and to preserve the Friendship, and defend the 
rights of our Indian Allies, this, as grateful Men, we owe to them...this will 
shew the Gallic Monarch, and his insatiable Ministry, that we are not to be 
intimidated or bullied out of our Rights, and that if he should insist upon 
his romantic Scheme of surrounding, confining and enslaving us, that we 
will jointly and unanimously support our valuable Religion, Liberties, and 
Properties, with our Lives and Fortunes….” 
The discursive claims put forth by Dobbs in his speech to the North Carolina assembly in 
December of 1754 reappear – in much more concise fashion – in the official declaration 
of war issued by the British crown in May of 1756. This declaration begins by firmly 
establish the authority to wage war in a sovereign rights logic of justification, citing the 
“Usurpations and Encroachments made by [the French] upon Our Territories” as well as 
the violations of the “solemn Treaties and Engagements… [that] has been evaded under 
the most frivolous Pretences….” The declaration then proceeds by specifying three 
factors in need of protection for which the war must be fought. The first discursive claim 
argues that: 
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“notwithstanding this Act of Hostility, which could not be but looked upon 
as a Commencement of War, yet, from Our earnest Desire of Peace, and in 
Hopes the Court of France would disavow this Violence and Injustice, We 
contented Ourselves with fending such a Force to America, as was 
indispensably necessary for the Defense and Protection of Our Subjects 
against fresh Attacks and Insults.” 
Here, the British crown invokes a protection obligation frame, arguing that despite its 
hopes for a peaceful settlement with France, it was essential to dispatch an armed force 
against France in order to protect British subjects from French aggression. In addition to 
this human-centric discourse, the British declaration of war invokes an interest-centric 
discourse: 
“In these Circumstances We could not but think it incumbent upon Us, to 
endeavor to prevent the Success of so dangerous a Design, and to oppose 
the Landing of the French Troops in America; and, in consequence of the 
just and necessary Measures We had taken for that Purpose…great Bodies 
of Troops marched down to the Coast; and Our Kingdoms were threatened 
with an invasion. In order to prevent the Execution of these Designs, and 
to provide for the Security of Our Kingdoms, which were thus threatened, 
We could no longer forbear giving Orders for the seizing at Sea the Ships 
of the French King….” 
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In response to the perceived aggressive intentions of the French, the British crown 
responds by asserting the necessity of using force to protect the national security interests 
and territorial integrity of the British Kingdom.  
The British justifications for waging war against France in the mid-18th century 
exhibit characteristics consistent with expectations regarding the discursive frames that 
my theory would be predict should be employed in this high power, symmetrical, and 
non-power divergent conflict at the end of the Westphalian age and the dawn of the age 
of popular sovereignty. Interest-centric discourses were dominant in both accounts, with 
human-centric discourses emerging as a prominent, but secondary justification. If human-
centric discourses indeed become more prevalent as the authority of the state system 
becomes successively more oriented toward the obligation of government to the will and 
well-being of its constituent population, then later conflicts should exhibit this shift with 
human-centric discourses surpassing interest-centric discourses as the primary need for 
waging war. 
 
The Second World War, 1939 
The causes of the Second World War were global and complex, including 
Japanese imperialism in the east, the rise of communism in Russia, and unsettled tensions 
in the European balance of power. Here I focus on the conflict between Germany and 
Great Britain that emerged in the summer of 1939 and that ultimately led to the outbreak 
of violence across Western Europe. In the years after the First World War, German 
bitterness over their military loss and the harsh economic punishments enacted by the 
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Treaty of Versailles allowed for the rise of a fascist regime under Adolf Hitler. Hitler’s 
promises of territorial expansion and a renewal of the former glory of the empire 
appealed to German nationalistic sentiments. In 1938, Hitler set his sights on Poland, 
claiming that the large German ethnic population in the city of Danzig needed protection 
and should be under German control. When Poland refused to turn Danzig over to the 
Germans, Hitler threatened invasion. Great Britain, supported by their French ally, 
promised retaliation if the Germans encroached on Polish territory. After a tense summer 
of speeches and communications between Germany and Britain, the German military 
commenced its invasion of Poland, sparking six years of war that would be the deadliest 
in European history. 
Britain’s involvement in the Second World War occurred in a historical context in 
which the authority of the state was transitioning between national and supra-national 
authority. In the era of national sovereignty that dominated from the mid to late 19th 
century, political authority was largely contextualized in terms of the rights of self-
determination. For Europeans and the former European colonies in Latin America, this 
expression of national self-determination was notably articulated in the “springtime of the 
nations” popular revolutions beginning in 1848. While notions of national sovereignty 
and self-determination were gaining an authoritative foothold in Europe and the former 
European colonies of the Americas, much of the rest of the world was continuing to 
experience the political authority of the state system as subjects of the European (and by 
the end of the 19th century, American) colonial powers. Throughout this era of colonial 
expansion at the turn of the 20th century, resistance to colonial authority both drew upon 
and challenged European ideals of popular national sovereignty, emphasizing universal 
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human rights and the right to self-determination for all people as a vital component of the 
authority of the state system. The events of the Second World War serve as a notable 
historic marker in another transformation in the authority of the state system. At the end 
of this war, the resistance to colonial rule among those people, particularly in south Asia, 
who had fought and died in support of imperial powers of France and Great Britain 
during the wars, found that their status within the imperial system was still subjugated. At 
the same time, the World War had weakened the administrative capacity of the great 
imperial powers over their colonial holdings. The transforming nature of political 
authority at this time was most notably articulated by the official end of British colonial 
rule in India and the establishment of the independent states of India and Pakistan in 
1947, events which became a source of inspiration for a number of colonial independence 
movements in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. The idea formed at this time was 
that there was a political authority that existed beyond the state and that to protect values 
of human rights and self-determination, states should subordinate some aspects of 
national sovereignty to supranational authoritative structures. In this context, I therefore 
expect justification discourses to be predominantly human-centric, particularly focusing 
on the right to self-determination and the need to defend the authority of supranational 
structures, such as the United Nations. Interest-centric discourses may still be prevalent 
as secondary frames, but should exhibit evidence of being less powerful than human-
centric discourses. 
Six primary documents were collected declaring the Britain’s justification for war 
against Germany in the weeks leading up to armed conflict, from June 10th to September 
4th, 1939: two speeches of the Prime Minister before Parliament, one speech of the 
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Secretary of State before Parliament, two letters of official correspondence between the 
British to the German head of state, and a radio broadcast from the Prime Minister to the 
German people of Danzig on the eve of attack (Great Britain 1939). Within these 
documents, 21 discourses of justification are invoked; 81 percent of the discourses are 
interest-centric, while no explicitly human-centric discourses are invoked. Nineteen 
percent of the discursive claims are universal discourses of justification, all of which 
invoke the need to protect the common good and general peace of humanity. This pattern 
directly contradicts the hypothesis that human-centric discourses should be invoked more 
prominently in this 20th century conflict relative to the predominantly interest-centric 
discourses of the late Westphalian to early popular sovereignty eras. 
Two types of interest-centric discourses were invoked in these documents: the 
most common (48 percent of the discursive claims) was for the protection of allies. One-
third of the discursive claims invoked the need to protect the national security interests of 
Britain as well as the regional security interests of Europe. The protection of allies claim 
is exhibited in a speech given by Prime Minister Chamberlain to the House of Commons 
on July 10, 1939: 
“the issue could not be considered as purely local matter involving the 
rights and liberties of the Danzigers, which incidentally are in no way 
threatened, but would at once raise graver issues affecting Polish national 
existence and independence. We have guaranteed to give our assistance to 
Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence, which considers it 
vital to resist with her national forces, and we are firmly resolved to carry 
out this undertaking.” 
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Here we see evidence of the political authority of national sovereignty, with Poland’s 
national independence made central to the need for war; however, rather than arguing for 
this need in terms of the right of the Polish people to national independence, Chamberlain 
argues for this need in terms of the obligations of alliance between nations. This 
sentiment is further expressed in the official reply of His Majesty’s Government to a 
letter from the German Chancellor on August 28th: 
“The German Government will be aware that His Majesty’s Government 
have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they 
intend to honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great 
Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence 
of a State to whom they have given their guarantee.” 
In an official letter two days later, His Majesty’s Government again asserts the interest-
centric argument of the need to protect its allies: 
“His Majesty’s Government repeat that they reciprocate the German 
Government’s desire for improved relations, but it will be recognized that 
they could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain 
that improvement.” 
The Secretary of State, Viscount Halifax, employed this same argument in a speech to 
Parliament on August 24th, stating “…we do not think of asking Germany to sacrifice her 
national interests, but we do insist that the interests of other States should be respected.” 
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When hostilities commenced on September 4, 1939, Chamberlain gave a radio 
broadcast directly to the German people, putting the protection of Britain’s Polish allies 
in terms of its own status interests:  
“Your country and mine are now at war. Your Government has bombed 
and invaded the free and independent State of Poland, which this country 
is honour bound to defend….You may ask why Great Britain is 
concerned. We are concerned because we gave our word of honour to 
defend Poland against aggression.” 
While the majority of Britain’s discursive claims were put in terms of the protection of its 
Polish ally, broader national and regional security interests accounted for approximately 
one-third of all the discursive claims. Secretary of State Viscount Halifax argued in a 
speech to Parliament on August 24th that 
“As a matter of history, successive British Governments have felt obliged 
to resist attempts by a single Power to dominate Europe at the expense of 
others, and the imposition of one country’s will by force of arms. This 
country has stood for the maintenance of the independence of those States 
who both valued their liberties and were ready to defend them….Our 
object is, and has been, to build an international order based on mutual 
understanding and mutual confidence, but that order can only rest on the 
basis of certain moral principles which are widely recognized to be 
essential to the peaceful and the orderly life of nations, and among those 
principles I place high the renunciation of forcible solutions and the 
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respect for the pledged word in international relationships. And, 
fundamentally, it is those principles which are to-day as we see it in 
danger, and it is those principles which we consider it vital to try and 
protect.” 
This supranational authority is again evident in an official letter from His Majesty’s 
Government to the German Government on August 28th, where the British suggest that 
any discussions to negotiate peace must be centered on “the safeguarding of Poland’s 
essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.” 
The evidence provided in these documents from the British government at the 
start of the Second World War do not support the hypothesis of a transition from interest-
centric to human-centric discourses as the state system became increasingly oriented 
toward the human rights, self-determination, and supranational authority. Rather, the 
British government articulated its need to go to war in terms of its obligation to allies, its 
status interests, and the regional security interests of Europe. These discursive claims 
were made in the context of an emerging notion of supranational authority, with emphasis 
on the need to strengthen international relationships and to use international guarantees 
the basis to secure peaceful settlement of disputes. In this context, it is entirely reasonable 
to imagine the British government invoking a human-centric discourse in its obligation to 
fulfill its promises to Poland by invoking the need to protect the Polish people as citizens 
of state that the British had guaranteed to protect. Instead, they assert that armed force is 
necessary for the existence of the Polish state as a governing entity. Even when citing 
specific attacks by the Germans against Polish towns, the British government does not 
invoke the need to protect the Polish people, or innocent women and children, but rather 
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to protect the independence and security of the Polish state. When speaking directly to 
the German people, Chamberlain could have invoked the humanitarian cost of German’s 
aggression; instead, he emphasizes Poland’s right to sovereign independence as a free 
state. 
 
The Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982 
The conflict that erupted in 1982 between Britain and Argentina over the tiny 
south Atlantic Islands (known to the British as the Falklands, South Georgia, and South 
Sandwich islands and to the Argentinians as the Malvinas) came as a surprise to the 
international community. The islands, a few hundred miles from Argentina’s southeastern 
coast, had been British possessions since 1833. Though Argentina had requested on 
several occasions that the islands be turned over into their possession, Britain retained 
control, arguing that the vast majority of the islands’ several thousand inhabitants 
identified as British subjects. In the 1980s, as Argentine society was in the midst of 
economic, political and social upheaval, the government of Argentine president Galtieri 
saw the disputed islands as an opportunity to whip up patriotic unity and distract from the 
country’s troubles. An Argentine force invaded the islands on April 2, 1982, and quickly 
compelled the Falkland’s minimally staffed defense force into surrender. The British, 
caught off guard by the surprise invasion, quickly assembled a task force to regain 
control of the islands. For nearly two months, the two countries fought over control of the 
tiny islands, whose main economic activities were fishing and sheep herding. Nearly 
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1,000 people were killed on both sides before the British retook the islands and forced an 
Argentine surrender in June.  
The Falklands/Malvinas War occurred at a moment of transition between the eras 
of supranational authority and the era of fragmented authority that would come to 
characterize the post-Cold War political context. At this late stage in the Cold War era, 
the bipolar superpower system that characterized the supranational state system was 
already strained by a weakening Soviet Union and a growing challenge of non-state 
combatants to the stability of the state system. In this context, my theory would predict 
that a high power actor in a symmetrical conflict would invoke predominantly human-
centric frames within a sovereign rights logic of justification, that is, predominantly a 
protection obligation frame, with minimal invocation of interest-centric claims. Indeed, 
this appears to be case.  
In the two months that surrounded this brief conflict, seven primary documents 
explicitly outlining Britain’s justification for the use of force against Argentina were 
collected.14 Two of these documents were speeches given by Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher before the House of Commons, two were interviews given by Thatcher on 
television and radio, one was a speech given by Thatcher at a public event, one was a 
speech given by British representative to the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons, and one was an 
official appeal submitted to the UN by the British government. Within these documents, 
31 discursive claims are invoked, the vast majority of these (68 percent) being human-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 All documents cited here were taken from The Margaret Thatcher Foundation online archive, available at 
www.margaretthatcher.org 
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centric claims. Nineteen percent were interest-centric claims, and 16 percent were 
universal claims to protect the common good.  
Interest-centric frames comprised a minority of the discursive claims invoked by 
Britain to justify the use of force against Argentina, and these interest-centric claims were 
exclusively oriented toward the territorial sovereignty of the British state. In fact, this is 
the very first claim invoked by Thatcher upon calling an emergency session of Parliament 
following the news of the Argentine invasion on April 3. Thatcher opens her remarks to 
Parliament by saying “The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great 
gravity. We are here because, for the first time in many years, British sovereign territory 
has been invaded by a foreign power.” In an interview two days later, Thatcher again 
asserts “We have to recover what is our sovereign territory…. If this [invasion] succeeds 
there will be other examples of it elsewhere. Therefore we have a duty to our territory, to 
our people, but also a duty to see that these aggressive moves do not succeed.” Here 
Thatcher intertwines interest- and human-centric discursive claims by invoking the 
government’s obligation to both its territory and its people. 
The vast majority of these human-centric claims called for the protection of 
British citizens to whom the government was legally and morally obligated to defend. In 
a speech to Parliament on April 3, 1982, Prime Minister Thatcher argued for the need to 
use force to expel the Argentine invasion of the islands by claiming that  
“The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United 
Kingdom, are an island race…. They are few in number, but they have the 
right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine 
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their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the 
Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty’s 
Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right.” 
As was the case in World War II, the right to self-determination forms the central 
authoritative logic by which the British claim the right to wage war. However, unlike in 
the case of WWII, the need to wage war is articulated using human-centric language, 
both in terms of the obligation to protect to those who give their allegiance to the British 
government, as well as the need to carry out the wishes of the British people to uphold 
the Falklanders right to self-determination. Thatcher again expresses this discourse in an 
April 3 interview, in which she asserts, “we have to recover [the Falkland islands] for the 
people on them are British and British stock and they still owe allegiance to the crown 
and want to be British. We have to what is necessary to recover those islands.” In a 
speech on April 30, Thatcher further emphasizes that the obligation of a government to 
its citizens holds regardless of how far away these citizens are to homeland. Speaking 
about the nationalistic reaction to the Argentine incursion, Thatcher comments that the 
crisis “awoke in Britain an fantastic pride of country” with the realization that “this 
country was a free country and we weren’t going to have other people walking all over 
British citizens even though they were 8,000 miles away.” Thatcher further asserts the 
obligations to the Falkland British citizens in a May 17 interview: 
“…the Falkland Islanders are British citizens. British citizens have ben 
invaded. If they can’t look to their own country to protect them, to go and 
try to get the invader off, what future is there for anyone in this world? 
...And don’t forget…you’re dealing with a country that hasn’t exactly got 
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a good record on human rights. Are you going to leave our people to be 
under the heel of that kind of junta?” 
Here Thatcher invokes a human rights argument for using force, but does so within the 
context of a protection obligation frame. It is not simply because the human rights of the 
Falklanders are under threat that warrants action, but because those people are British 
citizens that the government must act. In addition, this claim is firmly embedded in the 
authoritative structure of the state system; Thatcher asserts a dangerous future for all 
people if they cannot expect the protection of their government against foreign invasion.  
The authoritative context of the supranational era is likewise evident in language 
invoked by Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons. In a speech before the 
UN Security Council on April 3, Parsons argues that whether the Falklanders number 
“1,800 or 18,000 or 18 million, they are still entitled to the protection of international law 
and they are entitled to have their freely expressed wishes respected.” In a formal appeal 
to the UN on 21 May, the British government further asserts that Argentina’s “unlawful 
use of force in unprovoked aggression threatened not only to destroy the democratic way 
of life freely chosen by the Falkland Islanders but also the basis on which international 
order rests.” Within the context of supranational authority, the British claim for the need 
to use force against Argentina is premised both on the right of self-determination of its 
citizens as well as an obligation to protect the international system which is premised on 
that right.   
The evidence provided by Britain’s claims surrounding the initiation of the 
Falklands/Malvinas War indicates that human-centric language was more dominant in 
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this conflict than the two earlier examples of conflict provided. The British government 
articulated its need to go to war predominantly in terms of its obligation to protect its 
citizens, and secondarily, in terms of obligations to protect territorial sovereignty. These 
discursive claims were made in the context of a supranational authority that was at the 
beginnings of a transformation, with emphasis on the need to safeguard the rules of the 
dominant international system. In this context, it is entirely reasonable to imagine the 
British government invoking interest-centric discourses in a more dominant manner, by 
emphasizing its territorial rights under international law. Instead, territorial claims 
comprised a minority of the discursive claims, with the arguments for the use of force 
framed predominantly in terms of citizen rights and the obligations of government to 
protect its citizens regardless of their territorial location. These claims highlight the 
overarching supranational authority that dominated the political context at this historical 
moment, in which the protection of citizen rights and the right to self-determination are 
conceived of as legitimate causes for war.  
 
Conclusion 
My hypothesis regarding the shift from interest-centric to human-centric 
discourses over the course of the state system was rooted in an effort to explain why the 
fracture narrative suggested that recent conflicts have exhibited justifications framed 
more in terms of the need to protect people rather than the need to protect interests. I 
argued that the tendency to perceive of this transformation was rooted in a discursive, 
rather than a logical shift in the nature of war justifications over time. I argued that 
because successive phases in the development of the international system of sovereign 
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states became increasingly oriented towards the obligation of governments to their 
constituent populations, that those embedded within the fracture narrative were picking 
up on a discursive, but not a logical shift. 
Fuzzy-sets analysis did not support this expectation, and this chapter’s 
examination of the Seven Years’ War, the Second World War, and the 
Falklands/Malvinas War provided somewhat mixed results. Instead of human-centric 
discourses becoming more steadily more prevalent, the pattern that emerged was that 
Great Britain, as a high power actor in highly symmetrical, non-power divergent 
conflicts, employed mostly interest-centric and some human-centric discourses in the 
Seven Years’ War, exclusively interest-centric frames in the Second World War and 
predominantly human-centric frames in the Falklands/Malvinas War.  
One possible explanation for this pattern is that the creation of supranational 
organizations, such as the United Nations, after WWII made human-centric discourses 
more necessary. As is evident in the Falkland/Malvinas war, appeals to the United 
Nations by both countries were strongly situated in a context of human rights and self-
determination. If it was the creation of the United Nations that necessitated this discursive 
shift, then we should see evidence of this shift before and after 1945. However, 
examining the proportion of interest-centric vs. human-centric discourses employed by 
all high power actors in symmetrical conflicts before and after 1945 (figure 5.1), there 
appears to be no discernable temporal trend indicating periods of time in which human-
centric or interest-centric trends are more prevalent. Similarly, figure 5.2 demonstrates no 
discernable temporal trend among all conflicts in the data set.  
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Because there is no discernable temporal trend, the factors that influence the use 
of human- or interest-centric discourses must be structural or contextual in nature. The 
fsQCA results did not point to power integration, dyad symmetry, colonial power/subject 
history, or colonial relationships factors influencing the use of discourses of justification. 
Therefore, the conditions that drive the use of human- or interest-centric discourses must 
be outside of the score of variables considered by this study. This suggests that future 
research should examine a broader range of factors than those considered in the current 
study. 
 
Figure 5.1 Discourses of Justification Used by High Power Actors in Symmetrical 




Figure 5.2 Discourses of Justification Used by all Actors in all Conflicts, before and after 
1945 
 
Although my original hypotheses were not fully supported, the findings of this 
chapter do support the skepticism of the fracture narrative claims on which this 
dissertation is based. This narrative argues that high power actors have shifted their 
justifications in recent decades as the authoritative logic of the state system gradually 
disintegrated. I argued that the authoritative logic of the state system remained strong, but 
that the tendency to see a transformation was in fact evidence of a discursive, rather than 
a logical, shift that was part of a long term trend of the state’s power becoming 
increasingly oriented toward its obligation to the people under its rule. The cases 
examined here did not provide evidence of such a temporal trend. Rather, the evidence 
indicates that another structural or contextual factor is at play, but this factor was not 
accounted for in the current analysis. While this analysis did identify state system 
integration and colonial history variables, particularly in dyadic relational terms, as being 
central driving features of the use of logics of justification, it was not able to identify the 
conditions that drive the discourses of justification. Future research should focus on 
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uncovering these factors to create a fuller theoretical explanation for the use of interest- 
or human-centric discourses.  
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Chapter 6 Group Preservation Frames 
The low consistency scores associated with the causal combinations produced by 
the truth table algorithm for the group preservation frame does not allow me to draw any 
conclusions about the causal factors associated with these frames. Only three conflicts 
within the dataset were calibrated as being mostly or fully in the set of cases 
characterized by the group preservation frame. The current chapter examines these three 
cases in depth to help uncover the conditions that are associated with the use of this 
frame. 
 
The Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years’ War, 1618 
Conflicts between Catholic and Protestant factions had been ongoing across 
Europe for a full century by the time Protestant Bohemian Lords tossed the Catholic 
representatives of Holy Roman Emperor Matthias out the window of the Bohemian 
Chancellery on May 23, 1618. The Bohemian Revolt against the expansion of Catholic 
rights and perceived imposition of Catholic rule over the largely Protestant principality 
reignited the Catholic-Protestant wars of religion that had been previously settled by the 
Peace of Augsburg in 1555. The Holy Roman Empire justified its use of force against the 
Protestant League that arose to support the Bohemian rebels predominantly in terms of 
the need to protect the practice of Catholicism across Europe, citing the divine authority 
of God to maintain peace and order within its kingdoms. Using an exclusively 
humanitarian justice logic and split between human-centric and interest-centric 
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discourses, this case was fully in the set of group preservation frame cases, fully out of 
the power-interests frame set, and neither in nor out of the suffering of innocents and 
protection obligation frames. This case also represents a highly symmetrical, non-power 
divergent conflict between high power actors. The force that backed the Bohemian rebels 
was a coalition of German States, the Protestant Union, which formed in 1608 to counter 
the power of the Catholic League headed by the Holy Roman Empire.   
In the first phase of this long conflict, the Bohemian phase, two documents 
articulate the justifications of the Holy Roman Empire in taking up arms against the 
Bohemian rebels. In an open letter to the Bohemians issued shortly after the 
Defenestration of Prague in May 1618, Holy Roman Emperor Matthias warns the 
Bohemians: 
“If our gracious and paternal warnings and our just orders and instructions 
are ignored and the soldiers and militia are not immediately disbanded in 
the kingdom of Bohemia, we will be obliged to accept that order and 
justice are being disregarded. We will be left no choice, but to take the 
necessary measure to maintain our authority with the help of the Almighty 
by whose grace we are your rightful king and master.” 
Here, Emperor Matthias makes an interest-centric arguing – claiming the need to protect 
the order and justice of the realm – embedded within a humanitarian justice logic, that is, 
invoking the divine authority of God as the basis of the right to use force.   
In the following year, the Holy Roman Empire consolidates its forces against the 
Protestant Union by calling on the Duke of Bavaria to raise a force on behalf of the 
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Catholic League. In the Treaty of Munich, the Duke of Bavaria justifies his use of force 
against the Protestant Union in order “to protect the Catholic religion and all the Estates 
of the Empire loyal to it.” The call for protection invoked here is for a population that is 
non-territorial in nature, that is, the need to protect the Catholic population exists beyond 
the boundaries of any one state.  
Although limited primary documentation is available for this early conflict, the 
documentation that is available indicates that the group preservation frame as it was used 
at the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War was used in the context of divine authority to 
fight for the preservation of a religious group.  
 
Transylvania in the Thirty Years’ War, 1644 
The Principality of Transylvania had been involved on both sides of the Thirty 
Years’ War, first as an ally to the Protestant Union in 1620, then switching sides later that 
year in exchange for Hungarian lands from the Holy Roman Emperor. The Transylvanian 
prince largely stayed out of the conflict for the next 20 years, but tensions grew between 
the prince and the empire as the Hapsburgs attempted to re-Catholicize that had been 
acceded to Transylvania in the 1620 deal. By the 1640s, the Protestants and Catholics 
were in a tenuous stalemate, and the entrance of Transylvania into the conflict on either 
side could tip the balance. When Prince Racokzkie issued a manifesto declaring his 
intentions reenter the war on the side of the Protestant Swedes in 1644, the pamphlet was 
published and distributed across Europe.    
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Much like the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of the conflict in 1618, the 
entrance of the Transylvanians into the war represents a high power, highly symmetric, 
and non-power divergent conflict. The Transylvanian manifesto does, however, provide 
evidence of the shifting conceptions of political authority that would come to characterize 
the state system that would be established in the Westphalian Peace four years later. 
Religious justifications enter prominently into Rocokzkie’s manifesto, but he also cites 
issues related to the power and right to political control of independent states that was 
largely absent from justifications at the beginning of the war. Thus, the Transylvanian 
manifesto exhibits justifications that are mostly in the group preservation set, neither in 
nor out of the power-interests and suffering of innocents sets, and mostly out of the 
protection obligation set.  
Thus, Racokzkie argues that taking up arms is necessary, not only for the “liberty 
of our souls,” speaking in terms of the freedom of religious practice he seeks to 
reestablish, but also for “temporall liberty,” drawing repeated reference to the right of 
Nations to establish “the Statutes and Laws of the Kingdome” as they see fit. The 
authority to establish national political control is still firmly rooted in divine authority, 
however, because “to Domineere and Rule over Consciences doth not belong to men, but 
to God alone.” Racokzkie’s manifesto, however, also exhibits a blending of divine and 
national political authority that was absent from earlier justifications:  
“Our conscience, as also our duty to the glory and service of God, and the 
love and zeale to the Libertie of Our native Country and Nation required 
Us, yea by some of the Protestant States and Peeres also, and not lesse by 
some of the Roman Catholiques, We have beene exhorted upon Our soules 
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salvation, and in a manner beene forced, that for defence of their Liberties 
We would rule.” 
The justification frames invoked by Prince Racokzkie near the end of the Thirty Years’ 
War provide some evidence of the conceptual shifts in political authority that surrounding 
the Westphalian transformation. The group preservation frame that dominated the 
beginning of the Thirty Years’ is still a prominent frame near its conclusion, but shows 
evidence of being integrated with notions of state sovereignty that would characterize the 
political world of Europe after the 1648 Westphalian Peace. 
 
Italy in the Italian-Ethiopian (Abyssinian) War, 1935 
The group preservation frame doesn’t appear as a driving frame again until the 
1935 Italian-Ethiopian (Abyssinian) War. The Italians had been a late-comer to African 
colonization, and by the 1930s Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini was eager to seize any 
opportunity to gain a foothold on the continent and demonstrate Italy’s rising power. Italy 
had fought the Ethiopians before: after seizing control of Somaliland in the 1880s, they 
attempted to establish a protectorate over the Ethiopian empire in 1895 and were 
decisively defeated. Four decades later, Mussolini was determined to make Italy a 
colonial power in Africa through Ethiopia. Branching out from their base in Somaliland, 
the Italians began encroaching on Ethiopian territory, building a fort at the Wal Wal oasis 
well inside Ethiopian territory, leading to a skirmish that led to the deaths of 150 
Ethiopians in December 1934. The Wal Wal incident, and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
that followed in the spring of 1935 proved the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations. 
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Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie appealed emphatically and repeatedly to the League to 
enforce the regulations, particularly Article X regarding aid to member states to defend 
against external aggression. The League’s response was weak, imposing sanctions on 
Italy in November of 1935 only to lift them by the following July. By the spring of 1936, 
the Ethiopian military was defeated and Selassie was driven into exile in England. The 
Italians won control of the Ethiopian kingdom, but their colonial control of the region 
would be relatively short-lived. Mussolini entered WWII on the side of the Axis powers 
in 1940 and Selassie returned to Ethiopia in 1941 to lead the resistance against the Axis 
powers in Africa, who were forced to surrender their positions in North Africa in 1943. 
Haile Selassie returned to power as the emperor of Ethiopia. When Italy formally 
surrendered to the Allied powers in 1947, they were compelled to sign a treaty of peace 
which included a formal recognition of Ethiopia’s independence and a promise to pay 
reparations of $25 million. 
Like the two earlier conflicts detailed above, Italy in the Italian-Ethiopian War 
represents a high power actor in a symmetrical conflict. This conflict occurred at a 
historical moment of transition between the era of national sovereignty that had 
dominated global politics since the middle of the 19th century and the emerging notions 
of supranational authority that would become prevalent after the end of the Second World 
War. 
Italy in the war against Ethiopia represents in an interesting case for a number of 
reasons. Although Ethiopia, as a member of the League of Nations, is coded as a full 
member of the state system without a colonial history at the start of the conflict, it ends 
the conflict as a colonial subject of Italy that is not integrated into the state system. 
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Indeed, the political power of the League of Nations disintegrates in large part because it 
fails in its mission to protect member states from invasion. Thus, although this conflict is 
coded in the data set as a high power, high symmetry, non-power divergent and non-
colonial conflict, this characterization could be reasonably disputed. How well integrated 
into the state system should Ethiopia be considered, if that system failed to come to its 
aid when called upon? Should a conflict be considered colonial if colonial domination 
was a driving motivation in Italy’s aggression, even if Ethiopia had not experienced 
colonial subjugation at the start of the war? In these features, the Italian-Ethiopian War is 
a unique case in this dataset.  
Mussolini’s justifications for war are evident in five documents from the summer 
and fall of 1935; two of these documents are transcripts of speeches given before the 
League of Nations, one speech given to the Italian legislative assembly, one speech 
broadcast to the Italian public, and one publicly issued policy statement. In these 
documents, Mussolini justifies Italian force against the Ethiopian (or Abyssinian) empire 
exclusively in terms of a humanitarian justice logic of justification, with near equal 
invocation of interest-centric and human-centric discourses. Thus, these justifications are 
coded as being mostly in the group preservation set, mostly in the suffering of innocents 
set, and mostly out of the protection obligation and power-interests sets. 
Although Mussolini draws exclusively on humanitarian justice logic of 
justification, this logic looks entirely different from the divine authority arguments 
present in the earlier 17th century conflicts. Rather, Mussolini claims the authority to 
attack based on a natural and geographic authority. In a policy statement issued in August 
1935, Mussolini argues that Italy’s unique position in the Mediterranean imposes upon it 
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both the right and obligation to “civilize Africa.” Mussolini frequently cites Ethiopia’s 
failure to eradicate slavery as evidence of its barbarism and the need for the Euoprean 
“civilizing mission” to spread through Africa. However, he also claims that  
“it is not for [slavery] that Italy is preparing herself for action. The 
abolition of slavery will be only a consequence of the Italian policy…. Not 
even civilization is the object that Italy has in view. Civilization, too, will 
be only a consequence of the Italian policy. The essential arguments, 
absolutely unanswerable, are two: the vital needs of the Italian people and 
their security in East Africa.” 
Italy’s civilizing mission, Mussolini asserts, is not for “territorial conquests” but rather is 
rooted in a “natural expansion which ought to lead to a collaboration between Italy and 
the peoples of Africa, between Italy and the nations of the Near and Middle East.” In 
announcing the war to the Italian people in October, Mussolini again invokes a natural 
right to expansion by claiming that action offers a redress for the Italian people “against 
whom the blackest of all injustices has been committed – that of denying them a place in 
the sun.” 
Mussolini’s justifications for the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia largely invoke a group 
preservation frame, namely the need to spread the Western civilizing mission to Africa 
within an authoritative framework of Italy’s natural right and geographic position. 
However, this frame was intertwined with a number of other justifications, including 
interest-centric discourses regarding Italian security and economic interests, the 
protection obligation Italy owed to its citizens, the suffering of innocent Africans trapped 
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in illegal slavery, and the sovereign right of Italy as “the only judge of her security in 
East Africa.” Thus, although the group preservation frame figures prominently into 
Mussolini’s justifications, this frame is blended with a number of other justifications. 
This complex blending of justifications may reflect the unique status of the case of the 
Italian-Ethiopian War which does not seem to fit neatly into analytical categories.  
 
Conclusion 
The fsQCA results detailed in chapter 4 indicated that the group preservation may 
be associated with high power actors in symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. 
However, the low consistency of the solutions produced by the fuzzy sets analysis did not 
allow me to draw confident conclusions regarding the conditions associated with the use 
of this frame.  
The findings of the case studies in the current chapter supports the fsQCA results 
that the group preservation frame is associated with high power actors in symmetrical, 
non-power divergent conflicts. Table 6.1 summarizes the characteristics of these 
conflicts. With the exception of the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935, this frame appears to 
only be used as a dominant frame in the early era of the state system. Closer examination 
of these cases also reveal that the type of group preservation claims made by Italy in 1935 
are vastly different from the divine-authority invoked in the group preservation frames 
used in the Bohemian and Swedish phases of the Thirty Years’ War. Thus, although the 
fsQCA results did not give a clear indication of how historical era may contribute to the 
use of the group preservation frame, these case studies can allow for some speculation. 
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The group preservation appears more strongly associated with the early era of the state 
system than any subsequent eras. The use of this frame in the 1935 Italian-Ethiopian War 
is associated with the same structural conditions as the earlier wars, namely high power, 
symmetrical, and non-power divergence, however, the type of humanitarian justice logic 
invoked was very different. That is, while the earlier conflicts invoked specific divine 
authority, the logic employed in the 1935 war invoked a more general authority of 
“natural right.”  
Table 6.1 Summary Characteristics of Combatant Actors the Employing Group 
Preservation Frame 
Combatant Holy Roman Empire 
(1618) 
Transylvania (1644) Italy (1935) 
Era Early Westphalian Westphalian Late national into early 
supranational 
Power Integration High power High power High power 
Dyad Characteristics Symmetrical Symmetrical Symmetrical 
Power Dyad Non-divergent Non-divergent Non-divergent 
Colonial 
Characteristics 
None None None, but aspiring 
colonial power 
Group Preservation Fully in Mostly in Mostly in 
Suffering of Innocents Neither in nor out Neither in nor out Mostly in 
Protection Obligation Neither in nor out Neither in nor out Mostly out 
Power-Interests Fully out Mostly out Mostly out 
 
These findings are entirely contradictory to my hypothesis that humanitarian 
justice logics of justification would be employed by high power actors in asymmetrical 
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and/or power divergent conflicts. Given the limited number of cases in which the group 
preservation figures prominently, the fsQCA results and the cases examined here do not 
provide strong evidence of the conditions that drive the use of the group preservation 
frame. However, these results do provide evidence against the just war revival arguments 
that were detailed in chapter 2. 
These findings support the critique offered by this study of just war revival claim. 
These arguments suggest that those justifications characteristic of the early modern 
period have reemerged in recent decades as a result of the fracturing authority of the 
sovereign state system in the face of non-state challengers. The group preservation frame, 
rooted in a humanitarian justice logic and a human-centric discourse, is definitive of 
those early modern, pre-Westphalian justifications described by the just war revival 
arguments. Brown (2010), for example, argues that political authority is currently in the 
process of “migrating from the nation-state to the unrelieved domination of capital and 
God-sanctioned political violence.”   
The findings of both the fsQCA and case study analysis do not support this notion 
of sovereignty shifting from national to divine authority; rather, the group preservation 
frame in which this divine authority is contained appears predominantly in the 
Westphalian era of the state system. Even when invoked in the 1935 Italian-Ethiopian 
War, the logic invoked is not one of “God-sanctioned political violence” but rather of a 
more abstract and general sense of a natural right to determine the justness of war, as well 
as an argument related to geographic convenience. 
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Chapter 7 Fighting for Dignity 
Early in the coding process, I took note of an apparent association between low 
power actors and the use of discourses related to the dignity and humiliation of the 
population represented by the combatant group that was not present among high power 
actors. A fuzzy sets analysis of the conditions that contribute to the use of this discourse 
yielded a parsimonious solution of: 
1. colonized 
2. colonial dyad 
These solutions indicated that being a colonial subject and being in conflict with 
another actor with whom the combatant shares a colonial relationship are the driving 
factors contributing to the use of dignity as a justification discourse. However, the 
consistency scores of these solutions are far too low (<0.60) to draw conclusions with any 
confidence. 
To explore how state system integration and colonial history characteristics may 
contribute to the  use of dignity claims in justifications for war, I calculated the average 
number of dignity claims made among each of the combatants within the variable 
categories. That is, the number of dignity codes within the total number of discursive 
codes for each type of combatant. 
Fully non-state actors were more likely to employ dignity claims in justifying war 
than fully state actors (figure 7.1). Actors that were fully integrated into the state system 
employed dignity claims on an average of 1.4 times per combatant case, while fully non-
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state actors employed actors on average 2.3 times per case. However, dignity claims were 
most likely to appear among mostly or partially non-state actors (4.5 times per case) and 
least likely to appear among mostly or partially state actors (less than one claim per case 
on average). 
 
The difference in use of dignity claims within symmetrical and asymmetrical 
conflicts is far less pronounced (figure 7.2). Combatants within fully asymmetrical 
conflicts were 1.6 times more likely to employ dignity claims than combatants within 
fully symmetrical conflicts. There was little difference between the use of dignity claims 
among mostly or partially asymmetrical and mostly or partially symmetrical conflicts.   
The most striking patterns, however, when examining the use of dignity claims by 
colonial history of the combatants. Figure 7.3 demonstrates a steady increase in the 
average use of dignity claims by colonial subject status as well as the time between the 
end of that colonial subjugation and the start of the conflict. Combatants who have never 
been colonial subjects or whose colonial experience ended more than a century prior to 







Fully non-state Mostly or partially non-
state 
Mostly or partially state Fully state 
Figure 7.1. Average Dignity Claims by Level of State Integration 
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case. These claims rise to an average of 2.0 per case when the combatant was a colonial 
subject between 51 and 100 years prior to the start of the conflict, 2.3 times per case 
when the combatant was a colonial subject within 50 years prior to the start of the 
















Fully asymmetrical Mostly or partially 
asymmetrical 
Mostly or partially 
symmetrical 
Fully symmetrical 











more than 100 years 
ago or never 
Colonial subject 
51-100  years ago 
Colonial subject 
within past 50 years 
Colonial subject at 
start of conflict 
Figure 7.3. Average Dignity Claims by Colonial Subject History 
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Because those who are colonial subjects at the start of a conflict are likely to be in 
anti-colonial struggles against their colonial masters, whereas those who have a recent or 
distant history of colonial subjugation may be in conflict with any other type of actor, it is 
important to look at the impact of the colonial relationship between the conflict dyad. 
Figure 7.4 displays the average number of dignity claims by the colonial status of the 
conflict dyad. Dignity claims were 1.5 times more likely to be invoked in conflicts 
involving combatants who were in a colonial relationship at the start of the conflict than 
in those conflicts in which the combatant dyad had no colonial relationship or those 
whose relationship ended more than a century prior to the start of the conflict. 
Interestingly however, dignity claims were least likely to be employed in conflicts in 
which there was a colonial relationship between the dyad within the past century.15  
 
Taken together, counts of the average use of justifications for war related to the 
dignity and perceived humiliation reveal interesting associations with the state integration 
and colonial history of the central combatants. Those who have experienced exclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Because of the low frequency of conflicts in which the central combatants shared a past colonial history 
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Figure 7.4. Average Dignity Claims by Colonial Dyad Status 
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from the state system appear far more likely to employ dignity claims than those who are 
well integrated into the state system. In particular, dignity claims are most likely to be 
employed by those who have a low level of integration within the state system but are not 
entirely excluded from it, for example, those who receive meaningful support from 
another member of the state system. In addition, the power dynamics between the central 
combatants also appear to play a role in influencing the use of dignity as a justification 
for war. Dignity claims were more common among fully asymmetrical conflicts than 
among symmetrical conflicts, and more common within conflicts in which the combatant 
dyad is in a colonial relationship at the start of conflict than in conflicts in which a 
colonial relationship existed between the dyad in the past or never existed. 
To further explore how state system integration and colonial history dynamics 
impact the use of dignity as a justification frame, I explore three cases in which this 
frame was most prevalent: The Algerian Revolution of 1954, the Second Intifada of 
2000, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq of 2003. These three cases are among the five cases in 
the dataset with the highest prevalence of dignity claims. Examining these three cases in 
depth allows us to explore how state system integration characteristics and colonial 
history impact the use of dignity as a justification for war. As outlined in table 7.4, these 
cases vary in terms of state system membership and dyad symmetry, and exhibit different 
patterns of colonial relationships. Two other cases that had similarly high prevalence of 
dignity claims that are not examined in depth here were Iran in the 1980 Iran-Iraq War 
and ZANU in the 1964 Zimbabwean/Rhodesian Bush War. The case of Iran in the 1980 
Iran-Iraq war exhibits state system and colonial history characteristics (in terms of their 
definitions here) that are identical to the 2003 U.S. Iraq War (both state members, 
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symmetrical conflict, with no dyadic colonial relationship, with Iraq having a past history 
as a colonial subject), while ZANU in the 1964 Zimbabwean/Rhodesian Bush War 
exhibits identical characteristics to Hamas in the Second Intifada (mostly non-state, 
mostly asymmetrical, with no dyadic colonial history but a history as a colonial 
subject).16  
Table 7.1. Dignity Case Study Characteristics 
Combatant State System 
Membership 




Algerian FLN Fully non-state Fully asymmetrical Colonial subject at 
start of conflict 
Colonial 
relationship at start 
of conflict 












Algerian Revolution, 1954  
Algeria had been occupied as a French colonial possession since the 1830s; 
however, since 1848 it held a unique status as “an integral part of France.” Many 
Algerians fought for France during both the First and Second World Wars, and these 
experiences contributed to a growing sense of nationalism and a desire for independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The Zimbabwean/Rhodesian Bush War presents an interesting case because although the Zimbabweans 
were not directly colonized by the Rhodesian government at the time of the start of the conflict, both sides 
considered themselves to have been past colonial subjects to the British government. While the white 
Rhodesians saw themselves as resisting the influence of their former British imperial masters, the black 
Zimbabweans viewed the white Rhodesians as the “settler government” that was imposing a racist, imperial 
inspired regime upon the native Zimbabweans. This is a rather unique dynamic within the dataset, and one 
that I hope to explore further in future research.  
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national sovereignty among many Algerian intellectuals. After WWII, France extended 
citizenship to all Algerians, further contributing to the sense among some Algerian 
nationalists that an independent Algerian identity would be increasingly difficult to 
distinguish from that of France. Uprisings and protests against the French colonial 
authority had occurred sporadically throughout the 1920s and 1930s, but it was with the 
1954 foundation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and its armed wing, the National 
Liberation Army, that the movement exploded into a full-scale civil war. On November 
1, 1954, the FLN issued a proclamation calling for the restoration of Algerian sovereignty 
and democracy within an Islamic framework and launched a series of attacks across 
Algeria, many against civilian targets. 
In the FLN’s primary publication, El Moudjahid, the group cites the profaning of 
religious values, the economic and political exploitation of France’s colonial government, 
and the violation of its cultural dignity as a central motivation for the conflict:  
“It just so happens that Islam was in Algeria the last refuge of these values 
hounded and profaned by an outrageous colonialism. Is there any reason 
then to be surprised that, in recovering a national consciousness, it 
contributes to the victory of a just cause?.... That said, we must add that a 
war can never be holy enough against a colonial regime which after a 
cowardly aggression in 1830 has, for the past 125 years, tried to 
exterminate the Algerian people and, not being able to do so, has worked 
to despoil it and exploit it to the extreme, to maintain it in fetters, in an 
iron collar of political domination, to systematically violate its language, 
its religion, its traditions.” 
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The language of the indignities of slavery, such as the “fetters” and the “iron collar of 
political domination” imposed by the colonial power, are common across these 
justifications. It was not only native Algerians who cited the indignities of colonial 
subjugation; Henri Mailloit, a French Algerian military commander, famously deserted 
his unit in April, 1956, to join the FLN, taking a truck load of weapons and ammunition 
with him. In an open letter published shortly thereafter, Mailloit justified his actions by 
saying, 
“I consider Algeria to be my homeland. I feel that I should have the same 
obligations towards it as all of its children. At a moment when the 
Algerian people has risen up to free its soil from the colonialist yoke, my 
place is at the side of those who have taken up the fight for 
liberation….The Algerian people, so long scorned and humiliated, has 
taken its place in the great historic movement for the liberation of colonial 
peoples which has set Africa and Asia ablaze.” 
The FLN further appealed to European Algerians in October, 1957, arguing that the 
responsibility for “this cruel war” lies with  
“those who, after having conquered a land that didn’t belong to them, have 
spent 127 years enslaving its people, degrading them, ridiculing them, 
refusing them any kind of dignity, sabotaging the few laws grudgingly 
granted by Paris, shamefully falsifying elections, refusing the most 
rudimentary instruction to the majority of Algerian children, denying all 
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official rights to the Arabic language, and keeping the majority of 
Algerians in the most atrocious poverty.” 
The justifications employed by the Algerian revolutionaries against the French colonial 
government make clear that the nature of colonialism, its economic exploitation, its 
violation of cultural and religious values, and its imposition of oppressive laws against 
the Algerian people, are a central motivation and justification for waging violence. The 
dynamics of colonialism are repeatedly presented in terms of the humiliation it imposes 
upon colonized people, and a fundamental right to human dignity is presented as a just 
cause of war.  
 
Second Intifada, 2000 
The long-standing tensions between Palestinian and Israeli leaders flared up once 
again into full-scale violence in the fall of 2000. Tensions in the region were already high 
as a result of the failed Camp David summit negotiations in July, and these tensions were 
further inflamed when Ariel Sharon, then a candidate for Israel’s prime minister, entered 
the Temple Mount on September 28 with 1,000 guards. The Temple Mount, an area 
sacred to Jews, is located on the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, an area sacred to Muslims. 
Palestinian protestors interpreted Sharon’s speech at the Temple Mount as an act of 
provocation surrounded the area and clashed with Israeli police. The militant group 
Hamas called for an Intifada, or armed uprising, against Israeli occupation of the region.  
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The area known as Palestine came under British administration in 1920, carved 
out of an Ottoman administered region in the aftermath of World War I. After the Second 
World War, the British administration, in conjunction with American and European 
allies, worked to implement the creation of an Israeli state. Designating a colonial subject 
and colonial history status for Palestine is rather complicated. From the perspective of 
Muslim Palestinians, the area has been and remains a colonial subject of Israeli Zionist 
imperialism. From the perspective of Israel and its American and British allies, however, 
Palestine at the time of the Intifada had full civil autonomy while remaining under Israeli 
military control. Hamas emerged as a militant resistance movement in 1987, claiming to 
represent the Palestinian people and their fight for full independence. 
Claims to be acting in defense of Palestinian dignity and to counter the 
humiliation of occupation were repeatedly cited by Hamas’ frequent proclamations. In all 
of the Hamas proclamations, some statement of Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa as being a 
“declaration of war against our nation and its religion and dignity” is made. In a 
statement issued October 1, 2000, Hamas claims, 
“O our steadfast Palestinian people: The intifadah of the blessed Al-Aqsa 
Mosque will continue and persist and escalate to prove to the whole world 
that our people have not become tired or weakened and will not surrender 
to humiliation, oppression and occupation. This intifadah will also prove 
that our people have been and will continue to be able to offer resistance 
and sacrifices, confront the barbarism of the Jewish occupiers and their 
covetous ambitions and oppression, and defend Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque.” 
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In a statement issued a week later, Hamas expresses resistance to negotiating a 
peaceful settlement as a humiliation: 
“We urge the anticipated Arab summit to be a summit for Al-Aqsa, 
jihad, resistance, and building a real Arab strategy to repulse the 
occupiers and save Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and Palestine from 
them, rather than issuing statements of condemnation and giving new 
chances for the humiliating peace process.” 
Much like the case of the FLN in Algeria, the Hamas militant organization of Palestine 
justifies their violent actions in terms of the past humiliations of occupation and in terms 
of the necessity of protecting the dignity of their people. 
 
The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003 
Just over a year after attacking the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 
response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, American president George W. 
Bush began arguing for the need to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power 
to in an effort combat anti-American terrorism around the world. The negotiations that 
ended the war between the U.S. and Iraq in 1991 had set up a U.N. backed system for 
preventing Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction. Armed with evidence that 
Iraq was developing banned weapons the Bush administration petitioned the U.N. to 
authorize the use of force to remove Hussein from power. The U.N. refused to authorize 
the American-led war, but Bush presented Hussein with an ultimatum and assembled a 
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coalition of 46 countries (although Britain, Australia, and Poland sent the vast majority of 
manpower) to take part in the invasion. The invasion of Iraq commenced on March 19, 
2003. 
Although Iraq was a full member of the state system at the start of the invasion, 
and its history as a British colonial subject had ended 71 years prior to the 2003 invasion, 
Iraq’s status as a former colonial subject informed its justifications for responding to the 
U.S. ultimatum with a call for war, rather than submitting to U.S. demands for full 
weapons inspections. In an interview with a British journalist six weeks before the 
commencement of the joint U.S.-British invasion, Hussein responded to a question about 
how he would respond to those who wished for peace: 
“Tell the British people if the Iraqis are subjected to aggression or 
humiliation they would fight bravely. Just as the British people did in the 
Second World War and we will defend our country as they defended their 
country each in its own way. The Iraqis don’t wish war but if war is 
imposed upon them – if they are attacked and insulted – they will defend 
themselves.” In an interview with Dan Rather three weeks later, Hussein 
further emphasized that “we must defend ourselves, and defend our right 
to dignity, and to live in peace and to live in dignity and freedom.”  
Hussein further cited dignity in a televised address to the Iraqi people as the invasion 
commenced on March 24:  
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“O brothers, you know that our country’s policy is to avoid evil. But when 
evil comes, armed with deceit and destruction, we must face them with 
faith and holy struggle in a manner which dignifies us and satisfies God.” 
Despite the relatively long historical distance between the end of the colonial period in 
Iraq, and despite Iraq’s full integration into the state system, dignity and the perceived 
humiliation being brought against Iraq  by the U.S.-led coalition formed a central theme 
in Hussein’s justifications for fighting back.  
 
Conclusion 
 The three cases presented above indicate that while power divergence in terms of 
state system integration between the combatants may influence the use of dignity as a 
justification frame, it appears as if having a history of being a colonial subject is a driving 
condition in influencing the use of dignity as a justification frame.  
This finding calls into question the nature, or perhaps very existence of, the 
perceived threat to the authority of the state system. As outlined above, political 
scholarship in the post-Cold War, and particularly in the post-9/11, eras have been 
dominated by fears that the sovereign state system is under threat by non-state 
challengers who seek to dismantle its authority. The language used to justify war has 
been cited as evidence of this dangerous transformation, suggesting that states have had 
to reformulate their language for waging war as non-state challengers have rendered 
previous formulations obsolete (Falk 2002, Lawler 2004). The relational ontology 
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employed by this study challenges this vision, however. The sovereign state system has 
been experienced as a system of protection and security for much of the world for 
hundreds of years, and the erosion of its authority would pose danger to millions. 
However, it is also essential to realize that the safety and security offered by this system 
is not experienced equally. For the majority of the world’s population, the power and 
authority of the state system has been experienced through colonial exploitation. By 
employing language related to dignity and humiliation, formerly colonized groups are not 
necessarily challenging or rejecting the authority of the state system. Rather, they seek to 
claim the dignity and privilege that being integrated into and a beneficiary of such a 
system confers.  
In addition to the theoretical implications of these findings, this study offers 
insight into potential avenues for conflict resolution among actors with different levels of 
power and integration within the state system. The justifications highlighted above give 
us insight into the emotional context that surrounds many current conflicts. While those 
who have high levels of power and integration within the state system see the non-state 
challenge as a threat to global security and the protection offered by the state system, 
those who have low levels of power integration and who have histories as colonial 
subjects see that same system as a source of exploitation and humiliation. This disconnect 
creates a significant barrier in negotiating peace. This barrier becomes further entrenched 
when non-state combatants are labeled as terrorist organizations with which opponents 
within the state system refuse to negotiate. Refusal to acknowledge the position of these 
actors as advocating for the needs of the people they perceive themselves as representing 
further entrenches this hatred. Understanding the link between colonial history and the 
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emotional language used to justify war carries implications for conflict resolution 
between high and low power actors. These implications are further discussed in the 
following concluding chapter.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to answer two questions. First, drawing from a body of 
scholarship in recent decades which has problematized the threat of non-state combatants 
to the continuing dominance of state sovereignty as the prevailing form of legitimate 
political authority, I asked to what extent do justifications for war-making in the post-
Cold War reflect a fundamental transformation in conceptions of political authority? 
Second, drawing from post-colonial and critical race critiques of the study of the state, I 
asked which constellations of conditions related to the power status and state system 
integration of combatant actors were associated with the use of particular logical and 
discursive frameworks to justify war-making? 
Employing post-colonial and critical race perspectives, I critiqued the fracture 
narrative, arguing that the tendency to see a recent transformation in the language of war 
was due to both theoretical and empirical misconceptions. Theoretically, the 
characterization of the threat of non-state combatants to the authority of the state system 
within the fracture narrative neglects the impact of power relations between those who 
hold privilege within the state system and those who are excluded from accessing its 
benefits. Empirically, there has been an absence of systematic study of the language used 
to justify war in way that is both historically and geographically broad. It is one thing to 
argue that non-state combatants pose a challenge to the authority of the state system, it is 
quite another to suggest that this challenge is somehow fundamentally different or more 
serious now than in the past. Drawing from a previously developed scheme of 
justification frameworks (Clever 2012), I argued that one likely explanation for the 
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tendency to see a transformation in the language of war was due to a shift from interest-
centric to human-centric language over the course of the state system, as political 
authority became increasingly oriented toward human rights. Because human-centric 
discourses can be made within a sovereign rights logic of justification, I argued that 
improving the conceptual clarity with which justifications for war are analyzed can give 
insight into the extent to which the apparent transformations of the state system can be 
characterized as logical in nature, that is, a transformation in the fundamental political 
authority of the system, or rather is discursive in nature, that is, a transformation in the 
orientation of that authority. 
My theoretical approach, employing a relational ontology challenges the fracture 
narrative. I predicted that high power and low power actors would employ different 
justifications frames depending on the combatant structural and historical context that 
surrounds the conflicts. I expected that in conflicts in which the relations of power 
between the main combatant actors were highly divergent and/or highly asymmetrical, 
high power actors would employ a humanitarian logic of justification while low power 
actors will employ a sovereign rights logic of justification. I expected this pattern to 
occur because the sovereign state system is a system of political power which confers 
privilege on those who are highly integrated into its structure, and disadvantages to those 
who are excluded from it. Those who are excluded seek to invoke the rules of that system 
in order to stake claim to its privileges, while those who benefit from the system shift 
focus toward justifications that lay outside the rules of the system, as if to refuse to allow 
those who threaten that privileged status to play by the set of rules that grants them that 
privilege. However, if both combatants hold privileged status within the system of states, 
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sovereignist logics will be most prevalent among both actors, since both seek to assert 
their privilege most strongly. While this balance fluctuates between humanitarian and 
sovereignist logics dependent upon the divergence in power-integration, I expected that 
discourses of justification would show an increasing trend in prevalence towards human-
centric justifications over the course of time, because each era in the transformation of 
political authority has become successively more oriented toward human rights. 
Fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative analysis was used to determine the 
constellations of conditions that drive the use of particular justification frames. This 
analysis largely supported my hypotheses regarding sovereign rights logics of 
justification, but provided limited evidence regarding humanitarian justice logics of 
justification. I hypothesized that a sovereign rights logic of justification would be 
employed as a primary logic of justification by high power actors in symmetrical and/or 
non-power divergent conflicts and by low power actors in asymmetrical and/or power 
divergent conflicts. This hypothesis was supported by the fsQCA results with a high 
frequency and consistency threshold; both the power-interests and protection obligation 
frames were used by high power actors in symmetrical/non-power divergent conflicts and 
used by low power actors in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts.  
I also hypothesized that a humanitarian justice logic of justification would be 
employed as a primary justification by high power actors in asymmetrical/power 
divergent conflicts while low power actors would not employ this logic as a primary 
justification. The fsQCA results were inconclusive in specifying the conditions that 
contribute to the use of these frames. The solutions produced by the fuzzy sets analysis 
indicated that the group preservation frame was employed in a very different context than 
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my theory predicted: by high power actors in symmetrical conflicts. However, the low 
consistency threshold associated with this solution makes it impossible to draw 
conclusions with any confidence. The suffering of innocents frame did not reveal any 
logically consistent solutions to indicate the conditions that drive the use of this frame. 
Because of the rarity with which these frames emerge as dominant, including more cases 
in the dataset may help to provide insight into the conditions that drive their use. 
Although the fsQCA results could not give insight into the conditional configurations that 
contribute to the use of the group preservation or suffering of innocents frames, this lack 
of a finding does provide useful information to contribute to this dissertation’s critique of 
the just war revival and fracture narrative. Very few cases exhibited a strongly 
humanitarian logic of justification; however, fracture narrative claims are premised on the 
notion that the reemergence of this just war language, the language that was characteristic 
of early modern Europe before the Westphalian transformation. The evidence provided 
here indicates that the humanitarian justice logic of justification is employed consistently 
as a secondary frame throughout the history of the state system, but only emerges as a 
dominant frame in a very small number of cases, mostly occurring at the very early stages 
of the state system. There is no evidence that these frames have made a resurgence in 
recent decades. 
Finally, I hypothesized that within both types of justification logics, human-
centric discourses within a sovereign rights logic of justification would become 
increasingly more prevalent over time. This hypothesis was not supported. By examining 
three cases of high power, symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts at three points in 
time in chapter 5, I sought to understand the extent to which a discursive transformation 
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may have, or have not, occurred. These case studies revealed no discernable temporal 
trend, suggesting that the factors that influence the use of human- or interest-centric 
discourses must be structural or contextual in nature. The fsQCA results did not point to 
power integration, dyad symmetry, colonial power/subject history, or colonial 
relationships factors influencing the use of discourses of justification. Therefore, the 
conditions that drive the use of human- or interest-centric discourses must be outside of 
the score of variables considered by this study. This suggests that future research should 
examine a broader range of factors than those considered in the current study.  
Although several of my hypotheses were not supported, the finding that low 
power actors invoke sovereign rights logics of justification when in conflict with high 
power actors provides support for the theoretical expectation that relations of power 
between combatant actors, defined in terms of state system integration and colonial 
history, influence the language these actors use to justify war. Because these justifications 
are reflections of conceptions of legitimate political authority, this finding also provides 
evidence against the claims of the fracture narrative. Rather than non-state actors 
challenging the authoritative logic underlying the sovereign state system, their use of 
sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts 
indicates a desire to access the benefits and privileges of that system. When interpreted 
through a post-colonial and critical race lens, we can understand these claims as 
challenging their exclusion from the system, an exclusion that for much of the world was 
rooted in a legacy of racialized colonial subjugation. Just war revival claims have argued 
that states have had to alter the language of justification in response to the challenge of 
non-state actors; these findings provide limited support for that assertion. High power 
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actors were shown to use sovereign rights logics of justification in symmetrical/non-
power divergent conflicts, however, the fsQCA results provided no evidence of the 
frames that are employed by high power actors in asymmetrical/power divergent 
conflicts.  
Thus, it may be the case that high power actors have altered the language they use 
in wars against low power actors because of the challenge posed by non-state actors, 
however, I argue that the reasons for this shift in language is not occurring because the 
old rules of the system no longer apply, as asserted by the just war revival claims. Rather, 
in the context of the finding that low power actors invoke sovereign rights logics of 
justification in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts, the absence of sovereign rights 
logics among high power actors in these conflicts would indicate that high power actors 
are reacting to the challenge of exclusion posed by low power actors. By not using 
sovereign rights logics of justification in these conflicts, high power actors are refusing to 
allow those who threaten their privileged status play by the same set of rules that grants 
them that privilege.  
Theoretically, these findings provide support for the relational ontology advocated 
by Go (2013) and other recent post-colonial theorists, and calls into question the nature, 
or perhaps the very existence of, the perceived threat to the authority of the state system. 
The fracture narrative, which has dominated political scholarship in the post-Cold War, 
and particularly in the post-9/11, eras have been dominated by fears that the sovereign 
state system is under threat by non-state challengers who seek to dismantle its authority. 
The language used to justify war has been cited as evidence of this dangerous 
transformation, suggesting that states have had to reformulate their language of waging 
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war as non-state challengers have rendered previous formulations obsolete (Falk 2002, 
Lawler 2004). The relational ontology employed by this study challenges this vision, 
however. The findings highlighted here support the preliminary findings of Clever (2012) 
that states are not eschewing sovereignist frameworks in the face of non-state challengers 
because the authoritative logic of the sovereign rights system is fracturing. Rather, this 
study uncovered evidence that it is relations of power, embedded in a state system that 
developed through imperial conquest and colonial domination, which drive the use of 
justification frames. The evidence indicates that low power actors may in fact threaten the 
stability of the sovereign state system, but not in the manner characterized by the fracture 
narrative. The threat is not to the authoritative logic of the system, but rather to the 
uneven distribution of the powers and privileges of that system that stems from a legacy 
of colonization, which produced lasting divisions in power. 
The sovereign state system has been experienced as a system of protection and 
security for much of the world for hundreds of years, and the erosion of its authority 
would pose danger to millions. However, it is also essential to realize that the safety and 
security offered by this system is not experienced equally. For the majority of the world’s 
population, the power and authority of the state system has been experienced through 
violence and colonial exploitation. The impact of the colonial legacy was further 
explored in chapter 7, in which I examined the factors that contributed to one specific 
justification discourse: dignity. By employing language related to dignity and 
humiliation, formerly colonized groups are not necessarily challenging or rejecting the 
authority of the state system. Rather, they seek to claim the dignity and privilege that 
being integrated into and a beneficiary of such a system confers. 
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These findings carry implications for conflict resolution. Because divisions in 
power between actors produce different understandings of when war is appropriate and 
actionable, diplomatic efforts can focus on bridging these gaps in understanding by 
acknowledging the benefits that being integrated into the state system offers high power 
actors, and by acknowledging the resentment that exclusion from that system creates 
among low power actors. This was the strategy employed by Greek Foreign Minister (and 
later Prime Minister) George Papandreou in mediating long-standing tensions between 
Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s. Disagreements over sovereignty and natural 
resources between the two countries, along with a long history of distrust deeply 
embedded within both cultures, brought the two countries to the brink of armed conflict 
in 1999. Tensions began to dissolve, however, when foreign minister Papandreou went to 
Turkey and offered to support Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union, and 
began to publicly talk about the benefits of a shared future between Greece and Turkey 
(Vedantam 2013).  
Understanding how exclusions from systems of power in general, and the legacy 
of colonialism in particular, as having a lasting impact on the emotional language used to 
justify war supports the restorative justice approach to conflict resolution. Restorative 
justice programs as applied to civil and international violence have been typically used 
with the objective of resolving ethnic, inter-communal, and cultural hatreds that stem 
from protracted conflict and human rights violations (Avruch & Vejarano 2001). 
Typically these programs are implemented by governments or international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, in countries experiencing a tenuous post-
conflict transition, for example in South Africa, Guatemala, and East Timor. Employing a 
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reconciliation framework, restorative justice programs seek to bridge community divides 
created by the conflict by allowing the perpetrators and victims of violence to openly 
discuss and confront the emotional legacy of the conflict. Although meeting with varying 
degrees of success (Hayner 1994), such programs have been shown to be largely effective 
in dissolving tensions and promoting lasting peace among both civil and international 
conflicts when reconciliation events lead to the redefinition of identities and partial 
justice to address wrong-doings; that is “reconciliation occurs when shame and anger that 
often lead to aggression or a desire for revenge are superceded by a different emotive and 
cognitive path—empathy and desire for affiliation” (Long & Brecke 2003: 28). Long and 
Brecke (2003) argue that by integrating emotion into the conflict resolution process, 
previously antagonistic groups are able to redefine their identities away from “us-them” 
and toward a super-ordinate national or international identity within which all parties are 
included and all parties have a stake in maintaining.  
Building effective strategies for negotiating and maintaining lasting peace in 
conflicts involving non-state combatants will require addressing the legacy of colonial 
subjugation and the ongoing exclusion from the state system that is experienced by these 
groups. Diplomatic efforts can focus on bridging these gaps in understanding by 
acknowledging the benefits that being integrated into the state system offers high power 
actors, the privileges that former colonial powers continue to enjoy because of colonial 
exploitation, and by acknowledging the resentment that exclusion from that this system 
has created among those who have experienced colonial subjugation or otherwise have 
been excluded from the state system. 
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For those who operate from the vantage of being the beneficiaries of a system of 
power, it can be difficult to understand how exclusion from such a system can be 
experienced as both hatred and envy, a desire to destroy the system while simultaneously 
desiring to be part of it. The complex results of this study highlight the Janus-faced nature 
of this relationship and emphasize the importance of putting the dynamics of power and 
exclusion in conversation with one another to better understand the nature of conflict and 




Appendix Table 1. Case Selection 
Combatant Name War Name Year 
Initiated 
War Type Geographic Area 
Ming Dynasty Ming Conquest 1618 External Asia 
Holy Roman Empire Thirty Years’ War 
(Bohemian Phase) 
1618 External Europe 
Protestant Union Thirty Years’ War 
(Bohemian Phase) 
1618 External Europe 
Denmark Thirty Years’ War 
(Danish Phase) 
1625 External Europe 
Sweden Thirty Years’ War 
(Swedish Phase) 
1630 External Europe 
Holy Roman Empire Thirty Years’ War 
(Swedish Phase) 
1630 External Europe 
Transylvania Thirty Years’ War 
(Swedish Phase) 
1630 External Europe 
Tokugawa Shogunate Shimabara Revolt 1637 Internal 
separatist 
Asia 
Shimabara Christians Shimabara Revolt 1637 Internal 
separatist 
Asia 













Bacon’s Rebellion 1676 Internal 
separatist 
Americas 
Ottoman Empire Siege of Vienna 1683 External Asia 
Brandenburg 
Monarchy (Prussia) 
War of Austrian 
Succession 
1740 External Europe 
Hapsburg Monarchy 
(Austria) 
War of Austrian 
Succession 
1740 External Europe 
Great Britain Seven Years’ War 
(European Theater) 
1756 External Europe 
Continental Congress American Revolution 1774 Internal 
separatist  
Americas 
Great Britain American Revolution 1774 Internal 
separatist  
Americas 
Haitian Slaves Haitian Revolution 1791 Internal 
separatist  
Americas 
Haitian Mulattoes Haitian Revolution 1791 Internal 
separatist  
Americas 
Haitian Planters and 
Merchants 




(HRE, Prussia, Great 
European Wars of the 
French Revolution 
1792 External Europe 
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Britain) 
French Republic European Wars of the 
French Revolution 
1792 External Europe 
Spain Peninsular War 1808 External Europe 
France Peninsular War 1808 External Europe 
Great Britain Ashanti War 1824 External Europe 
Peru-Bolivia 
Confederation 
War of the Confederation 1836 External Americas 
Chile-Peru 
Restoration Army 
War of the Confederation 1836 External Americas 
China First Opium War 1839 External Asia 




French Revolution of 
1848 



















Taiping rebels Taiping Rebellion 1850 Internal 
separatist 
Asia 








France Franco-Prussian War 1870 External Europe 
Prussia Franco-Prussian War 1870 External Europe 
Great Britain Third Ashanti War 
(Sargenti War) 
1873 External Africa 




Boer War 1898 External Africa 
Great Britain/South 
African Uitlanders 
Boer War 1898 External Africa 




















World War I 1914 External Europe 
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Germany World War I 1914 External Europe 
France World War I 1914 External Europe 




Russian Civil War 
(October Revolution) 







Russian Civil War 
(October Revolution) 




Italy Italo-Ethiopian War 1935 External Africa 
Ethiopia Italo-Ethiopian War 1935 External Africa 
Spanish Republic 
(Popular Front) 










Japan Sino-Japanese War 1937 External Asia 
China Sino-Japanese War 1937 External Asia 
Great Britain World War II 1940 External Europe 
Germany World War II 1940 External Europe 
Chinese Nationalists 
(KMT) 

















Algerian Revolution 1954 Internal 
separatist 
Africa 
France Algerian Revolution 1954 Internal 
separatist 
Africa 












Soviet Union Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia 
1968 External Europe 
Iraq First Persian Gulf War 1980 External Asia 
Iran First Persian Gulf War 1980 External Asia 
Great Britain Falklands/Malvinas War 1982 External Americas 
Argentina Falklands/Malvinas War 1982 External Americas 










Abkhazian separatists Abkhazian War 1992 Internal 
separatist 
Europe 





Chiapas Uprising 1994 Internal 
separatist 
Americas 
Mexico Chiapas Uprising 1994 Internal 
separatist 
Americas 
Ecuador Alto Cenepa War 1995 External Americas 
Peru Alto Cenepa War 1995 External Americas 
Eritrea Badme Border War 1998 External Africa 
Ethiopia Badme Border War 1998 External Africa 
Hamas Second Intifada 2000 Internal 
separatist 
Asia 
Israel Second Intifada 2000 Internal 
separatist 
Asia 
United States Iraq War 2003 External Asia 
Iraq Iraq War 2003 External Asia 
Russia South Ossetian War 2008 External Europe 




Appendix Table 2. Coding Schemes by Round of Coding 
First Round Codes Second Round Codes Third Round Codes Fourth Round Codes 
Open coding Consolidation of 
similar first round 
codes, identification of 
discourses and logics of 
justification 
Consistency check of 
second round coding, 
minor consolidation of 
similar codes 
Consistency check of 
third round coding  






Authority by popular 
assent/popular 
sovereignty 
Authority by state 
sovereignty 


















Disc: civilizing mission 







Disc: obligation to 
homeland 
Disc: obligation to 
individual ruler/safety 
































































































No cause for rebellion 
Obligation from citizens 
to government 
Obligation to allies 
Obligation to defend 
territory 
Obligation to individual 
under protection 





































































































Obligation to own 
citizens/subjects 
Obligation to protect 
government body 
Obligation to protect 
homeland 
Obligation to protect 
kingdom/monarch 




Obligation to uphold 
international law 
Obligation to protect 
external/international 






































Protect safety of other 
nation 
Protect safety of own 
territory/state/polity 




























Suffering of innocents 
Suffering of 
subjects/citizens 






























Violation of national 
sovereignty 
Violation of popular 
sovereignty 
Violation of religion 
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